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GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Amidst increasingly global competition during the last decades, we witnessed a sharp 
increase in interfirm cooperation. As a result, various forms of interfirm cooperation, joint 
ventures (JVs) in particular, have aroused considerable enthusiasm in recent years among 
scholars and practitioners (Contractor and Lorange, 2002). I define JVs as equity-based 
collaborative arrangements whereby two or more organizations each contribute resources, 
including equity, for the joint pursuit of economic goals (Martin and Salomon, 2003b). 
Despite their popularity, JVs have led to a great deal of controversy as they often are 
unstable or fail to live up to their expectations (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Hence, there 
remains a clear need to study in more detail how firms can make their JVs live up to their 
expectations. In this dissertation, I aim to improve our understanding of JVs by looking at 
several major stages of the life-cycle of a JV. I am particularly interested in JV formation, 
stability and performance. By considering these JV stages side-by-side, I can raise several 
new issues which have not been addressed and can only be addressed by more integrative 
research. Namely, it allows me to compare arguments and variables used to explain different 
JV stages, and to assess whether certain factors have a different effect in one stage than in 
another stage. 
More specifically, this dissertation consists of four studies in which I examine the 
roles of different types of uncertainty and experience on the successive stages in the lifecycle 
of a JV. In these studies, I respectively look at JV formation (chapters 2 & 3), changes in JV 




do so, I draw on several theoretical perspectives including real option theory, learning theory 
and transaction cost theory. I aim to contribute to the existing literature by resolving some of 
the apparent contradictions between these theories. More specifically, I aim to refine them 
and to specify their boundary conditions more accurately. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, SEQUENCE AND KEY FINDINGS 
Although each of the four essays in this dissertation has its own specific research 
question, I aim to address a broader overarching research question: 
 
How do different types of uncertainty and experience influence joint venture 
formation, stability and performance? 
 
In an ever more competitive world managers are increasingly confronted with a 
variety of sources of uncertainty (Miller, 1993). At the same time, they are pushed to learn 
from their experiences in order to remain competitive (Barkema, Baum and Mannix, 2002). 
Accordingly, attention has shifted toward understanding how uncertainty and experience 
influence various managerial decisions and outcomes. As a result, these factors have become 
prominent in research in strategic management and international business research. Not 
surprisingly, both uncertainty and experience have been found to influence various aspects of 
JVs including JV formation, stability and performance (e.g. Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Reuer, Zollo, and Singh, 2002). Various theoretical perspectives on JVs such as learning, 
transaction cost and real option theory provide different and sometimes contradictory insights 
into the role of uncertainty and experience (e.g. Leiblein, 2003). Simultaneously, empirical 




my dissertation I aim to resolve several of these apparent empirical and theoretical 
contradictions. 
In the second chapter, I provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real 
option literature on JVs, contributing in three main areas. First, I examine major alternative 
theoretical perspectives on JVs – learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to 
elaborate how they complement or contradict real option predictions. Second, I compare 
arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages and highlight research 
opportunities, with the aim of improving the integration within the real option literature on 
JVs. Third, I discuss and extend research on behavioral effects and potential decision-making 
biases when making real option (JV) investments. Overall, I offer new predictions and 
suggestions for a better integration within the real option literature, and between real option 
and related literatures on JVs. 
In the third chapter, I examine empirically the boundaries of real option logic. 
Uncertainty is widely held to be a principal motivation for using JVs to expand 
internationally, as well as a predictor of investments in real options. I build on a distinction 
between forms of uncertainty which resolve endogenously versus exogenously. Exogenous 
uncertainty is uncertainty of which the resolution is unaffected by the actions of the firm, 
while endogenous uncertainty is resolved (at least partially) by the actions of the firm itself 
over time. I theorize that only exogenous uncertainty will have the impact predicted by most 
extant real option theory. Using a sample of 6,472 Sino-foreign JVs established between 
1979 and 1996, I show that investors’ choices of equity shares are indeed consistent with real 
options predictions when uncertainty resolves exogenously, but not when uncertainty 
resolves endogenously. This study contributes to the literature by advancing our 
understanding of the boundary conditions for real option theory and by showing that the 




In the fourth chapter, I examine the evolution of international subsidiaries including 
joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries. More specifically, I predict and find that firms 
whose ownership levels in international subsidiaries are misaligned with the levels of 
uncertainty in the external environment adapt their ownership levels to re-align with the 
environment. I argue that experience and shifts in the levels of external uncertainty have an 
impact on subsidiary evolution. However, the impact of these factors is contingent on the 
source and type of uncertainty, and the direction of the shift in uncertainty. Using a sample of 
726 Japanese-foreign subsidiaries established in 38 different host countries, I find support for 
my hypotheses. Overall, this study improves our understanding of how subsidiaries evolve 
and adapt to their external environment. 
In the fifth chapter, I extend research on the link between prior JV experience and the 
amount and distribution of the value generated by the JV. More specifically, I investigate 
how the prior JV experiences of each of the JV partners, and the level of asymmetry in their 
respective JV experience, have an impact on value creation and value appropriation. I test the 
hypotheses, using the event study methodology, on a sample of over 576 JVs derived from 
Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation (SDC) database. This paper contributes to 
the literature on JVs by considering the experience of all the JV partners and by 
distinguishing between the total value created and the way value is distributed among each of 
the partners. In addition, I contribute to the research on organizational learning by looking at 
the degree of fit between the prior JV experience of each of the JV partners and how this 
influences value creation in a different way than the subsequent distribution of the value 
created. Furthermore, I argue that the need for experience fit is contingent on several factors, 






A NOTE ON THE COHERENCE BETWEEN CHAPTERS 
Although specifics of the research question, theoretical framework, research design, 
and (where applicable) empirical setting may differ across four studies in this dissertation, 
there is a significant conceptual overlap between the chapters. The common thread through 
the four studies in this dissertation is a focus on how different types of uncertainty and 
experience have an impact on major life-cycle stages of a JV. 
Chapter 2 deals with this question in a conceptual way and acts as an overarching 
chapter. More specifically, the effects of different types of uncertainty on each of the JVs’ 
life-cycle stages are discussed in detail from several key theoretical perspectives such as real 
option theory and learning theory. In chapter 3, I use real option theory to extend and test 
some of the arguments from chapter 2. In particular, I contrast the effects of two distinct 
types of uncertainty, i.e. exogenous and endogenous sources of uncertainty, on the equity 
distribution of JVs. In chapter 4, I look at the determinants and the implications in terms of 
subsidiary dynamics of misaligned ownership levels. In order to determine the extent to 
which ownership levels are misaligned, I build on the findings in chapter 2, several of the 
arguments I made in chapters 2 and 3, and elements of the empirical model from chapter 3. In 
chapter 5, I use learning arguments to investigate how prior JV experience determines how 
much value is created and how this value is distributed among the partners. In doing so, I 
extend some of the learning arguments in chapters 2 and 4. More specifically, I argue that not 
only absolute levels of prior JV experience matter but that the level of asymmetry between 
JV partners’ prior JV experience also determines how much value is created and how this 
value is distributed between the JV partners. 
Although there is less theoretical overlap between chapters 3 and 5, I expect and find 
that several of the sources of uncertainty I investigated in chapter 3 have an indirect effect on 




uncertainty, cultural distance and the scope of the JV, respectively, moderate the effect of 
experience asymmetry on value creation. Furthermore, I show that the effect of experience 
asymmetry on value creation is also contingent on the ownership distribution of the JV – i.e., 
the dependent variable in chapter 3 becomes a meaningful contingency in chapter 5. Chapters 
4 and 5 share a learning framework and an uncertainty focus and variable. 
Overall, besides making individual contributions to the real option and learning 
literatures respectively, the four papers which comprise this dissertation aim to make a 
broader contribution to the JV literature by adding to our understanding of the influence of 












We provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real option (RO) 
literature on joint ventures (JVs), contributing in three main areas. First, we 
examine major alternative theoretical perspectives on JVs – learning, 
bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to elaborate how they 
complement or contradict RO predictions. Second, we compare arguments 
and variables used to explain different JV stages – initial RO explicitness and 
equity shares, JV stability, and performance consequences – and highlight 
research opportunities. Third, we discuss and extend research about 
behavioral aspects of making RO (JV) investments. Overall, we offer new 
predictions and suggestions for a better integration within the RO literature, 







                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin. It appeared in 2007 in Advances in Strategic 




In recent years, real option (RO) theory has emerged as an important approach to 
understand and value strategy under uncertainty. Accordingly, numerous types of investments 
such as R&D projects, taking out patents, investing in human capital, subcontracting, and 
entering into joint ventures (JVs), which are all characterized by uncertain outcomes, have 
been studied from a RO perspective (e.g., Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001; Chi and Levitas, 
2007; Nerkar, Paruchuri and Khaire, 2007; Fister and Seth, 2007; Van Mieghem, 1999; Reuer 
and Leiblein, 2000). 
In this paper, we focus on one type of investment, namely JVs, which we define as 
equity-based collaborative arrangements whereby two or more organizations each contribute 
resources, including equity, for the joint pursuit of economic goals (Martin and Salomon, 
2003b). It has long been established that firms often use JVs to enter into unfamiliar and risky 
product-market and geographic areas (Aharoni, 1966; Harrigan, 1988b). Accordingly, though 
JVs may vary in their form and functional purpose(s), they are generally surrounded by high 
levels of uncertainty (Martin, Mitchell and Swaminathan, 1995; Krishnan, Martin and 
Noorderhaven, 2006).2 This is especially – but not exclusively – the case for international 
joint ventures (IJVs), which are subject to powerful sources of uncertainty such as cultural 
differences and the burdens of operating across multiple locations and jurisdictions (e.g., 
Martin and Salomon, 2002, 2003a; Reuer and Tong, 2005).3 Furthermore, JVs allow for, and 
are subject to, ongoing adjustments in the terms of the agreement (and the relationship among 
parent firms). These features make JVs – and IJVs in particular – both suitable and important 
to study from a RO perspective. Indeed, the application of RO theory to JVs has led to 
numerous insights and an improved understanding of collaborative ventures. Still, there 
                                                 
2 For a review of JV types, purposes and scope, see Pisano, Russo and Teece (1988) and Martin (2002). 
3 However, we believe that our arguments are also broadly relevant for other types of JVs, which face their own 
distinct sources of uncertainty. For instance, ventures for joint product introduction must deal with uncertainty 
concerning design acceptance by buyers and regulators, competitive reaction, etc. (Pisano, Russo & Teece, 
1988; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). 
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remain a number of promising opportunities for future research on JVs from a RO 
perspective, and several theoretical and empirical gaps and inconsistencies exist. Therefore, 
our objective in this paper is to provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the RO 
literature on JVs. Where relevant, we offer new testable propositions. We aim to make 
contributions in three areas. 
Firstly, several theoretical perspectives besides RO theory can be used to study JVs. 
In fact, cooperative ventures lend themselves to a particularly broad range of explanatory 
perspectives, which sometimes lead to sharply differing conclusions (Martin, Mitchell and 
Swaminathan, 1994; Cuypers and Martin, 2006a). Therefore, we revisit the most important 
related literatures on JVs – including learning, transaction cost, bargaining models and 
agency theory – and link them to the RO literature, with a view to elaborate on the 
relationships between these theories. 
Secondly, one of the most attractive features of RO theory is that it is a dynamic 
perspective that can explain each of a JV’s stages, from formation to subsequent adjustment 
and post-JV outcomes (sale, dissolution, etc.). To make the best of such a dynamic theory 
requires consistency in researching sequential stages. Although various JV stages have been 
duly studied from a RO perspective, there are differences in the scope and content of studies 
of the various JV stages. Therefore, we compare the theoretical arguments and explanatory 
variables used to explain different JV stages, to highlight important research opportunities 
and offer predictions and suggestions towards a better integration within the RO literature. 
Finally, we address the behavioral aspects of making RO investments. Recent 
developments, including some applications to the RO literature, have not been fully 





EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT REAL OPTIONS IN JOINT VENTURES 
Shortly after the formalization of financial option theory, scholars recognized that 
financial options logic could be applied to corporate investments (Myers, 1977). These 
options on non-financial assets have been labeled “real options” and can be seen as 
contingent investment commitments that secure future decision rights (Trigeorgis, 1993). 
The insights and techniques from financial option theory have shown that the 
traditional Net Present Value (NPV) valuation approach does not fully capture the value of an 
investment. The traditional NPV should be expanded to take into account management’s 
flexibility to adapt to unexpected developments (Trigeorgis, 1995). Such flexibility is 
valuable because it can limit investors’ downside losses to their initial investment, while 
preserving the upside potential. Thus, the expanded NPV approach should incorporate both a 
passive NPV component and a dynamic option value component (Pindyck, 1988): 
 
Value of an investment = “passive NPV” of expected cash flows + “dynamic real option” 
value 
 
However, these two different value components usually have to be captured in 
different ways, requiring differently structured investments – in terms of share of the total 
investment, absolute size of the investment, scope and sequencing of the project, etc. (e.g., 
Reuer and Tong, 2007). For instance, with regard to JV investments, capturing the passive 
NPV component requires taking a larger percentage stake in the JV, holding its size constant, 
in order to capture as much of the cash flow as possible; while capturing the dynamic option 
component requires taking a smaller stake (Chi and McGuire, 1996), which secures future 
decision rights while minimizing the initial sunk costs (and therefore downside risk). 
Meanwhile, an option-like investment by a firm to seek new technology (without partner) 
10
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corresponds with a smaller (absolute) investment while an investment to capture the NPV 
component corresponds with a larger (absolute) investment (Hurry, Miller and Bowman, 
1992). 
Among the first to apply RO theory to JVs, Kogut (1991) argued that firms can use a 
JV to capture the upside potential of an investment by buying out the partner in a later stage 
when favorable information becomes available, while limiting their exposure to the initial 
investment. This option to acquire can be explicit, but this is not a necessity.4 It remains 
possible, when there is no ex ante contractual specification of the strike price, or of the party 
holding the acquisition right, for the parties involved to negotiate the acquisition and sale of 
their share at a later stage. Therefore, a JV has at least an embedded implicit call option5 - i.e. 
an option to acquire a partner’s stake (Chi and McGuire, 1996; Chi, 2000). Furthermore, Chi 
and McGuire (1996) and Chi (2000) argued that the presence of an explicit option clause will 
depend on three conditions: (1) the level of uncertainty,6 (2) the anticipation of a change in 
the relative bargaining power of the two parties during their collaboration, and (3) ex ante 
asymmetry between both parties in their expected pay-offs of the option. Only the first 
determinant has received empirical attention. Reuer and Tong (2005) studied empirically the 
determinants of having an explicit option to acquire additional equity in a JV making use of 
transaction costs theory and RO theory arguments. They found that the likelihood that a firm 
has an explicit call option to acquire equity in an IJV is a function of property rights, 
political, and diversification-related uncertainty, but not of cultural distance between 
partners’ home countries – though only a very small proportion of JV listed in their sample, 
                                                 
4 An explicit option is a contractual clause that specifies the terms including the conditions under which 
additional equity can be acquired from a partner (Reuer & Tong, 2005). Chi and Seth (2002) provided an 
extensive overview of different option specifications. These include options with predetermined exercise prices, 
flexible or fixed termination dates, or a predetermined pricing mechanism. 
5 The holder of a call (put) option has the right but not the obligation, to buy (sell) an underlying asset at the 
contractually determined strike price until (American option) or at (European option) a certain expiry date 
(maturity). 
6 Option valuation models assume that it is possible to specify the probability distribution of the future value of 
an asset. Therefore, the concept of uncertainty used in RO theory is actually closer to what Knight (1921) refers 
to as risk. Nevertheless, we will refer to this as “uncertainty” as this is done throughout most of the literature. 
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drawn from the SDC database, had explicit options (1% in general, and 4% of minority 
holdings). Altogether, there is some support for the premise that JVs serve as ROs (Kogut, 
1991; Chi and McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2000, 2002; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000) – albeit mostly 
implicit ROs. Further research in this area is thus warranted. 
Researchers have also examined the governance implications of implicit and explicit 
ROs. Chi (2000) and Reuer and Tong (2005) argued that explicit call options in JVs are one 
of several contractual safeguards that can be used to reduce transaction costs. More 
specifically, Reuer and Tong (2005) argued that an explicit call option enables a firm to take 
control of a JV when it observes that its partner is cheating (for instance, misappropriating 
knowledge), or alternatively that the presence of an explicit call option might reduce the 
chance of such opportunistic behavior. However, Chi and Seth (2002) and Seth and Chi 
(2005) argued that the presence of an explicit call option may weaken the other party’s 
incentive to contribute to the JV beyond the value of the strike price of the option, as all value 
resulting from these additional contributions will be captured by the call option holder. Put 
together, these arguments suggest important questions for future research. Would monitoring 
the other party in a JV with an explicit call option clause, in order to know when to strike the 
option and take control of the venture, be subject to greater or lesser costs and constraints 
than without an explicit option clause – and under what conditions? More generally, how 
would negotiation and monitoring costs compare, considering the stages identified above – 
from initial JV setup to potential renegotiation to option exercise or other JV conclusion? 
Before turning to the later stages, we examine another critical initial decision regarding JVs 
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THE INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF EQUITY AMONG JOINT VENTURE 
PARTNERS 
Real Option Theory 
Several scholars have examined the initial formation of JVs from a RO perspective 
(e.g., Chi and McGuire, 1996; Folta, 1998). One key finding is that the options embedded in 
JVs will have an impact on the distribution of the equity stakes. On the one hand, an investor 
who tries to capture the static NPV part will take an as large as possible share in the JV, to 
fully capture the JV’s future cash flows. In the extreme, this will lead to an acquisition 
instead of a JV (Seth and Kim, 2001). On the other hand, an investor who aims to capture the 
dynamic RO part will invest in a smaller share of the JV because this way (s)he limits the 
downside risk while preserving the opportunity to capture the upside potential (Chi and 
McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2002). 
The value of the dynamic option part is a function of the same five factors that 
determine the value of financial options, i.e.: the value of the underlying asset, the strike 
price, the time to maturity, the risk-free rate and the uncertainty surrounding the underlying 
asset (Seth and Kim, 2001). Of these, uncertainty has been by far the most prominent 
throughout the RO literature on JVs, because of its natural appeal to strategy and 
international business scholars. 
Chi and McGuire (1996) argued that the value of the options embedded in JVs is 
positively related to market, partner-related, and legal uncertainty. Hence, higher levels of 
uncertainty in general, and these three forms of uncertainty in particular, should lead to 
investors taking a smaller share in JVs. Using a sample in the biotechnology industry, Folta 
(1998) studied the trade-off between administrative control and commitment. He found that 
uncertainty about the partner, exogenous technological uncertainty, and competitive 
uncertainty all influence the likelihood of choosing a collaborative venture over an 
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acquisition. However, when a distinction was made between two types of collaborative 
ventures – minority investments and JVs – the results showed that only exogenous 
technological uncertainty encouraged the formation of JVs as call options (rather than 
acquisitions). Multiple forms of uncertainty were associated with taking RO positions in the 
form of minority equity investments (rather than acquisitions). 
In order to explain the apparent inconsistencies found in past research (e.g., Folta, 
1998; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000), Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2010) sought to refine and 
expand conceptually and empirically the boundaries of RO theory, with application to the 
ownership distribution of JVs. They built on the distinction between forms of uncertainty that 
resolve endogenously and exogenously (Roberts and Weitzman, 1981): Exogenous 
uncertainty is uncertainty of which the resolution is unaffected by the actions of the firm, 
while endogenous uncertainty is resolved (at least partially) by the actions of the firm itself 
over time.7 Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2010) theorized that only exogenous uncertainty 
would have the impact suggested by RO theory. The case of exogenous uncertainty 
corresponds to models of financial options, where it is assumed that uncertainty is resolved 
independently of the investor’s behavior. Moreover, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that 
exogenous uncertainty increases the value of waiting for new information and makes 
committing resources early less attractive, because investing will not influence how 
uncertainty is resolved. Hence, RO models should be applicable. 
However, when uncertainty resolves endogenously, RO logic is subject to three 
objections. Firstly, because investors are no longer price-takers, conventional option 
valuation models break down. Secondly, firms will have an incentive to invest and commit 
resources rather than wait (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Thirdly, the flexibility of targets renders 
RO theory problematic as a decision-making template (Adner and Levinthal, 2004a). For 
                                                 
7 Li, James, Madhavan and Mahoney (2007) also touch upon the distinction between exogenous and endogenous 
uncertainty in their general review of RO research. 
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these reasons, RO predictions will not accurately describe firms’ responses to endogenous 
uncertainty. 
Using a sample of 6,472 Sino-foreign JVs established between 1979 and 1996, 
Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2010) found, as predicted by RO theory, a negative relationship 
between the initial equity share taken by the foreign partner and three sources of exogenous 
uncertainty: economic conditions, local institutions, and exchange rate fluctuations. 
Conversely, they found no such relationship for three sources of endogenous uncertainty: 
cultural uncertainty, uncertainty resulting from the scope of JV operations, and uncertainty 
associated with R&D activities. Indeed, null-hypothesis tests showed that these endogenous 
sources of uncertainty have no significant effect on the distribution of equity shares among 
partners. In summary, Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2010) theorized and showed empirically 
that initial alliance governance decisions, as evidenced by initial equity stakes in IJVs, 
conform to RO predictions when uncertainty is exogenous but not when uncertainty is 
endogenous. Furthermore, they provided a first empirical test which is more consistent with 
Chi and McGuire’s (1996) model by considering the entire range of the ownership 
distribution rather than just the choice between collaborative ventures and acquisitions, or 
minority and majority JVs. 
Alternative Theories 
A number of other theories have been used to study the initial formation of JVs - for 
an overview of these, see Cuypers and Martin (2006a). This raises the question of whether 
and how these theories contradict or complement RO theory. Next, we briefly discuss three 
alternative approaches that have been used to examine governance decisions including the 
distribution of JV equity shares. 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE). Transactions are arrayed on a continuum 
between markets and hierarchy. On this continuum, the optimal degree of integration 
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(control) reflects the trade-off between shirking costs that tend to arise when the parties are 
brought into the same organization and cheating costs due to opportunism by arm’s length 
parties (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1993). In TCE, behavioral uncertainty figures as an 
endogenous factor that can be addressed via governance decisions. Furthermore, exogenous 
uncertainty acts in TCE theory as a conditional factor: It exacerbates other characteristics of 
the transaction (especially asset specificity) that increase ex-ante and ex-post costs of 
contracting (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Leiblein, Reuer and and Dalsace, 2002; Lu and Hébert, 
2005).8 However, few TCE studies have examined JV equity shares. Furthermore, these 
studies have yielded mixed results regarding uncertainty – especially regarding exogenous 
uncertainty. 
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) studied the choice between full ownership and shared 
ownership, and the ownership level in case of shared ownership. They argued that higher 
levels of control, through equity ownership, are preferred in case of higher asset specificity – 
especially in combination with external (exogenous) uncertainty. Although R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, and marketing asset specificity, were indeed all associated with a 
preference for full ownership, the interactions between them and external uncertainty were 
insignificant. Furthermore, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) were generally unsuccessful in 
explaining intermediate levels of ownership when ownership is shared. Similarly, Chen, Hu 
and Hu (2002) failed to find a significant relationship between R&D and advertising 
intensities, respectively, and intermediate levels of ownership. 
Delios and Beamish (1999) focused mainly on the nature of the resources that the 
foreign firm contributes to the IJV and argued that as asset specificity increases, the foreign 
                                                 
8 Williamson (1985: 59) emphasizes the conditional effect of exogenous uncertainty: “The influence of 
[exogenous] uncertainty on economic organizations is conditional. Specifically, an increase in parametric [i.e. 
exogenous] uncertainty is a matter of little consequence for transactions that are nonspecific.” Leiblein (2003) 
concluded that empirical findings in the TCE literature are consistent with Williamson’s (1985) argument that 
exogenous uncertainty has a conditional effect. A few studies have postulated a direct effect of exogenous 
uncertainty on make-versus-buy decisions, but reported mixed or inconsistent results (e.g., Walker & Weber, 
1984, 1987). 
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firm will take a higher equity position in order to reduce the increased hazards of 
opportunistic behavior by the other party. However, their results suggest ambiguous effects of 
transactional characteristics on the ownership distribution of IJVs. 
Bargaining Perspective. The ownership distribution of a JV is the outcome of 
negotiations in which relative power is a deciding factor (Fagre and Wells, 1982). Generally, 
it is assumed that partners prefer full ownership to gain more control and greater payoffs 
from the venture. Subsequently, the relative bargaining power between both parties explains 
deviations from full ownership. However, the preferred ownership structure predicted by 
other theories could also serve as a starting point and the bargaining power of the venture’s 
parties can then be used to explain deviations from the starting point (Blodgett, 1991). 
A wide range of factors seem to influence bargaining power, and thereby the equity 
distribution (Kobrin, 1987). Fagre and Wells (1982) found a partner’s level of ownership to 
be positively related to its advertising intensity, its provision of market access, and the 
amount of technology that it contributes; and negatively related to its number of competitors. 
Blodgett (1991) found that partners who contribute technology tend to have a higher initial 
share in the JV, in particular when the other party only contributes local knowledge and 
marketing resources. Furthermore, government restrictions may limit the bargaining power of 
the foreign party by restricting the range of ownership it can bargain for (Blodgett, 1991). 
However, the exogeneity of uncertainty-causing factors such a government regulation is not 
addressed in the bargaining perspective, which tends to focus on firm-level determinants of 
bargaining power.9 In general, bargaining power seems to be negatively related to the need 
for complementary assets from the other party, and positively related to the contribution the 
firm makes to the JV. 
                                                 
9 Some studies in the bargaining power literature have looked at the effects of government restrictions on mode 
of entry. However, to our knowledge, they have focused almost exclusively on the choice between shared 
ownership and sole ownership (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Only Blodgett (1991) has examined the effects of 
government restrictions on the ownership distribution of JVs from a bargaining power perspective. 
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Agency Theory. The ownership structure of companies influences agency costs, i.e. 
those inefficiencies resulting from the differing objectives of separate parties (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Foreign partners depend on the effort of the local partner to make the JV 
succeed. However, the local partner only has an incentive to put effort into the JV to the 
extent that it receives benefits for its contribution. These benefits, in turn, are proportionate to 
the ownership share that the local partner holds since the distribution of profits of the JV is 
typically based on the ownership distribution of the JV. Hence, the local partner’s effort will 
depend on the share in the JV it owns. The foreign partner can reduce the resulting agency 
costs by taking a smaller share in the venture (Nakamura and Yeung, 1994). Therefore, 
uncertainty about the behavior of the other party in the JV is endogenous. However, the 
foreign partner also has to avoid spillovers to potential competitors, in particular of intangible 
assets, by protecting the property rights of its resources. Nakamura and Yeung (1994) argued 
that the likelihood of such spillovers decreases less than proportionally as the foreign 
partner’s share in the JV increases. Using data on technology-based US subsidiaries in Japan, 
they found, as predicted, that JV ownership share is determined by a combination of spillover 
and agency considerations. Furthermore, they reported ownership differences across different 
industries, which they attributed to differences in the level of reliance on intangible assets – 
which is endogenous – rather than an exogenous industry condition. 
Chi and Roehl (1997) distinguished between ownership level and control in JVs. 
More specifically, they argued that cheating cost could be reduced by means of more control 
- measured by the number of key managerial positions held in the venture. Shirking costs, on 
the other hand, can be reduced by giving away more of the venture’s payoff - measured by 
the level of equity ownership. Such shirking costs depend on how important and measurable 
a party’s effort is to the overall success of the venture. Chi and Roehl (1997) found positive 
relationships between the amount of discretionary training provided by the foreign partner, 
18
Joint Ventures and Real Options: An Integrated Perspective 
the proportion of JV output distributed by the foreign partner, and the dissimilarity between 
the local and foreign partner, respectively, and the foreign partner’s equity share. This 
indicates that the initial ownership distribution serves to align incentives when one party’s 
expected contribution is important to the overall performance of the venture yet is hard to 
measure, rather than to increase control and thereby reduce the costs of making specific 
investments. Thus, Chi and Roehl (1997) described how sources of endogenous uncertainty 
affect equity shares. It is noteworthy that these sources of uncertainty can be controlled by the 
partners. However, this research did not address exogenous uncertainty. 
Conclusion 
Several theoretical perspectives besides RO theory can be used to study the formation 
of JVs (see Table 1). Furthermore, based on the above discussion, we can identify areas of 
overlap and complementarity with these perspectives. Firstly, TCE and agency theory focus 
primarily on behavioral uncertainty, which is endogenous. These theories have contributed to 
the analysis of endogenous uncertainty as it affects JV equity share. However, they have not 
yielded strong generalizable results regarding exogenous uncertainty. This may be because, 
in TCE theory, exogenous environmental uncertainty is of interest not as a direct effect but as 
an interactive effect (and likewise, more implicitly, in agency theory). With respect to 
exogenous uncertainty, which we know to influence equity shares too, RO theory has proven 
itself to be a most promising starting point (Folta, 1998; Cuypers and Martin, 2006b). Thus, 
theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence in the literature dedicated to each theory 
suggest that TCE and agency theory hold promise as complements to RO theory, with RO 
theory shedding light on exogenous uncertainty (Cuypers and Martin, 2006b, 2010), while 
the other theories shed light on endogenous uncertainty (Cuypers and Martin, 2006a).10 
                                                 
10 Other JV studies have contrasted TCE and RO theory in different ways. Folta (1998) argued that RO theory 
and TCE contradict rather than complement each other. Specifically, he argued that TCE emphasizes the use of 
commitment to reduce uncertainty, while RO theory emphasizes flexibility to deal with uncertainty. 




                                                                                                                                                        
prominent under conditions of high uncertainty. Conversely, Chi (2000) and Reuer and Tong (2005) argued that 
explicit call options in JVs are one of several contractual safeguards that can be used to reduce transaction costs 
– thus suggesting that RO theory and TCE are overlapping. Clearly, these studies raise interesting questions for 
future research, the most critical of which we outlined above in the section dealing with JVs as (explicit) ROs. 
On balance, however, current empirical evidence in studies of initial JV equity stakes suggests that RO theory 
and TCE are complements. 
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Secondly, studies from a bargaining perspective have provided limited insight into 
exogenous uncertainty. Still, this perspective may complement RO theory, as follows: The 
exercise of bargaining power might explain some deviations in initial equity shares relative to 
what RO theory would indicate. Given that no empirical study has touched upon this, it 
remains unclear whether or not, and in which direction, relative bargaining power can 
actually explain deviations from the initial ownership distribution predicted by RO theory. 
This too represents an opportunity for future research. 
In this section, we have highlighted the need for – and rewards from – a more precise 
conceptualization of uncertainty when studying the initial distribution of equity among JV 
partners. There is a fundamental difference between endogenous uncertainty and exogenous 
uncertainty. This calls for a more explicit and elaborate argumentation as to what theory, or 
combination of theories, is suitable given the sources of uncertainty on hand. TCE and 
agency theory hold promise as complements to RO theory. Furthermore, the bargaining 
perspective may be useful to explain some deviations from normative RO models. Many of 
these insights, starting with the importance of conceptualizing uncertainty carefully, also 
stand to be relevant in studying later JV stages from a RO perspective. Given this, we turn 
next to the stability and change in JVs following their formation. 
 
THE STABILITY AND EVOLUTION OF JOINT VENTURES 
Real Option Theory 
Another aspect of JVs that has received attention from a RO perspective is the stability of JVs 
after their formation. JV instability – or more generally evolution – can refer to a number of 
different outcomes: joint or unilateral dissolution, termination of the JV, a partial change in 
ownership, a full buyout of one partner by the other, or (in rare cases) a (partial) sale to a 
third party. Each outcome may have different causes, as described below, but in all cases 
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there is a change in the ownership and/or activity of the JV, which indicates a change in 
option terms and/or an exercise of the option. 
According to RO theory, the holder of a (call) option will hold onto the option either 
until it expires, meaning that the joint activity ceases; or until a positive signal occurs, i.e. the 
value of the underlying asset exceeds the strike price at which the firm can increase its equity 
share. This discrete investment logic distinguishes a RO investment from other path-
dependent and incremental investment processes (Adner and Levinthal, 2004a). 
Kogut (1991) examined the effect of demand uncertainty on the timing of the exercise 
of call options, when one JV partner buys out the other. Using a sample of 92 manufacturing 
JVs, he found that the timing of exercising the option is determined by positive product 
market signals, while negative signals do not affect the stability of the JV. This asymmetry in 
the effects of positive and negative signals, combined with the discrete nature of changes in 
ownership structure, is a defining characteristic of JVs as ROs. 
Similarly, Miller and Folta (2002) and Folta and Miller (2002) studied the timing 
decision to exercise ROs. Miller and Folta (2002) argued that the optimal time to exercise 
real call options depends on six factors: (1) the current dividends, (2) the exercise price, (3) 
the residual resource value, (4) the discount rate, (5) the call option value and (6) the nature 
of the option (compound vs. simple). In turn, they argued that most of these six factors are 
determined by a number of other factors.11 
Folta and Miller (2002) examined empirically the timing decision to strike real call 
options embedded in biotechnology equity partnerships, by looking at the acquisition of 
additional equity by one party. They found that the value of the underlying asset and the 
number of parties in the JV increase, while the level of technological uncertainty decreases, 
                                                 
11 Current dividends are a function of market size, first-mover advantages, and learning opportunities. The 
residual resource value is determined by the uniqueness, transferability to other markets, and durability of the 
underlying resources. The exercise price depends on whether there is an explicit contractual option, and the 
proprietariness of the option. The value of the option depends on the amount of exogenous uncertainty, the 
threat of preemption, and the presence of unique complementary resources (Miller & Folta, 2002). 
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the likelihood that an option is exercised. Furthermore, they looked at interaction effects and 
found that the effect of the value of the underlying asset, and the effect of the number of 
parties on the timing of striking the option, both differ under different levels of technological 
uncertainty. They also found some evidence, albeit weak, that the presence of an explicit 
option decreases the likelihood that options are struck. This result contradicted Miller and 
Folta’s (2002) prediction. 
Finally, Vassolo, Anand and Folta (2004) studied empirically both the abandonment 
decision and the striking of options in collaborative ventures in the biotech industry. 
Consistent with RO theory, they found a negative relationship between industry uncertainty 
and the technological distance between the focal alliance and the parent’s portfolio of other 
alliances, respectively, and the likelihood of the alliance being divested. Additionally, 
Vassolo, Anand and Folta (2004) found evidence of a negative relationship between the 
technological distance between the firm and the focal alliance, and the likelihood of striking 
the option. However, they failed to find any such relationship for technological uncertainty. 
Like Folta and Miller (2002), they found that explicit option agreements decrease the 
likelihood of buyouts and divestures. 
Alternative Theories 
A number of other approaches have been used to explain alliance evolution and 
instability (Gulati, 1998). Most prominent among them are transaction cost economics, the 
bargaining perspective (power-dependence), and organizational learning and experience 
(Martin, Mitchell and Swaminathan, 1994).12 In addition, there are large differences across 
and within these approaches in the way instability is defined or operationalized. These 
different operationalizations of instability each correspond to different outcomes from a RO 
                                                 
12 We discuss learning in this section because the range of its manifestations and effects is better understood in 
connection with alliance evolution and (in)stability than solely in connection with terms at founding (initial 
distribution of equity). Conversely, the literature on agency theory has relatively little to say about alliance 
instability (other than as adjustment of terms, following a logic similar to transaction cost predictions), so we do 
not treat it separately in this section. 
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perspective. On the one hand, several studies focused on JV termination as JV instability 
(e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997), which from a RO perspective, corresponds with letting 
options expire. On the other hand, some scholars studied partial or full buyouts (e.g., 
Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993), which from a RO perspective correspond with striking the 
option. Furthermore, some studies did not distinguish between both outcomes (e.g., Blodgett, 
1992). We will now briefly discuss the theoretical approaches and findings most predominant 
in the literature: transaction cost economics, the bargaining perspective, and learning theory.  
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE). Although TCE is sometimes held to be a static 
theory that focuses on ex ante governance decisions, Williamson (1991) argued that TCE can 
be the basis of a comparative analysis that explains the adaptation of governance structures – 
and specifically JVs – to changing circumstances. Following this line of reasoning, some 
studies have examined the post-formation dynamics of JVs from a TCE perspective. Lu and 
Hébert (2005) argued that the survival of a JV depends on the fit between the initial 
conditions, i.e. the characteristics of the transaction and the environment, and the chosen 
governance structure at the formation of the JV. They found that higher levels of control in 
IJVs in the presence of high asset specificity (i.e., fit between governance arrangement and 
transaction conditions) lead to higher IJV survival rates. Reuer and Ariño (2002) also studied 
the impact of the initial conditions of JVs on their stability, as measured by the absence or 
presence of a contractual renegotiation. They argued and found that the willingness or the 
ability to change the governance of alliances increases with the level of governance misfit 
and asset specificity while it decreases when there are more contractual safeguards. 
Furthermore, they examined whether or not changes in the environment affect the decision to 
renegotiate. They did not find any effect of changes in the environment on this form of JV 
stability. 
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Bargaining Perspective. Earlier studies, which linked the internal structure of JVs to 
their stability, argued that ventures with a dominant partner were more stable. Absolute 
control makes it easier to make decisions and the potential for conflict will be reduced 
(Killing, 1983). However, subsequent research argued and found empirical evidence that a 
more equal ownership division will result in more stable JVs (e.g., Beamish and Banks, 1987; 
Blodgett, 1992, Hennart and Zeng, 2002). As discussed above in the section covering the 
formation of JVs, this stream of research sees the ownership of a JV as the result of the 
relative bargaining power of the partners in the negotiation process. Balanced ownership 
indicates partners with equal bargaining power and equal contributions to the JV, which 
pushes both partners to make accommodations that enhance stability. Conversely, an unequal 
ownership division implies that one partner has made a larger contribution to the venture and 
has more bargaining power than the other party, which it can use to dictate terms, leading to 
more negotiations and changes (Blodgett, 1992). 
Some studies have taken a more dynamic perspective by focusing on shifts in 
bargaining power (e.g., Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Such shifts can be the consequence of 
learning or changes in the environment (Hamel, 1991). Hamel (1991) and Inkpen and 
Beamish (1997) argued that learning is the more important determinant of changes in relative 
bargaining power and JV instability. Hence, there is an overlap between this dynamic 
bargaining perspective and the view of JVs as learning races (which we discuss below) in that 
as knowledge is acquired from the partner, the dependence of one party on the other is 
reduced and the likelihood that the JV is terminated increases. Yan and Gray (1994) found 
that changes in the environment, such as policy changes introduced by local governments, 
also lead to changes in relative bargaining power between the partners and thereby trigger 
changes in the structure of the venture. 
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Learning Theory. Kogut (1988) argued that JVs are vehicles to learn and transfer 
knowledge. Subsequently, learning from past collaborative ventures and learning within 
collaborative ventures will have an impact on their stability. The literature includes studies 
that stipulate three very different learning purposes, and thereby different links between 
learning and stability: learning about partnering, learning from the partner, and learning about 
the partner. 
Firstly, several studies have examined the effect of prior experience on the survival of 
JVs. However, different scholars have put forward opposing effects of prior experience on JV 
survival. On the one hand, several scholars have argued that prior experience will lead to 
more stable JVs. For instance, Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) and Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1997) found that the cultural barriers associated with starting a venture abroad 
are reduced as a result of learning from prior experiences abroad, which increases the 
survival of foreign collaborative ventures. Furthermore, Pangarkar (2003) argued and found 
evidence that collaborative ventures will last longer if both partners have prior experience 
because firms learn to manage alliances and generate synergies through the pooling of 
resources. On the other hand, some researchers have argued that prior experience would lead 
to more unstable JVs. Blodgett (1992) found that prior experience in the renegotiation of 
ownership terms would lead to more unstable JVs because partners learn to make similar 
changes in the future. Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) integrated these two opposing effects on 
the stability of JVs. They argued that experienced firms should be able to design the JVs 
more effectively ex ante, which increases JV stability; while prior experience also creates a 
capability to effectively modify the alliance’s governance structure, which decreases JV 
stability. By discriminating between different types of experiences in which different effects 
dominate, they found support for their arguments. The corresponding form of instability is a 
change in the terms and equity shares in the JV. 
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Secondly, a few studies have examined the competitive learning dynamics of partners 
within JVs. Firms may enter into a JV with the aim of learning and internalizing the skills of 
its partner. In that case, collaborative ventures can be seen as a transitional device in which 
partners race or compete to learn and acquire each other’s resources, competencies and skills. 
As soon as one partner has achieved its goal, the race is over and the JV will be terminated 
(Hamel, 1991). Thus, the timing of the termination of the JV will be a function of the pace of 
learning, which is endogenous to the partners’ actions according to Hamel (1991). 
Furthermore, the termination of JVs will be the likely outcome observed, and such 
termination represents a success for at least one partner from this perspective. However, the 
prevalence of such strategies is in question. Hennart, Roehl and Zietlow (1999) failed to find 
support for the associated prediction that firms – specifically the Japanese firms discussed by 
Hamel (1991) – use JVs as temporary “Trojan horses” at the expense of their partners. 
Because of the importance of relation-specific skills and routines, stability in interfirm 
cooperation is in fact normally a precondition both for partner expansion and for knowledge 
sharing among partners, and these in turn reinforce the stability of interfirm relations (Martin, 
Swaminathan and Mitchell, 1998; Kotabe, Martin and Domoto, 2003). 
Thirdly, making use of learning and information economics arguments, Balakrishnan 
and Koza (1993) argued that JVs could act as intermediate forms that enable firms to learn 
about possible take-over targets. A firm can use the JV as a means to collect information 
about the quality of its partner. Subsequently, if the partner turns out to be of bad quality the 
JV will be terminated. Conversely, if the partner turns out to be of good quality an acquisition 
will take place. Several subsequent studies have argued or found empirically that JVs can 
mitigate the effect of information asymmetry about a potential acquisition target (Reuer and 
Koza, 2000; Shen and Reuer, 2005). Thus, the corresponding form of JV instability is the 
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effective buyout by one partner as it acquires the other partner, and suggests potential success 
for both partners. 
Conclusion 
In this section, we compared the literature used to explain the evolution and stability 
of JVs (see Table 2). The TCE literature on JV stability is still small and has mainly focused 
on how the degree of fit between the initial conditions and the governance choice at the 
formation stage influences subsequent stability. Nevertheless, TCE holds promise to shed 
light on endogenous uncertainty too. As we have described earlier, environmental uncertainty 
has an interactive effect from a TCE perspective (Williamson, 1985). Namely, a change in 
environmental conditions will not have much of an impact unless some other characteristics 
of the transaction, such as a high level of asset specificity, make this change problematic. 
Meanwhile, RO theory points to the existence of an explicit option, depending on uncertainty, 
as factors affecting JV stability. Thus, TCE and RO theory do not contradict each other. 
However, the interaction effect between environmental changes and asset specificity has not 
been tested empirically in the context of JV stability. Furthermore, it would imply a 
realignment of ownership shares. From a RO perspective, however, equity stakes adjust 
asymmetrically – specifically, the holder of a call option will increase her share only if 
changes in the environment push the option “in the money”, i.e. if the value of the partner’s 
underlying equity share has improved beyond the threshold strike price. Therefore, we 
propose: 
 
Proposition 1a: Ceteris Paribus, the likelihood of JV instability will increase when 
there is a change in the environment and there is high asset specificity. 
Proposition 1b: Ceteris Paribus, in the presence of an explicit call option, this effect 
will be stronger on the likelihood of a (partial) buyout (as opposed to termination), 
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The bargaining perspective has been used to predict both the initial distribution and 
subsequent changes in bargaining power. On the one hand, the studies looking at the initial 
bargaining power distribution argued that more unbalanced bargaining power, which 
translates in a more unequal equity division, will result in more unstable JVs. However, RO 
theory offers an alternative explanation for this prediction. Namely, taking a RO position will 
correspond to taking a smaller share in a JV with the intention to change this equity position 
at a later stage. Thus, a more imbalanced equity position might lead to JV instability from a 
RO perspective because it corresponds with one party taking an option. Furthermore, in the 
case of an option, the timing and conditions for a change in equity shares should correspond 
to specific changes in business conditions whereby the option becomes “in the money”. 
On the other hand, several studies argued that shifts in bargaining power would result 
in JV instability. Furthermore, the emphasis in these studies is on internal and endogenous 
factors, such as learning, which influence bargaining power. Chi and McGuire (1996) and 
Chi (2000) suggested that this bargaining power argument and RO theory may be 
complementary. Specifically, they argued that bargaining power will affect the value 
distribution between the parties in a changing JV, in case a strike price has to be negotiated 
when there is no explicit call option. Consequently, the parties in a JV would anticipate shifts 
in bargaining power and react by negotiating for an explicit option clause. Accordingly, the 
following proposition can be tested:13 
 
Proposition 2a: Ceteris Paribus, the likelihood that a firm has an explicit call option 
will be higher when it expects its bargaining power to deteriorate during the life of 
the JV. 
 
                                                 
13 In accordance with the existing literature, we focus here on call options. However, a similar argument can be 
made for put options that give the holder the right to sell its share. The likelihood that a firm has an explicit put 
option should also be higher when it expects its bargaining power to deteriorate during the life of the JV. 
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However, when there is no explicit option in place we would expect the option holder to 
anticipate a loss in bargaining power by striking the option when (s)he still has a more 
favorable level of relative bargaining power. This way, the option holder is able to capture 
more value than after the shift in bargaining power. Hence, we expect the following effect of 
shifts in bargaining power on the timing of exercising the option: 
 
Proposition 2b: Ceteris Paribus, the likelihood that the holder of an implicit call 
option will increase its share or buy out its JV partner is higher when the holder 
expects that its bargaining power will deteriorate, while such a relationship will not 
hold when the option holder has an explicit option clause. 
 
Although external factors have received less attention from a bargaining perspective, 
they may also play a significant role in explaining shifts in bargaining power and subsequent 
JV instability. Similarly, RO theory predicts that favorable changes in the environment results 
in option holders exercising their options. Thus, both the bargaining perspective and RO 
theory seem to offer similar predictions for favorable changes in the environment. However, 
RO theory predicts that JVs will remain stable when the changes in the environment are 
unfavorable until the expiry date of the option. Thus, the predictions of both views differ 
when it comes to changes that have a negative impact. 
Beside the learning race view of JVs, the learning perspective has focused on prior 
experience. On the one hand, prior experience is expected to influence the ability to design 
alliances ex ante and the ability to restructure the alliance ex post, and thereby influence JV 
stability. However, this view only focuses on ability and not on the external factors that 
would trigger the need for ex post adjustments. Hence, this part of the learning literature on 
alliances does not seem to contradict or overlap with RO theory. Some studies have also 
explored how learning can reduce uncertainty during the life of JVs. These studies hold 
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promise as complements to RO theory, with RO theory shedding light on the effect of 
changes in exogenous uncertainty (Cuypers and Martin, 2010) while learning models focus 
on the impact of changes in endogenous uncertainty on JV stability. 
Overall, the key feature of ROs, which distinguishes RO theory from the other 
theories described above, is the asymmetry in the expected effect of a negative and positive 
signal from the environment. Instability in the sense of one partner buying out at least a part 
of the other’s share, will only occur after a positive signal is observed, while JVs are expected 
to remain stable when a negative signal is observed until the option expires. This property of 
ROs should be exploited, as done by Kogut (1991), to distinguish empirically between RO 
explanations and alternative explanations such as the bargaining perspective and learning 
theory. Furthermore, we showed how the bargaining perspective can contribute to our 
understanding of the timing of exercising options, and vice versa. Namely, changes in relative 
bargaining power due to asymmetric learning are likely to be a key determinant of the timing 
decision to strike options when no explicit option clause is present, but this effect will depend 




There exist a variety of ways to assess performance in the JV literature (Anderson, 
1990; Olk, 2002). Firstly, there are a number of alternative levels of analysis. The 
performance of the JV itself can be analyzed, or that of one specific parent, or the combined 
performance of all parents. Secondly, performance can be measured via several scales such as 
subjective evaluation and satisfaction, financial performance, or JV (or parent) survival. 
Thirdly, performance can be measured at different points in time, and over different time 
horizons. For instance, regarding financial performance, abnormal returns from event studies 
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capture all performance implications of an investment as they can be anticipated in a near-
instantaneous measurement window, while accounting measures such as ROA capture 
performance as it unfolds during the selected years. Likewise, there exist a broad range of 
measures of performance in the RO literature, as reviewed by Reuer and Tong (2007). 
Most RO studies at least implicitly assume that investment decisions made in 
accordance with RO predictions will lead to value creation and higher financial performance 
(Kumar, 2005). However, studies testing this assumption are few, particularly pertaining to 
JVs. Kumar (2005) provided insights into the conditions under which acquiring a venture – 
i.e. striking a call option – or divesting a venture enhances the value of the parent firms. 
Using event study methodology, he found that JVs created value when they were divested 
with the aim of refocusing the firm’s product-market portfolio. Furthermore, the results 
revealed a negative relationship between the value created by both the acquirers and 
divesters, respectively, and the degree of technological and demand uncertainty. A similar 
relationship was found between the degree of rivalry in the target market and the value 
created by the acquirer. Contrary to RO predictions, rivalry did not seem to influence the 
value created by the divester. Furthermore, Kumar (2005) failed to find positive abnormal 
returns when a partner acquired a JV with the aim of growth and expansion in a target 
market, which would be predicted by RO theory. 
Tong, Reuer and Peng (2008) also examined under what conditions firms capture 
growth option value from having JVs. Contrary to Kumar (2005) who used abnormal returns 
to measure option value, Tong, Reuer and Peng (2008) measured value creation at a more 
aggregate corporate level. Namely, they partitioned the total value of the firm into a “value of 
assets in place” component and a “growth option” component, as suggested by Myers (1977). 
Their findings revealed a positive relationship between a firm’s number of JVs and its growth 
option value. Furthermore, they found that the number of minority JVs and the number of 
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non-core JVs have a greater impact on growth option value than the number of non-minority 
JVs and the number of core JVs, respectively. This is consistent with JVs being valuable 
growth options. However, they failed to find that the number of JVs in developing countries 
has a greater impact on growth option value than the number of JVs in developed countries. 
Finally, Reuer and Leiblein (2000) focused on the value that results from using ROs 
to limit downside risk, rather than on the upside potential of making RO investments. This is 
important as Kogut (1991) argued that firms could use JVs to capture upside potential by 
buying out a partner when favorable news becomes available, while limiting their downside 
risk. However, inconsistent with this RO prediction, Reuer and Leiblein (2000) found that 
firms that enter into multiple JVs do not thereby reduce their downside risk. In fact, for two 
out of three measures of downside risk, IJVs were associated with increased risk. 
In sum, although some of the above empirical findings offer support to some RO 
arguments, they also point out some important deviations from the predictions of the theory. 
Therefore, the performance implications of making RO investments should receive additional 
attention. Specifically, the conditions under which JVs indeed serve as growth options that 
enhance firm value require attention. So do the conditions under which JVs do or do not 
allow firms to avoid downside risk. 
The conditions under which JVs serve as growth options can be studied by combining 
elements of Kumar’s (2005) and Tong, Reuer and Peng’s (2008) approaches and looking at 
the effect of divestments and buyouts on a firm’s growth option value. The adjustment to a 
firm’s growth option value after a divestment or buyout will depend on the conditions 
surrounding the JV, specifically the level of exogenous uncertainty that enhances the growth 
option. Accordingly, we propose:  
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Proposition 3a: Ceteris Paribus, divesting a JV surrounded by higher levels of 
exogenous uncertainty will lead to a higher reduction in a firm’s growth option value 
than divesting a JV surrounded by lower levels of exogenous uncertainty. 
Proposition 3b: Ceteris Paribus, buying out a JV surrounded by higher levels of 
exogenous uncertainty will lead to a higher reduction in a firm’s growth option value 
than buying out a JV surrounded by lower levels of exogenous uncertainty. 
 
INTEGRATING THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF JOINT VENTURES 
As we have discussed earlier, one of the attractive features of RO theory is that it is a 
dynamic perspective that can explain each of a JV’s life-cycle stages – from initial 
conditions, to JV terms and initial ownership, to formation, to subsequent adjustment and 
post-JV outcomes (sale, dissolution etc.). Ideally, such a dynamic theory requires consistency 
in researching sequential stages. However, some variables or relationships that have been 
studied at one particular stage of JVs have received far less attention (or none at all) in 
studies that examined other stages. In this section we aim to integrate the different JV stages 
from a RO perspective. We discuss each of the stages and recap the results and arguments 
stepwise. Based on this we develop implications and propositions for researching each 
subsequent stage of the JV life cycle. We start by discussing how uncertainty can predict 
outcomes of each of the JV’s life-cycle stages and then we move through each of the later 
stages – explicit vs. implicit options, initial equity shares, and finally stability and 
adjustments – to see how each of them can explain the subsequent stages. Table 3 describes 
the arrangement of the resulting predictions. 
Exogenous Uncertainty 
One of the most prominent concepts in RO theory, uncertainty, stands to influence each of 
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theorized and found empirically that exogenous uncertainty will affect the initial ownership 
distribution in JVs as predicted by RO theory, but endogenous uncertainty will not. Studies 
looking at the other stages in the JV life cycle have not explicitly contrasted the effects of two 
or more sources of uncertainty, nor distinguished between forms of uncertainty that resolve 
endogenously versus exogenously. However, the theoretical arguments of Cuypers and 
Martin (2006b, 2010) can be generalized. The distinction between exogenous and 
endogenous uncertainty stands to matter not only to different forms of ROs (Roberts and 
Weitzman, 1981, Adner and Levinthal, 2004a), but also across stages of JVs as analyzed 
from a RO perspective. Our arguments so far entail that RO logic can help explain each of 
other stages of the JV life cycle when uncertainty resolves exogenously, but does not operate 
the same way when uncertainty resolves endogenously. Accordingly, first, we expect the 
presence of an explicit call option to depend on the nature of uncertainty. Thus, we propose: 
 
Proposition 4: Ceteris Paribus, the likelihood that a firm has an explicit option to 
acquire equity is positively related to the level of exogenous uncertainty surrounding 
the JV. However, from a real option perspective, we do not expect such a relationship 
for JVs surrounded by endogenous uncertainty. 
 
This does not preclude the possibility that from a transaction cost perspective, the likelihood 
of an explicit option increases with endogenous uncertainty because of the governance 
properties of such an explicit option – as suggested by Reuer and Tong (2005). In this area, 
then, RO and transaction cost theories are not fully reconciled. 
Furthermore, we would expect the effect of the level of uncertainty on the stability of 
JVs to be consistent with conventional RO predictions when uncertainty resolves 




Proposition 5: Ceteris Paribus, a lower level of exogenous uncertainty will increase 
the likelihood of a buyout by the call option holder. However, from a real option 
perspective, we do not except such a relationship for endogenous uncertainty. 
 
Kumar (2005) found, as predicted, that a negative relationship exists between the 
value created by both the acquirers and divesters, respectively, and the degree of 
technological and demand uncertainty. Although Kumar (2005) considered these two distinct 
sources of uncertainty, he did not contrast exogenous and endogenous sources of uncertainty. 
Following Cuypers and Martin’s (2006b, 2010) arguments, we expect performance 
implications to be consistent with conventional RO predictions when uncertainty resolves 
exogenously, but not when uncertainty resolves endogenously. Accordingly, we propose: 
 
Proposition 6: Ceteris Paribus, from a real option perspective, the value created for 
the acquirer and the divester when a JV is (partially) acquired will be negatively 
associated with the degree of exogenous uncertainty. However, from a real option 




Explicitness of Call Options 
Having an explicit call option gives the option holder certainty over the price it will 
have to pay when it decides to strike the option. Conversely, when a firm does not have an 
explicit option contract, it will have to negotiate a price when it wants to strike the option. 
There will be costs as a result of bargaining, and the other party is likely to capture at least 
part of the value that otherwise would have fully gone to the call option holder; however, in 
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the meanwhile, any disincentive to effort by the party not holding the explicit option may be 
reduced (Chi and McGuire, 1996, Chi, 2000). 
With respect to initial JV equity shares, this implies that having an explicit call option 
clause ex ante will make the option more valuable relative to not having such a clause, 
because the option holder will be able to capture all residual value (see also Reuer and Tong 
(2005)); while the option holder may concede more initial ownership to the other party in 
order to obtain the call option (Chi and McGuire, 1996). In this case, the two effects work in 
the same direction, and an investor who takes an explicit RO position in a JV is likely to have 
a smaller initial equity share. Hence, we expect: 
 
Proposition 7: Ceteris Paribus, if a firm holds an explicit call option, it will take a 
smaller share in the JV than when it only has an implicit call option. 
 
However, there is a complication in that the presence of an explicit option clause 
seems to be determined by the same factor, i.e. exogenous uncertainty, as the initial 
ownership distribution (Reuer and Tong, 2005). The presence of an explicit option clause 
may also act as a mediator because exogenous uncertainty influences the ownership 
distribution. Therefore, it would be interesting to decompose the total effect of exogenous 
uncertainty on ownership distribution into an indirect effect through the presence of an 
explicit option and a direct effect, and evaluate which effect is more important. A similar 
effort would also prove insightful for other stages of the JV life cycle as exogenous 
uncertainty influences each of them. 
The RO literature on JV stability has already largely incorporated the effects of 
explicit call option clauses. As discussed above, Miller and Folta (2002) argued that an 
explicit option clause accelerates the timing of striking options. Furthermore, Folta and Miller 
(2002) and Vassolo, Anand and Folta (2004) controlled for the presence of explicit option 
39
Chapter 2 
clauses. However, both studies found that the presence of an explicit option clause decreases 
the likelihood of the option holder striking the option. Thus, the empirical results contradict 
Miller and Folta’s (2002) prediction. This indicates a need for further research. 
With respect to the performance implications of striking an option, the presence of an 
explicit call option is also relevant. As mentioned earlier, in the presence of an explicit call 
option the option holder will capture all value while in the absence of such a clause, the value 
is likely to be divided between the acquirer and divester. Hence, we expect: 
 
Proposition 8a: Ceteris Paribus, if the acquirer of a JV share held an explicit call 
option initially, the abnormal return for the acquiring party will be positive while the 
abnormal return for the divesting party will not differ from zero. 
Proposition 8b: Ceteris Paribus, if the acquirer holds only an implicit call option, the 
abnormal returns for the acquiring and divesting parties will both be positive. 
 
Initial Joint Venture Equity Shares 
 
Investors who are aiming to make an option investment will take a smaller share in 
the JV because the payoff of the option increases as the stake of the investor in the JV 
decreases. Conversely, investors will take a larger share if they aim to capture the static NPV 
part (Chi and McGuire, 1996). Thus, a different ownership stake will indicate a different type 
of investment. 
Regarding the stability of JVs, we would expect RO investments to be associated with 
higher levels of instability than more static investments in the NPV part. Given that both 
types of investments are associated with taking different levels of equity in a JV, the equity 
distribution should be a predictor of JV stability. Therefore, we propose the following, which 
to our knowledge has not been tested in RO research: 
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Proposition 9: Ceteris Paribus, the likelihood that a firm will (partially) buy out its 
partner after receiving a positive signal will be higher when it has a smaller initial 
stake in the JV. 
 
The performance implications of having different levels of ownership have not been 
studied empirically, although Chi and McGuire (1996) developed a model whereby the 
payoff of striking the option increases as the initial stake of the investor in the JV decreases, 
because the investor has a greater range of additional in-the-money equity to invest in. 
Assuming that this relationship holds, we would expect the following: 
 
Proposition 10: Ceteris Paribus, an acquirer that held a smaller share will have a 
higher abnormal return when it (partially) buys out its partner. 
 
Stability of Joint Ventures 
Tong, Reuer and Peng (2008) found a positive relationship between a firm’s number 
of JVs and its growth option value. However, they did not study the effects of instability of 
the JVs in a firm’s option portfolio on the firm’s growth option value. Any adjustment in the 
number of options, should lead to a corresponding adjustment in growth option value. Three 
kinds of adjustments can be made: (1) terminating a JV, (2) fully buying out a JV, or (3) 
partially buying out a JV. All three should reduce the growth option value. However, the 
latter case should reduce growth option value less as it does not fully abandon or strike the 
option as in the first two scenarios because it leaves the possibility to acquire an additional 




Proposition 11: Ceteris Paribus, the termination of a JV, the full buyout of a JV and 
the partial buyout all reduce the growth option value of a firm. However, this 
reduction will be smaller in the case of a partial buyout. 
 
Conclusion 
In this section, we compared the literature used to explain the different JV stages and 
discuss how each stage can predict outcomes at subsequent stages (see Table 3). We 
contributed to the literature by identifying a number of important research opportunities 
resulting from the current lack of integration between these different stages. We offered a 
number of predictions and suggestions towards a better integration within the RO literature 
on JVs. 
Furthermore, the lack of integration between the different stages raises a number of 
empirical issues. Firstly, there are several potential sources of omitted-variable bias when a 
determinant of one JV stage is ignored in studying subsequent stages. For instance, 
exogenous uncertainty affects both the ownership structure of JVs (Folta, 1998; Cuypers and 
Martin, 2010) and the stability of equity partnerships (Folta and Miller, 2002). Furthermore, 
we have argued that the ownership structure will also have an effect on the stability of JVs 
from a RO perspective. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the JV stability 
studies from an RO perspective has controlled for the initial ownership distribution. By 
integrating the different stages in the RO process, and based on the propositions in this 
section, we aim to clearly indicate which factors should be controlled for in each of the 
different stages. 
Secondly, a possible endogenous-selection bias arises when the different stages are 
not sufficiently integrated. Firms make RO investment choices based on environment 
conditions. Hence, their investment decisions are self-selected and endogenous (Shaver, 
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1998). However, studies of the performance implications of RO investments do not 
incorporate several of the factors that determine the initial RO investment choice. The 
conclusions drawn from these studies might be incorrect or incompletely generalizable in the 
presence of self-selection. We have discussed above how the conditions and decisions 
leading to each successive JV stage (uncertainty, explicit versus implicit options, initial 
equity shares, and subsequent stability) should be considered when studying the performance 
implications of making RO investments. This should help ensure that variable omission and 
self-selection do not invalidate future research. 
 
INTEGRATING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS IN THE REAL OPTION LITERATURE 
Objective vs. Subjective Uncertainty 
Several scholars have called to study the behavioral aspects of making RO 
investments (e.g., Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Li, James, 
Madhavan and Mahoney, 2007). Responding to this call, Miller and Shapira (2004) reported 
evidence of biases in decision-makers’ estimations of the value of options. However, other 
than that paper, studies of the behavioral aspects of making RO investments remain lacking, 
particularly so when it comes to exploring JVs. Therefore, we aim to contribute to the 
existing literature by making use of behavioral decision theory to offer new insights on how 
managers perceive uncertainty and ROs. 
While uncertainty is one of the fundamental concepts in RO theory, the way it is 
described in the literature does not necessarily correspond with observed practice. RO theory 
has its roots in finance. Therefore, it is generally (at least implicitly) assumed that investors 
are rational and able to specify an accurate distribution of the expected returns of an 
investment ex ante (Leiblein, 2003). Accordingly, uncertainty is usually conceptualized and 
measured as being objective. However, in reality managers value options based on their 
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subjective perceptions of uncertainty (e.g., Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Furthermore, studies 
have found only weak to moderate correlations between objective and perceptual measures of 
uncertainty (e.g., Tosi, Aldag and Storey, 1973; Boyd, Dess and Rasheed, 1993). Therefore, it 
is important to consider how uncertainty is perceived by decision-makers to explain more 
accurately how they make RO investments, and to explain observed deviations from 
normative RO models. In the section that follows, the decision-maker of interest would be the 
(potential) investor in a JV. Since the investor is usually a corporate entity, the discussion is 
subject to the usual caveat about generalizing from individual to group- or organization-level 
decisions. 
Heuristics and Biases Influencing Real Option Decisions 
It has long been established that managers cannot gather all possible information from 
their environment, due to limited attention and information processing capacities (Simon, 
1955). As a result decision-makers are not able to make complete or fully accurate 
representations of their complex environments on which their actions are based (Simon, 
1955; March and Simon, 1958). Instead, decision-makers rely on a number of heuristics, i.e. 
simplifying strategies or rules of thumb, to deal with complex and uncertain decision 
situations. Normally these heuristics are useful and effective, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors that tend to be universal and predictable (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1982a). Drawing on prospect theory, Miller and Shapira (2004) found evidence 
of systematic biases in the valuation of ROs, which they attributed to whether choices were 
framed as losses or gains. However, a number of other heuristics may also influence the 
valuation and the striking of options.14 
                                                 
14 Although Miller and Shapira (2004) provided the respondents in their experiment with objective information 
about the distribution of uncertainty, they suggested that biases in the assessments of probabilities might also be 
relevant to the valuation of options. 
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Overconfidence and Control. Firstly, decision-makers tend to be overconfident about 
the judgments they make. In an experiment in which subjects were asked to set the lower and 
upper bounds of the expected returns of different investment alternatives, Fischhoff, Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1977) showed that the range of possible outcomes of investments is 
systematically underestimated. Similarly, Shapira (1995) argued that decision-makers 
systematically ignore very low probability events, even when they could have significant 
consequences for the organization. Thus, only a part of the range of possible outcomes of an 
investment is considered. If so, decision-makers will systematically underestimate the 
volatility of the value of a JV. This will in turn lead to a systematic undervaluation of the 
corresponding option. 
Secondly, decision-makers overestimate the degree of control they have over the 
outcome of their strategies. They also assume that if things do not go according to plan they 
can turn things around with additional effort, even if outcomes are exogenously determined in 
reality. Thus, decision-makers tend to see exogenous uncertainty as being endogenous 
(Langer and Roth, 1975; Schwenk, 1984). This will result in different investment incentives 
than those associated with RO logic. Based on these two arguments we propose: 
 
Proposition 12: Ceteris Paribus, investors are prone to under-invest in real options 
and therefore take a larger than optimal initial share in JVs. 
 
Anchoring. A third relevant heuristic is anchoring. Decision-makers revise their 
judgment about the value of variables that are crucial to their decisions when new 
information becomes available. However, these adjustments are generally not large enough. 
Thus, the values of the decision-variables are biased towards the decision-makers’ initial 
values (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a). Likewise, decision-makers’ valuation of the call 
option in a JV during the holding period will be biased towards their initial valuation of the 
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option at the time of the JV formation. They will perceive uncertainty to resolve slower or to 
a lesser extent than it actually resolves. As a result, options will be exercised or abandoned 
sub-optimally. Therefore, we propose: 
 
Proposition 13: Ceteris Paribus, relative to the RO ideal, investors in a call option in 
a JV are prone to buy out their partner too late or abandon the JV at the expiration 
date even if the option is “in the money” (i.e., the value of the JV exceeds the strike 
price). 
 
Availability. Fourthly, decision-makers assess the probabilities that events will occur 
by the ease with which occurrences of a similar nature can be thought of. This availability 
heuristic can also lead to biases. Some events seem to occur more frequently than others 
because they are easier to think of, even if they do not actually occur more frequently in 
practice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982b). The probability of these more available events will 
be overestimated while that of unavailable events will be underestimated (Sherman, Cialdini, 
Schwartzman and Reynolds, 2002). The availability or ease with which events can be 
recalled will depend on a decision-maker’s experience (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Indeed Calori, Johnson and Sarnin (1994) found empirical evidence of experience having an 
effect on CEOs’ cognitive representations of the environment. Therefore, we expect top 
managers’ subjective perception of uncertainty, and thereby their valuation of options, to be 
dependent on their prior experiences. Accordingly, we propose: 
 
Proposition 14: Ceteris Paribus, the negative relationship between exogenous 
uncertainty and (initial) share in a JV will be influenced by the level of prior 
experience that makes the source(s) of uncertainty more salient to the investor. 
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Role-Related Effects. Furthermore, Ireland, Hitt, Bettis and de Porras (1987) found 
evidence that perceived uncertainty varies across different management levels in the 
organization. They argued that managers at different levels of the organization would have 
different experiences and access to different types of information. Adner and Levinthal 
(2004a) argued that actors at different levels of the organization would have different 
perspectives and incentives influencing option investment decisions. Furthermore, managers 
will focus selectively on different aspects of the environment, including uncertainty, which 
are more relevant to their functional specialty (Dearborn and Simon, 1958). Therefore, we 
expect: 
 
Proposition 15a: Ceteris Paribus, the negative relationship between the source(s) of 
exogenous uncertainty and (initial) share in a JV will be influenced by the level of the 
decision-maker in the organization’s hierarchy. 
Proposition 15b: Ceteris Paribus, the negative relationship between the source(s) of 
exogenous uncertainty and (initial) share in a JV will be influenced by the functional 
specialty of the decision-maker. 
 
Besides these individual-level factors, organizational-level, institutional, and country factors 
may also lead to biases or challenges to make RO decisions (e.g., Hurry, Miller and Bowman, 
1992; Adner, 2007). Accordingly, future research should also examine these factors. Finally, 
future research should also study how these systematic biases can be reduced to make more 
optimal RO decisions. A number of bias-reducing strategies and routines have been proposed 
in the literature. For instance, Janney and Dess (2004) identified guidelines such as ex ante 
specifying decision rules, separating the role of option-writer and option exerciser, and 
making use of external auditors to access exit strategies, which can be helpful to offset biases. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to assess whether or not firms who have such strategies and 
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routines in place make more optimal RO decisions, and if so what the conditions and costs of 
implementing such guidelines are. 
Implications  
To summarize, additional attention to behavioral decision theory can help to advance 
our understanding of how ROs are valued and managed. While Miller and Shapira (2004) 
focused on individuals’ evaluation of possible losses and gains, we have examined biases in 
the assessment of uncertainty. More specifically, we identified a number of relevant 
heuristics and explained how they could lead to biases in the way uncertainty is perceived. 
These biases in turn will influence the valuation and management of options. Therefore, our 
insights are all the more relevant for managers aiming to make optimal RO decisions. 
Furthermore, we distinguished between subjective and objective uncertainty and pointed out 
the importance of this distinction for research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper provides an extensive survey of the RO literature on JVs, which 
contributes to this body of work in three ways. Firstly, we reviewed the RO literature and a 
number of oft used alternative theories. By highlighting similarities and differences between 
the different theories, we have found RO theory to be complementary in most cases. 
However, in some instances RO theory seemed to be overlapping with or contradicting other 
theories at first sight. Therefore, it is important for future research to integrate these theories 
by investigating and refining their respective boundary conditions, both theoretically and 
empirically. The study of strategic alliances in general stands to gain from such efforts. 
In this paper, we have also highlighted the need for integrating the different stages of 
the JV’s life cycle. In doing so, we indicated a number of gaps and contradictions in the RO 
literature on JVs. We outlined several opportunities for future research by incorporating 
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explanatory variables in a particular stage that previously have only been used in the context 
of another stage. Addressing these issues empirically in future research will advance our 
understanding of RO theory, particularly with respect to JVs. 
Finally, we have examined the behavioral aspects of making RO investments. By 
linking RO theory with behavioral decision-making theory, we hope to introduce additional 
realism in the use of ROs, especially JVs. This refinement is all the more relevant as it can 
inform researchers about how practitioners use or misuse ROs in practice. 
Overall, we have demonstrated that RO theory is an important perspective to study 
JVs for researchers in strategy and practitioners, and opened avenues for further research both 
in combining RO research with other theories, and in integrating what we know about 
different JV decisions and stages. Given the promise demonstrated by RO research to date, 
but also the gaps and inconsistencies in existing models and results, further research on JVs 
from a RO perspective is well warranted. The research areas and predictions presented here 









WHAT MAKES AND WHAT DOES NOT MAKE A REAL OPTION? 




This chapter examines the boundaries of real option logic, with an application 
to joint ventures (JVs). We distinguish between forms of uncertainty which are 
resolved endogenously versus exogenously, and theorize that only exogenous 
uncertainty will have the impact predicted by real option theory on investors’ 
choices of equity shares. We theorize that macro-economic and institutional 
variables drive exogenous uncertainty, while choices pertaining to corporate 
scope and development activities are endogenous sources of uncertainty. Using 
a sample of 6,472 Sino-foreign JVs, we find support for our predictions. We 
discuss and implement proper methods to test for the existence of null effects, as 
is relevant here to establish the boundaries of real option theory. We draw 






                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Xavier Martin. It will appear in 2010 in the Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(1). Earlier versions of this project have been nominated for the Carolyn 
Dexter Award at the Annual Academy of Management Meeting in Atlanta, and for the Strategic Management 




With greater international competition and the rise of emerging-market economies, 
multinational firms increasingly face highly uncertain foreign environments in which to do 
business. Accordingly, the emphasis in management and international business research has 
shifted towards how firms can compete and adapt in environments where they face various 
sources of uncertainty (e.g., Campa, 1994; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Krishnan, Martin and 
Noorderhaven, 2006; Martin, Swaminathan and Mitchell, 1998). This points to a need to 
specify conditional relationships between sources of uncertainty and a firm’s expansion 
strategy, as a firm’s strategy should be in line with the nature of the uncertainties it faces 
(Miller, 1992). While this may entail a variety of entry modes and other risk-handling 
initiatives, one that has sustained much interest among international business scholars is the 
use of foreign joint ventures (JVs) and related cooperative strategies (e.g., Beamish and 
Bank, 1987; Contractor and Lorange, 2002). Furthermore, above and beyond the choice 
between JVs and alternative modes or initiatives, a JV’s setup, and specifically decisions 
about its ownership, have substantive consequences under uncertainty (e.g., Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988). 
Hence, uncertainty should also determine how much ownership firms seek over their 
foreign JVs, and how they use JVs to expand sequentially (e.g., Aharoni, 1966). In this 
chapter, we define JVs as equity-based collaborative arrangements whereby two or more 
organizations contribute resources, including equity, in a separate legal entity meant for the 
joint pursuit of economic goals (Gulati, 1995; Martin and Salomon, 2003a). We focus on 
international joint ventures (IJVs), which are subject to substantial uncertainty from exchange 
rate, cultural and institutional sources among others. This makes IJVs particularly suitable for 
our purpose. However, we believe that our arguments are also relevant for other (domestic) 
JVs insofar as they face various sources of uncertainty. 
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While numerous scholars have looked at the conditions under which JVs are more or 
less appropriate relative to extreme ownership solutions such as non-equity alliances or 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (e.g., Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Gulati, 1995; Hennart, 1988; 
Oxley, 1997, 1999; Pisano, 1990; Sampson, 2004), we look at the determinants of the 
distribution of JV ownership among partners, which is a far less studied aspect of JVs.2 We 
use a real option perspective as this is highly appropriate to explain the strategies of firms in 
highly uncertain environments (Bowman and Hurry, 1993), and specifically JV ownership 
stake decisions (Chi and McGuire, 1996) and international contexts (Li, 2007). 
The concept of real options has elicited considerable enthusiasm in recent years 
among scholars and practitioners of strategic investments, especially those investments that 
may encompass multiple stages subject to intervening events. Investments such as research 
projects, taking out patents, subcontracting, founding new businesses, expanding 
internationally, and entering into JVs have been classified as real options (e.g., Kester, 1981; 
Li, 2007; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000; Van Mieghem, 1999). The widespread use of real 
options logic, combined with the fact that a gap between theoretical and empirical work 
continues to exist in this area (Reuer, 2002), leaves open questions about the conditions under 
which real options logic is indeed applicable. At the same time, it is important to examine 
what variables are indeed suitable predictors within a real options framework, for both 
theoretical and empirical reasons. 
Theoretically, Adner and Levinthal (2004a, 2004b) called for further attention to the 
boundaries for the application of real option theory to strategic decision-making. They argued 
that the assumptions underlying the real option model are violated if variables such as the 
 
2 The approaches that have been used in the few existing studies investigating the distribution of JV ownership 
among partners are Transaction Costs Economics (Chen, Hu and Hu, 2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; 
Gatignon and Anderson, 1988), Agency Theory (Chi and Roehl, 1997; Nakamura and Yeung, 1994), and the 
Bargaining Perspective (Blodgett, 1991; Fagre and Wells, 1982). However, these studies have yielded mixed 
results regarding the role of (behavioral) uncertainty on the equity distribution of JVs. For a detailed review of 
this literature, see Cuypers and Martin (2007). 
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end-date of the underlying project are discretionary: “Because much attention in the 
management literature is focused on the ways in which the firm can affect outcomes and 
variances […], it is important to examine what happens to the applicability of options logic 
as we move away from a world of wait and see to a world of “act and see,” in which 
uncertainty resolution is endogenous to firm activity” (Adner and Levinthal 2004a, p. 76). 
This question is especially relevant when applying real options logic to the study of JVs, 
because JVs represent both investments with implications for each participating firm’s 
overall corporate strategy and performance, and a choice of a governance mode that itself 
may encourage strategic or opportunistic behavior among partners. Moreover, the literature 
on JVs has looked at how JVs can both be used as vehicles to “wait and see” and to “act and 
see”. For example, Aharoni (1966) argued that JVs could be used to limit a firm’s exposure to 
uncertainty, while other studies have looked at how firms can improve their performance 
through learning in JVs (e.g., Kogut, 1988; Mitchell and Singh, 1992; Mody, 1993). This 
makes JVs all the more suited to investigate the issues raised by Adner and Levinthal (2004a, 
2004b). Whereas Adner and Levinthal (2004a, 2004b) focus on the duration of the 
investment and the issue of project drift, we focus on uncertainty, which is a key reason for 
using JVs to enter international markets (Kogut, 1991) and to make real option investments in 
general. 
Empirically, while some studies of JVs have found support for predictions derived 
from real options theory, others have not. Indeed, two prominent studies, by Folta (1998) and 
Reuer and Leiblein (2000), found deviations from real options predictions with respect to the 
effect of uncertainty on JV formation and the downside-risk consequences of JVs 
respectively. 
We aim to address the above theoretical and empirical conundrums by developing and 
testing hypotheses about which sources of uncertainty are indeed, or are not, associated with 
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JV equity shares consistent with real option theory. In so doing, we contribute to the real 
option literature by examining, theoretically and empirically, to what extent real option logic 
accurately describes equity shares in international joint ventures (IJVs). Specifically, we 
examine whether various forms of uncertainty predict the distribution of equity stakes in IJVs 
in the way that real options logic suggests, depending on whether or not the uncertainty can 
be resolved endogenously. We also contribute to the JV literature at large in several ways. 
We explicate the conditional effect of uncertainty on JV ownership, thus complementing 
literature about the choice of entry mode. We thus refine the analysis of uncertainty as a 
determinant of JV strategy. In general, our study advances the understanding of how JVs are 
structured under conditions of uncertainty. 
BACKGROUND 
Real Options 
Simultaneously with the increasing popularity of financial options in the 1970s, it was 
realized that an analogy exists between organizational resources investments and financial 
options (Myers, 1977). Bowman and Hurry (1993) argued that the option lens can be very 
useful to study the strategies of organizations, since the capabilities and assets of an 
organization can be seen as a bundle of options for future strategic choices. These options are 
called “real options” and can be defined as contingent investment commitments in an asset or 
capability, rather than in a financial contract, which secure decision-making rights in the 
future (Trigeorgis, 1993). 
Numerous insights and techniques from financial option pricing have spilled over to 
the valuation of organizational resources investments. Prominently, they imply that the 
traditional Net Present Value (NPV) approach to value investments does not fully capture the 
value of management’s flexibility to adapt to unexpected market developments. Such 
flexibility can increase the investment’s upside potential while limiting its downside losses 
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relative to management’s initial expectations under passive management (Trigeorgis, 1995). 
This does not mean that the traditional NPV approach to valuing investments should be put 
aside, but instead that it should be extended to take into account both a passive NPV 
component and a dynamic option value component (Pindyck, 1988). The value of the real 
option component of an investment is a function of the same parameters that determine the 
value of a financial option (Seth and Kim, 2001). 
However, not every investment or decision is an investment in real options. The two 
different value components can be captured in a different way because they require a 
different size of investment. On the one hand, the passive NPV component requires a large 
investment in order to capture as much cash flow as possible. On the other hand, the dynamic 
option component can be captured with a smaller investment. This distinction can be applied 
to JVs too. 
Joint Ventures and the Option to Acquire 
Kogut (1991) was the first to apply real option theory to IJVs. He argued that firms 
can capture the upside potential of a JV by buying out the partner in a later stage when 
favorable information becomes available. At the same time, taking a lower share in the JV 
limits the downside risk. The option to acquire can be explicit, but this is not a necessity. 
Even when there is no ex ante contractual specification of which party holds the acquisition 
right and of the strike price, it remains possible for both parties to negotiate the acquisition of 
the other party’s share at a price that is agreed upon later under specific conditions. Hence, 
JVs have at least an embedded implicit call option to acquire a partner’s stake (Chi and Seth, 
2001). 
Following Kogut (1991), several other scholars have looked at JVs from a real options 
perspective (e.g., Chi and McGuire, 1996; Chi and Seth, 2001; Reuer, 2000, 2002; Reuer and 
Koza, 2000; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000; Reuer and Tong, 2005). One of the key findings is 
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that the options embedded in JVs will have an impact on the distribution of the equity stakes. 
On the one hand, if the investor tries to capture the static NPV part (s)he will take an as large 
as possible share, to fully capture the future cash flows. In the extreme, this will lead to an 
acquisition instead of a JV (Seth and Kim, 2001). On the other hand, an investor who aims to 
capture the dynamic real option part will invest in a smaller share of the JV because this 
limits the downside risk while leaving open the opportunity to capture the upside potential of 
the JV (see Chi and McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2002). Thus a JV contains an implicit or explicit 
call to acquire the other party’s stake, and we can expect the firm investing in the call option 
to take a smaller share in a JV. 
Real Option Theory and Uncertainty 
One of the most prominent concepts in real option theory is uncertainty.3 Two broad 
streams of research (Reuer, 2002) address JV investments (among other decisions) using the 
logic of real options. Although the general premise in both streams is that uncertainty in 
general is positively related to option value (e.g., Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kulatilaka and 
Perotti, 1998), the two streams provide different but complementary insights into the role of 
uncertainty. 
In the first stream, researchers use formal models to study the theoretical benefits and 
cost of investing in different kinds of strategic real options and to assess how flexibility can 
contribute to value creation. Many of these models focused on one or at most two different 
sources of uncertainty each. For instance, Bell (1995) and Huchzermeier and Cohen (1996) 
focused on exchange rate uncertainty. Bollen (1999) looked at demand uncertainty. Chi and 
McGuire (1996) and Chi (2000) examined how uncertainty about the market and about a 
collaborative partner can add to the value of collaborative ventures. Additionally, some 
 
3 The concept of uncertainty used in option theory is actually one of risk in the sense of Knight (1921), in that 
options pricing models assume that it is possible to specify the probability distribution of future asset values. 
Nevertheless, we follow the extant use of terminology in referring to this as “uncertainty”. 
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scholars have emphasized that real option reasoning applies to uncertainty that is exogenous, 
i.e. outside the control of the firm (e.g., Kulatilaka, 1995). Indeed, Miller and Folta (2002) 
argued that such exogenous uncertainty increases the value of a call option, unlike 
uncertainty that is under the control of the firm (e.g., responding to rivals’ threat of pre-
emption). 
In the second stream, researchers examine empirically whether JV decisions are 
consistent with real options theory. Kogut (1991) found evidence of JVs being used as 
options to make subsequent acquisitions in the presence of market uncertainty. Folta and 
Miller (2002) looked at the timing of exercising options and found evidence of the influence 
of uncertainty, operationalized as the variability in stock-market subfield indices, on the 
timing of partner buyouts in equity partnerships in the biotechnology industry. Reuer and 
Tong (2005) found that the likelihood that a firm will have an explicit option to acquire 
equity in an IJV is a function of property rights uncertainty, political uncertainty and 
diversification-related uncertainty but not of cultural distance. However, other studies found 
results inconsistent with real options predictions. Reuer and Leiblein (2000) found that firms 
that enter into multiple JVs do not thereby reduce their downside risk; in fact, for two of three 
measures of downside risk, IJVs were associated with increased risk. Folta (1998) found that 
multiple forms of uncertainty were associated with the taking of real option positions in the 
form of minority equity investments (rather than acquisitions). However, only exogenous 
uncertainty associated with subfield-specific stock market volatility encouraged the formation 
of JVs as call options. 
In summary, multiple sources and concepts of uncertainty have been advanced in real 
options research; however, very few studies have contrasted the effects of two or more 
sources of uncertainty. Furthermore, differences in concepts of uncertainty may explain some 
of the deviations from the general uncertainty-option value relationship which have been 
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found in the empirical literature with respect to JVs. To address this, we seek to contrast 
multiple sources of uncertainty. In this respect, the gaps between theoretical and empirical 
literatures suggest that a critical distinction is whether or not uncertainty is exogenous to the 
firm’s influence. 
HYPOTHESES 
The decision to invest in a call option to acquire will depend on the value of that 
option. This call option value will increase as uncertainty surrounding the value of the 
underlying asset increases. As the distribution of the possible values of the underlying asset at 
maturity widens, it becomes more probable that the option will be in-the-money at maturity, 
making the exercise of the call profitable. Conversely, the downside if the option is out-of-
the-money does not increase – it is just the initial cost of the option. Once a firm acquires a 
real option on a future opportunity, it can strike the option and take the full opportunity if the 
uncertainty is resolved favorably over time, or just let the opportunity pass at no further cost 
if the uncertainty is resolved unfavorably. 
Carrying over this insight from financial options to real options is what makes real 
option theory particularly appealing: It deals with one of firms’ most important challenges by 
linking current strategic decisions with uncertainty about future outcomes. However, the 
carry-over is problematic if the conditions for the resolution of the uncertainty depart from 
the theory (Adner and Levinthal, 2004a). In this respect, two forms of uncertainty can be 
distinguished: exogenous uncertainty and endogenous uncertainty (Folta, 1998; Roberts and 
Weitzman, 1981). 
Exogenous uncertainty is uncertainty of which the resolution is unaffected by the 
actions of the firm (Chi and Seth, 2001; Roberts and Weitzman, 1981). For example, 
uncertainty about currency exchange rates is exogenous since these rates are determined in 
atomistic markets that cannot be outguessed or manipulated (Campa, 1994). By contrast, 
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endogenous uncertainty is resolved (at least in part) by the actions of the firm itself over time. 
More specifically, the degree, direction and pace of resolution of endogenous uncertainty 
depend both on the effort of the firm to obtain more information and on the actions it 
undertakes accordingly to influence outcomes (Chi and Seth, 2001; Roberts and Weitzman, 
1981). For instance, a firm may not know a priori how hierarchically structured the 
organizations in a given country may be, but that uncertainty can be resolved by making a 
systematic effort to learn about the issue and by adjusting the investor’s own behavior and 
that of its business partners accordingly (Hofstede, 2001). 
We argue that while real options theory should apply in the case of exogenous 
uncertainty resolution, it need not when uncertainty resolution is endogenous. The case of 
exogenous uncertainty corresponds to the case of financial options, where it is assumed that 
uncertainty is resolved independently of the investor’s behavior. If this property carries over 
to investments that are non-financial in nature, the real option logic should hold (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2004a). Furthermore, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that exogenous uncertainty 
increases the value of waiting for new information4 and makes committing resources less 
attractive because investing will not influence how uncertainty is resolved. Hence, options 
pricing models should be applicable. 
Conversely, when uncertainty is resolved endogenously, three separate but related 
arguments can be made whereby real option logic will not hold anymore. Firstly, in case of 
financial options, investors are assumed to be price-takers (Black and Scholes, 1973; Jarrow 
and Turnbull, 2000). This is reflected in the use of the Brownian (random) motion to model 
the price of the underlying asset. However, when investors can influence the resolution of 
                                                 
4 In case of exogenous uncertainty the firm will wait for information about how the exogenous source of 
uncertainty has evolved and subsequently take action, i.e. decide whether to strike, hold-on to or abandon the 
option. In a broad sense this can also be seen as learning. However, contrary to learning in case of endogenously 
resolved uncertainty, the firm cannot determine the pace of information revelation, nor can it influence its 
outcomes. “Learning” amidst exogenous uncertainty thus simply represents the passive receipt of updated 
information. It does not represent the systematic, forward-looking accumulation of experience or the proactive 
development of causal insight that is normally associated with organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
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uncertainty through their own actions, they are not pure price-takers anymore; instead, they 
can affect the value of the underlying asset. This violates a fundamental assumption of 
(financial) option pricing models (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973). The resulting 
arbitrage opportunities mean that existing models will fail to price options accurately (Jarrow 
and Turnbull, 2000). 
Secondly, uncertainty that can be resolved endogenously influences the investment 
decision differently than uncertainty that is resolved exogenously. Endogenous uncertainty 
can be resolved by undertaking efforts to discover how to manipulate the outcome of interest 
and then by acting accordingly, i.e. by proactive investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; see 
also Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). In such a situation, the issue becomes one of figuring out 
the means and cost to resolve uncertainty rather than of uncertainty about the payoffs of the 
project proper. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), only investing will reveal the relevant 
information and allow the corresponding solution to be implemented. Therefore, there exists 
an incentive to invest and commit resources rather than wait. Hence, the normal real option 
logic will not apply in case of endogenous uncertainty. As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) noted, 
this does not exclude that investments surrounded by endogenous uncertainty occur 
sequentially, thereby superficially resembling real option investments when in fact their 
resolution depends on a different mechanism (the NPV component). 
Thirdly, Adner and Levinthal (2004a) argued that the validity of real options theory as 
a decision-making tool is likely to break down if uncertainty can be resolved endogenously 
and targets are flexible. Acting to reduce endogenous uncertainty will often lead to the 
discovery of new and unanticipated opportunities and paths. Thus, actions will not only 
reduce the uncertainty surrounding the initially intended project but it will also provide 
information about other possibilities and introduce new goals, even when the outcomes are 
negative from the perspective of the initial project and its goals. As a consequence of the 
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open-ended nature of this discovery process, the discrete nature of real options investment is 
eroded, which creates serious organizational challenges to preserve the specific form of 
flexibility that made a real option investment attractive in the first place. 
For these reasons, we expect that while real options predictions will accurately 
describe firms’ responses to exogenous uncertainty, they will not accurately describe their 
responses to endogenous uncertainty. To explicate this difference further, we derive six 
hypotheses, of which three deal with sources of uncertainty that are resolved exogenously and 
three with sources of uncertainty that are resolved endogenously. 
Exogenously Resolved Uncertainty 
Economic uncertainty: An important host country factor that has an impact on the value of 
an investment is economic uncertainty (e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). This refers to the 
uncertainty about the macroeconomic situation in a host country and encompasses all the 
unknowns about the level of economic activity and prices (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1987). 
More economic uncertainty results in higher variability in both the foreign investor’s cash 
flows and the value of the investment (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). As a result, the value 
of a call option will increase as economic uncertainty increases.5 
Key macroeconomic variables such as inflation, prices and aggregate demand are 
determined in a complex system consisting of markets and sovereign governments (Oxelheim 
and Wihlborg, 1991). Thus, for individual firms it is extremely difficult, if not outright 
impossible in larger economies, to influence the macroeconomic conditions of the host 
country. Therefore, economic uncertainty will be resolved exogenously. Accordingly, we 
expect real option logic to hold: 
 
                                                 
5 For simplicity of exposition, we treat the foreign partner as the call option holder. This is consistent with the 
existing literature (e.g., Reuer and Tong, 2005). We will discuss why this assumption is all the more valid in our 
empirical setting, i.e. China, when we describe our sample below. In some other empirical settings it may be less 
clear who is the call option holder. 
62
What Makes and What Does Not Make a Real Option? A Study of International Joint Ventures 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, a foreign partner entering into a joint venture in an 
environment with higher economic uncertainty will have a higher propensity to make 
a call option investment. Therefore, the foreign partner will take a smaller share in 
the joint venture. 
 
Local institutional uncertainty: The institutional environment includes legal, 
regulatory and social factors that shape business activity (Davis, North and Smorodin, 1971). 
These institutions can cause uncertainty for investors in various ways. For instance, in an 
underdeveloped judicial system, laws tend to be unclear or inadequate, and their enforcement 
unreliable. Investors are thus uncertain about current and future tax obligations, labor laws 
and the neutrality of courts. Generally, an unstable (local) institutional framework increases 
ongoing uncertainty for business owners (Davis, North and Smorodin, 1971). Such 
uncertainty is bound to affect foreign investors, including JVs (Shan, 1991). 
Furthermore, institutional uncertainty is resolved exogenously, especially in larger 
and more complex national systems, because a firm is unlikely to be able to affect the 
multiple layers of government and institutions that make such policies, even if it manages to 
understand them (e.g., Chi and Seth, 2001). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, a foreign partner entering into a joint venture located 
in an area with higher institutional uncertainty within a country will have a higher 
propensity to make a call option investment. Therefore, the foreign partner will take a 
smaller share in the joint venture. 
 
Exchange rate uncertainty: Expanding abroad usually also commonly means that a 
firm has to deal with a currency other than their home country’s currency. Changes in the 
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exchange rate will in turn influence the value of the foreign investment. This source of 
uncertainty is inherent in international business, regardless of whether the exchange rate is 
fixed (and thus subject to unpredictable adjustment) or floating (Katz, 1972; Miller, 1992). 
It has been well established that the private prediction of future exchange rates, is 
costly and unreliable – i.e., investors cannot reliably predict the direction of exchange rates, 
beyond information provided in currency markets. Furthermore, individual firms are price-
takers on the foreign exchange markets. Foreign exchange markets are too large in volume 
and too liquid for individual non-financial companies to influence exchange rates (Campa, 
1994; Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett, 1998). Hence, exchange rate uncertainty is resolved 
exogenously. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, a foreign partner entering into a joint venture in an 
environment with higher exchange rate uncertainty will have a higher propensity to 
make a call option investment. Therefore, the foreign partner will take a smaller 
share in the joint venture. 
 
Endogenously Resolved Uncertainty 
Cultural uncertainty: When an organization expands abroad it will be confronted 
with an environment that is culturally different from that in its home country. The success of 
the foreign venture will depend on the cooperation and communication with local parties who 
tend to have different values, beliefs, and customs (Hofstede, 2001). A lack of knowledge of 
the local culture can have serious negative effects on the investment (Barkema, Bell and 
Pennings, 1996). The more distance between the culture of the foreign investor and the 
culture of the host country, the more uncertainty there will be in this respect. The foreign 
partner will be unsure of how well it communicates with local employees, suppliers and 
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customers as is necessary to succeed in its new environment. The more distant the cultures, 
the less certain it becomes that the essential skills and knowledge can be effectively acquired. 
Thus, initial uncertainty also exists about the conditions for operating successfully across 
cultural boundaries in the new environment. Furthermore, as cultural distance increases, it 
becomes more uncertain how the parties (owners) to a JV will interact with each other. With 
increased cultural distance the partners face increased communication problems among 
themselves, are more likely to have different goals, are more likely to have a more negative 
attitude towards each other, and experience more stress (Weber, Shenkar and Raveh, 1996). 
Uncertainty about the JV’s performance increases accordingly. 
While such cultural differences indeed represent a severe source of uncertainty for the 
firm initiating expansion abroad, this uncertainty can be resolved by the actions of the firm 
itself. With local experience, a foreign investor can much better assess cultural predilections 
in the host country. It can then assess better how its own personnel and organization should 
interface with local parties, and adjust its behavior to conform to local culture as relevant 
(Black, Mendenhall and Oddou, 1991). The foreign investor can also use this information to 
bargain with the JV partner(s), local employees, suppliers and customers, etc. – parties whose 
behavior it may effectively influence, unlike macro-institutions. Such informed adjustments 
to the behavior of the foreign firm, and plausibly its business partners, will influence the 
outcome of the JV and thereby the value of the asset underlying the option. Furthermore, the 
firm can decide how to invest in learning about the local culture and values and how to act 
proactively based on this (Black and Mendenhall, 1990). Thus, unlike the exogenous 
uncertainty described in our first three hypotheses, cultural uncertainty can be resolved 
endogenously. This entails a departure from the assumptions underlying real option logic. 
Therefore, we do not expect cultural uncertainty to determine the value of a call option. 




Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, a foreign partner originating from a more culturally 
distant country will not have a higher propensity to make a call option investment 
when entering into a joint venture. Therefore, the foreign partner will not take a 
smaller share in the joint venture. 
 
Uncertainty about development capabilities: In case of JVs an important source of 
uncertainty pertains to corporate capabilities (Chi and Seth, 2001). Firstly, there is 
uncertainty about the stand-alone capabilities of the other party, due to information 
asymmetry. Secondly, there is uncertainty about the potential benefits of combining the assets 
contributed by each partner. This uncertainty is especially important when it comes to 
intangible assets and knowledge-based activities (Martin and Salomon, 2003a; Seth and Kim, 
2001). 
Such uncertainty about capabilities is most prevalent in collaborations that involve 
product and/or process development activities. Development projects generally require a 
substantial amount of specific know-how and proprietary information (Chan, Kensinger, 
Keown and Martin, 1997). Furthermore, in JVs that encompass development activities, this 
specific know-how and information must be shared in order to enable joint discovery, search 
for new solutions and accomplish product or process development goals. This entails higher 
uncertainty than in JVs that limit themselves to the use of existing know-how (Pisano, 1989). 
Therefore, we expect uncertainty about partner capabilities to be higher in JVs with 
development activities. 
However, over time the foreign partner will become better able to assess the 
development contributions of the local partner (Chi and Seth, 2001). Information asymmetry 
about the stand-alone capabilities of the partner will be reduced too (Balakrishnan and Koza, 
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1993). This will start to reduce the uncertainty about the benefits of combining assets (Seth 
and Kim, 2001). Furthermore, the pace and extent to which this uncertainty is resolved will 
depend on how much effort the foreign investor allocates to acquiring and implementing 
knowledge in the development process (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman, 1996). As a result, the foreign partner will be able to take a number of actions to 
increase the likelihood that the development activities are successful. Hence, resolution of 
this kind of uncertainty is endogenous to the foreign partner’s actions (Chi, 2000; Chi and 
Seth, 2001; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). Therefore, we 
do not expect the normal real option effect to hold. Rather, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, a foreign partner entering into a joint venture with a 
product or process development purpose will not have a higher propensity to make a 
call option investment. Therefore, the foreign partner will not take a smaller share in 
the joint venture. 
 
Scope-related uncertainty: JVs differ in their scope, i.e. the extent to which their 
partners combine functions and activities within the JV (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). For 
example, JVs can perform manufacturing, marketing, R&D, service activities or any 
combinations of these. An increase in the scope of a JV increases the interdependence, 
complexity and uncertainty of collaborating (Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Reuer, Zollo and 
Singh, 2002). Thus, we expect uncertainty to be higher in JVs with a broader scope. 
However, the JV partners can choose to increase the level of communication and 
coordination to deal with the increased uncertainty resulting from a broader scope (e.g., 
Kogut, 1988). Furthermore, they can learn about each other’s skills, procedures and 
capabilities and create idiosyncratic skills to collaborate, which enable them to deal more 
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successfully with unanticipated contingencies (Nakamura, Shaver and Yeung, 1996; Pisano, 
1989). As a consequence, the uncertainty resulting from a broader scope can be addressed by 
the actions of the partners in the JV. Therefore, scope-related uncertainty is endogenous and 
we do not expect a real option effect. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, a foreign partner entering into a joint venture with a 
wider scope of activities will not have a higher propensity to make a call option 





We collected data on equity JVs (JVs) formed in China between 1979 and 1996 and 
involving a foreign partner. The main source of data is the Almanac of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade of China, which is published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).6 The data source listed 8,077 Sino-foreign JVs. 
However, the number of observations was reduced to 6,472, originating from forty-one 
countries, once we excluded tri-partite JVs for which each party’s equity investment could 
not be broken down, and countries for which Hofstede’s (2001) cultural scores were not 
available. These JVs are newly established legal entities in which both partners contribute 
resources, including equity. Moreover, the JVs in our sample are active in 59 different 
industries and cover China’s entire geographical area. 
The data have been shown to be reliable and consistent with FDI data from 
independent non-Chinese sources and parts of the data have been used in several published 
                                                 
6 MOFTEC was formerly known as the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) and 
currently known as the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM). 
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studies (e.g., Chadee and Qiu, 2001; Chadee, Qui and Rose, 2003; Pan, 1996; Pan, 2002).7 
Furthermore, our sample is comparable to those used in other published studies of JVs in 
China which used other sources such as from the China Business Review (e.g., Gaba, Pan 
and Ungson, 2002; Tse, Pan and Au, 1997). Hence, we feel our sample is consistent with 
those used in other studies and representative of all JVs established in China between 1979 
and 1996. 
China and our JV data are particularly suited to test our hypotheses, for several 
reasons. Firstly, China was the world’s second largest recipient of FDI after the U.S. as of 
1994 – indeed it surpassed the U.S. in 2003 (UNCTAD, 2003). This provides a large number 
of observations originating from a wide range of countries. Secondly, China is a complex 
environment for foreign investors, where each of the sources of uncertainty described in our 
hypotheses is substantial (Boisot and Child, 1999). Thirdly, almost all foreign investment in 
China during the study period was through JVs. China’s government actively sought to 
promote equity-based JVs while preventing other modes of investment.8 This makes the data 
all the more complete. 
The question arises, naturally, whether these JVs are indeed real options. 
Theoretically, numerous scholars have argued that JVs are real options (e.g., Chi, 2000; Chi 
and McGuire, 1996; Kogut, 1991; Miller and Folta, 2002; Reuer and Tong, 2005). 
Furthermore, there is strong and corroborating empirical evidence supporting JVs as real 
options. More specifically, there is evidence pertaining to the presence of explicit options in 
JVs (Reuer and Tong, 2005), the formation of JVs (Folta, 1998), the stability of JVs (Folta 
 
7 Pan (2002) also looks at JVs established between 1979 and 1996. Other studies use a subset of our sample. 
Pan’s (1996) sample covers the 1979-1992 period; Chadee and Qui (2001) look at 1992-1995; and Chadee, Qui 
and Rose (2003) study JVs established between 1984 and 1996. 
8 Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were summed up in the “Four Modernizations” of agriculture, industry, science and 
technology and the military. The focus was on knowledge transfer from the West. The C.C.P.’s initial view was 
that this could best be achieved by setting up joint ventures with foreign partners. Therefore, all alternative 
investment modes were prohibited except for a few exceptions (Almanac of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade of China, various issues). 
69
Chapter 3 
and Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991; Vassolo, Anand and Folta, 2004), and the performance 
implications of making JV investments (Kumar, 2005; Tong, Reuer and Peng, 2008), which 
are all consistent with real option predictions. 
In the specific case of China there are four additional reasons to think these JVs 
contain real options. Firstly, Reuer and Tong (2005) argued that JVs are even more likely to 
be real options under high levels of uncertainty. 
Secondly, we conducted a number of interviews with managers of multinational firms 
that are active in China. These interviews consistently revealed that firms take a real option 
approach when they enter China. For example, one manager in charge of a large electronics 
firm’s JVs stated that: “we use a real option approach to structure our investments when we 
enter China because it is such an unpredictable market”. Other managers gave similar 
responses. 
Thirdly, by Chinese law, the articles of association of Sino-foreign JVs must include a 
pricing mechanism to determine the value of the JV at dissolution or for other changes of 
ownership. Furthermore, the contractual duration of a JV has to be specified ex ante in the 
JV’s articles of association. Therefore, JVs in China correspond at least with what Seth and 
Chi (2002) classify as an option with a restrictive termination clause and a pre-specified 
mechanism to value the JV. This kind of JV specification is a stronger and more explicit type 
of real option than purely implicit options, and it comes close to the strongest form of real 
options in which the strike price is exactly specified ex ante. Furthermore, we can say with 
confidence that the foreign parties in Sino-foreign JVs will only hold a call option, and no put 
option. That is because China’s legislation and the policy of the ruling Chinese Communist 
Party (C.C.P.) hampered foreigners from exiting by selling their equity to their venture 
partner. Likewise, the Chinese JV partner did not hold a call option but a put option. In 
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addition, the secondary market for JVs stakes among foreign investors in China was highly 
regulated, and almost non-existent in practice.9 
Fourthly, to confirm this we conducted a quantitative analysis of all the stock listed 
companies in our sample which showed that most of the JVs remained stable over their ex 
ante specified life. This is consistent with real option predictions in that options are usually 
held until maturity because of the time value of the option. Furthermore, when we saw 
changes in the ownership distribution of JVs, they consisted of the foreign partner buying out 
some or all of the Chinese party’s equity. This again is consistent with the JVs as being real 
options where the foreign partner holds a call option. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence 
that foreign partners use the ex ante specified pricing mechanism in the JV contract of 
association to value the venture when they decide to strike the call. For example, the Fortis 
banking group acquired an additional stake in one of its Chinese JVs without having to pay a 
premium over the price determined by the pre-specified pricing mechanism (Financial Times, 
2005). This indicates that the Chinese party was not able to renegotiate and drive up the strike 
price. 
All this does not preclude that the foreign partner can specify an explicit strike price 
when the JV is formed, making for an even stronger form of real option. Indeed, we observed 
a number of firms entering into a JV in China with such an explicit option. Among these 
foreign firms are the British bank HSBC, US IT-company 3COM, Australian 
telecommunication firm Telstra, and French car manufacturer PSA Peugeot Citroën. Overall, 
we found convincing evidence that the JVs in our sample indeed contain real options. 
 
9 Whatever the letter of the law, contracts may be imperfectly enforceable in the presence of weak institutions. 
For instance, in the context of the Brazilian telecommunication industry, Perkins, Morck, and Yeung (2008) 
found that local partners may use pyramidal ownership schemes and used local institutions to take advantage of 
foreign partners. Our fieldwork does not suggest that this is as much of an issue in China. This may partly 
explain why China has been so successful at attracting foreign direct investment, including Sino-foreign JVs. As 
Fan, Morck, Xu and Yeung (2007: 25) put it: “Ultimately, China may well provide a better institutional 
environment for FDI operations than for domestic operations – large or small, state controlled or privately run. 




Foreign share: Our dependent variable is the percentage of foreign ownership in 
Sino-foreign JVs. As discussed earlier, a foreign investor who wants to capture the static 
NPV part will be more likely to take a large share while an investor who makes a call option 
investment will take a smaller share (Chi and McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2002). Under Chinese 
law the percentage of foreign ownership could range from 25% to 99.9%. 
Independent Variables 
Economic uncertainty (H1): The degree of economic uncertainty is measured using 
the Euromoney country risk index. This oft-used index measures the economic uncertainty of 
a country at a particular time on a scale from 0 to 100 based on credit (e.g., payment records), 
analytical (e.g., economic performance forecasts), and market indicators (e.g., selldown 
performance). The index comprises a mix of market perception and objective measures.10 
Local institutional uncertainty (H2): The Chinese government established a number 
of special areas over time to attract foreign investment. These areas are characterized by a 
lower level of uncertainty for foreign investors as a result of a higher degree of liberalization, 
a more developed institutional and regulatory framework, less bureaucratic red tape and less 
government involvement (Shan, 1991). Two types of special areas exist, which differ in 
location; but are otherwise similar: the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Open Coastal 
Cities. Five Special Economic Zones11 were declared in 1980 and a number of coastal cities12 
were opened in 1984. We include a dummy variable which equals zero if the JV was located 
in either an SEZ or an open coastal city, indicating lower uncertainty, and one when the JV is 
                                                 
10 The Euromoney index is only available in its current format from 1982 onwards. An alternative format, albeit 
with similar interpretation, was reported for the earlier years in our study period. We transformed the index for 
the earlier of our sample years to get consistent scores that go back to 1979. Excluding the observations from 
1979 to 1981 or using alternative methods to extrapolate does not materially change our results. We opted to 
keep these observations to have a more complete and representative sample. 
11 Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, and all of Hainan 
province. 
12 Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, 
Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai. 
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located in any other region.13 The same or similar variables have been used in other studies 
(e.g., Pan, 1996; Shan, 1991). 
Exchange rate uncertainty (H3): In a fixed exchange rate regime such as China’s, 
exchange rate uncertainty does not come from continuous daily market changes in the 
exchange rate but from discrete changes (i.e., devaluations or revaluations) made by the 
government at unpredictable intervals. However, a black market or so-called parallel 
exchange rate market has developed in many countries with a fixed exchange rate regime 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). On this parallel market the exchange rate changes continuously 
subject to market forces. Therefore, there will often be a difference between the fixed official 
exchange rate and the floating parallel market rate. These differences are an indication of the 
level of exchange rate uncertainty for foreign investors. The official rate will correspond to 
the real (economic) exchange rate when the fixed official exchange rate equals the floating 
parallel market rate. Thus, it will be extremely unlikely that a discrete change of the official 
exchange rate will take place. However, there will be increasing exchange rate uncertainty 
when the gap between the fixed official exchange rate and the floating parallel market rate 
grows. This bigger difference indicates more strain on the official exchange rate. Uncertainty 
increases because it is unclear how much the official rate will change and when it will 
change. Accordingly, following Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we measure exchange rate 
uncertainty as the absolute value of the parallel market premium (or discount), measured over 
the previous 12 months as is common in the literature:14 
 RateOfficial Annual Average
   Rate ParallelAnnual Average -  RateOfficial Annual Average 
   emium Market PrParallel =  
                                                 
13 As an alternative measure of institutional uncertainty, we used the component of the Economic Freedom of 
the World index which captures the level of uncertainty resulting from a country’s institutional framework. This 
measure is published annually by the Fraser institute and varies over time rather than between different 
geographical areas within China. Our results remain robust. However, using this alternative measure resulted in 
moderate levels of collinearity, which is especially undesirable when testing multiple hypotheses. Therefore, we 
used the location-based variable described above instead. 
14 Exchange rate data are from various annual issues of the World Currency Yearbook, Pick’s Currency 
Yearbook and the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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Thus, a higher parallel market premium (or discount) indicates more exchange rate 
uncertainty.15 
Cultural uncertainty (H4): We measure cultural uncertainty by using Kogut and 
Singh’s (1988) cultural distance index. This oft-used index is based on the difference between 
each country and a focal country (here, the investor’s home country vs. China) along each of 
Hofstede’s (2001) four initial cultural dimensions. A higher score on Kogut and Singh’s 
(1988) cultural distance index implies a higher level of cultural uncertainty. 
Uncertainty about development capabilities (H5): Based on the textual description of 
the activities of the JVs, we identify those projects that were engaged in any substantive 
development activities. We construct a variable that takes a value of 1 if a JV undertakes 
development activities, and 0 otherwise. In almost all cases, these activities pertained to 
product (rather than process) adaptation. While pioneering technological research may 
represent exogenous uncertainty when it is subject to uncontrollable external conditions – a 
point to which we return in the discussion – upon careful verification we found no instance of 
such projects in our sample during this early period of foreign investment in China. A minute 
number of records (about one in a thousand) indicated some form of “research” activity, but 
these were not necessarily the type subject to exogenous uncertainty, and there were too few 
cases for a separate analysis. Our results are robust to excluding these cases altogether or 
including them as development cases. 
Scope-related uncertainty (H6): Similar to several other studies (e.g., Reuer, Park 
and Zollo, 2002), we measure the degree of scope-related uncertainty by using a count 
measure which captures the number of activities performed in the JV. This count measure 
increases with each of the following activities that are conducted in the JV: manufacturing, 
marketing, services, and development. 
                                                 
15 To test the robustness of our results, we used the 18-month volatility of the parallel rate (again the common 
timeframe) as an alternative measure of exchange rate uncertainty. The results were consistent with those 
reported below. 
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Control variables. We control for a number of additional factors that may influence 
the ownership structure of a JV. Firstly, we control for the duration of the JV, using the 
logarithm of the ex ante specified contractual duration of the JV. Foreign investors entering 
in an equity JV in China are required to determine the duration of the project ex ante 
(Beamish, 1993; Shan, 1991). The duration of an option determines its value insofar as longer 
time horizons provide more opportunities for the option to become in-the-money (Jarrow and 
Turnbull, 2000). Secondly, we control for the total size of the JV using the logarithm of the 
dollar amount invested by both partners. We also control for the experience of the foreign 
investor in China, measured as the logarithm of the number of years since the foreign investor 
formed its first JV in China. Furthermore, we create period fixed-effects for the different five-
year plans16 of the Chinese Communist Party. These capture general differences in the 
business environment across periods. Finally, we control for industry differences. There is 
evidence of inter-industry differences in the patterns of ownership of foreign subsidiaries 
(Kobrin, 1987). Furthermore, the C.C.P. preferred to keep control over strategically and 
symbolically important industries, which might also influence the ownership distribution in 
certain industries. Therefore, we classified all JVs by two-digit SIC code based on the 
description of their activities and business scope. Subsequently, we created industry fixed-
effects for every two-digit SIC code. 
Estimation 
We consider two important characteristics of our data in choosing the appropriate 
method to test our hypotheses. Firstly, our dependent variable is censored because the 
Chinese government only allows foreign ownership to range from a minimum of 25% to a 
maximum of 99.9%. Foreign investors might actually prefer an ownership share outside this 
range but end up taking a share somewhere between 25% and 99.9%, choosing the value 
 
16 Our sample covers (parts of) the 5th (1976-1980), 6th (1981-1985), 7th (1986-1990) and 8th (1991-1996) plans. 
The period effects are lagged by one year because these plans were usually announced at the end of the year. 
Thus, fixed effects represent the periods 1979-1981, 1982-1986 and so on. 
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closest to their true preference. Indeed, a substantial number of observations have either 
boundary value. Not controlling for the censored dependent variable is likely to lead to biased 
results (Greene, 2003). Secondly, our data is hierarchically structured, with units at two 
different but nested levels. The lower level consists of the individual JVs, which we label 
with the subscript i. The higher level, which we will label with subscript j, represents the 
different countries of origin of the foreign investors. Failing to take into account the 
multilevel structure of the data would possibly result in underestimated standard errors (Hox, 
1995). 
Given these considerations, we use a multilevel Tobit model to test our hypotheses. 
More specifically, we use a random-intercept multilevel Tobit model with double 
censoring.17 The general formulation of such a model, given in terms of an index function, is 
(Greene, 2003; Hox, 1995):18 
 , jijijij ueXy ++=  
* β
   if      *ijij yy = 9.9925
* << ijy
0=ijy   otherwise 
Testing Null Hypotheses 
In the social sciences, and especially in management and international business, 
testing that two variables have no effect on each other has been done using a technique called 
statistical power analysis (e.g., Brock, 2003; Casher and Geiger, 2004; Cohen, 1977, 1990; 
Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin, 1998). Advocates of this approach argued that ex post power 
calculations could be used to interpret non-statistical results. Despite its popularity, the use of 
                                                 
17 Our model comprises two levels, JV and home country. Such a model is also referred to as a Tobit model with 
double-censoring and random-effects. Here, the random effects are for home countries. 
18 Several scholars have argued that JVs in which one partner has a very dominant controlling stake can be 
better considered as wholly owned subsidiaries (e.g., Hennart, 1991). Therefore, to test the robustness of our 
results, we also specified several models with different limit values of ownership – such as upper limits of 90% 
(e.g., Hennart, 1991) and 95% (e.g., Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Lu, 2002) ownership. Our results were robust to 
these alternative Tobit specifications. 
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post hoc power analysis to test null hypotheses has been severely criticized. Among others, 
Hoenig and Heisey (2001) criticized the post hoc use of power analysis in general, and the 
use of the “observed power” and “detectable effect size” approaches in particular, for being 
misleading and meaningless due to the fact that for any test the observed power is a 1-to-1 
function of the observed p-value and therefore does not add to the interpretation of the 
results.19 Therefore, we used a series of more robust alternative approaches to post hoc power 
analysis to test our null hypotheses. We will discuss these in detail below. 
Despite the reservations about post hoc power analysis, some power applications are 
still considered to be appropriate and useful. These include the use of power analysis in meta-
analyses, and the ex ante determination of the minimum sample size for designing studies 
(e.g., Colegrave and Ruxton, 2003; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). The latter power application is 
proper and relevant for our purpose. Namely, we use an ex ante approach to determine the 
minimum sample size that is needed to be able to pick up any existing relationships between 
our independent and dependent variables. More specifically, we implement Cohen’s (1977: 
440) multiple regression table conservatively by calculating the minimum sample size given 
that the effect size is assumed to be extremely small (R²=.015), no more than 50 independent 
variables are used (including fixed effects not reported in our tables of results), and the power 
of the test (1-β) as desired ex ante is 0.99 (i.e. β=α=.01).20 This reveals that the minimum 
sample size we need to be able to observe even an extremely small effect size is 4,373, which 
is well below our sample of 6,472 observations. Hence, we can exclude the possibility that 
we fail to find any effects due to an insufficiently large sample size. 
 
19 We are grateful to an anonymous Reviewer and the Associate Editor for pointing out this issue and putting us 
on the path towards using the alternatives below. 
20 In the language of power analysis, α is the significance criterion, i.e. the “level of significance” as commonly 
used to evaluate (non-null) hypotheses. β is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact 
false, i.e. of making a type II error. The value we set for these parameters is more conservative than those used 
by Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998), for example. Note that β as referred to in this paragraph is a parameter 
for the power calculations, not to be confused with the β coefficient estimates from regression analyses as 
discussed elsewhere in the chapter. 
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To then test whether an effect is indeed null, several scholars have suggested 
examining the practical magnitudes of the effects and analyzing the range of possible effect 
sizes that are (not) supported by the data (e.g., Colegrave and Ruxton, 2003). The practical 
magnitudes of the effects can simply be examined by taking the partial derivatives of the 
coefficients and evaluating the effect of a one-standard deviation (for continuous variables) or 
one-unit (for binary variables) change in the variables. However, this only informs us about 
the mean of all possible values the true effect can take. Therefore, Hoenig and Heisey (2001) 
and Colegrave and Ruxton (2003) recommended that researchers investigate the range of 
effect sizes rather than just their mean value. To do so, we follow an approach similar to the 
one suggested by Johnson (2005) and Colegrave and Ruxton (2005) to interpret non-
significant results and test null hypotheses. This approach considers simultaneously the range 
and the position (relative to zero) of the distribution that the true effect size can have, and 
thus allows us to calculate the probability that the real effect size is larger or smaller than a 
trivial value. This probability can be written as: 
 
F( β  > d)   or      F( β  < d), 
 
where 
β  is the true coefficient, 
F = normal( β , ), βSE
SE is the standard error of β , 
d is a trivial effect. 
 
For this test it is important to specify what is to be considered a trivial effect size. 
Several methods to determine d have been suggested in the literature (e.g., Murphy and 
Myors, 2004). One is a deductive method based on well-established theory. We do not deem 
this method appropriate in this study because it presumes that there is a wealth of previous 
research to draw on. Alternatively, an inductive method might be used. This is appropriate 
when there are sufficient relevant data, derived for instance from meta-analyses. However, 
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such data are again not available in our case. Although neither of these approaches is helpful 
in our particular case, we can use a third method to identify values that are meaningful vs. 
trivial. Namely, we use the minimum effect size we observe for the exogenously resolved 
sources of uncertainty and the maximum effect size we observe for the endogenously 
resolved sources of uncertainty as starting points. This also allows us to contrast both forms 
of uncertainty. 
We ascertained the reliability of our measures of endogenous uncertainty (and others) 
in two ways. Firstly, we used measures that have oft been used in the literature and 
particularly in studies that focused on the same empirical setting as ours and resulted in 
significant findings (e.g., Luo, 2005; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Pan, 1996; Reuer, Zollo and 
Singh, 2002). This indicates that sufficiently established and noise-free measures are on hand. 
Secondly, we conducted nomological validity testing – a method that is commonly used to 
test the validity of psychological constructs (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). Namely, using the 
same sample, we found that our independent variables are significantly related to various 
dependent variables (such as indicators of investment size and timing) in a manner consistent 
with extant theory. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation can be found in Table 1. The negative 
correlations between our measures of economic uncertainty, local institutional uncertainty 
and exchange rate uncertainty, respectively, and the foreign share in the JV are consistent 
with our hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Conversely, the correlations between the measures of the 
three sources of uncertainty that are resolved endogenously – i.e. cultural, development 
(capabilities) and scope-related uncertainty – and the foreign share in the JV are positive. 




Examination of the distribution of equity shares shows that the values are broadly 
dispersed over the allowed range of 25%-99.9%, and no more than 20% of cases are censored 
(either to the right or to the left). This falls well below the threshold whereby an extreme 
proportion of censored cases may bias Tobit estimates. The multilevel Tobit results, obtained 
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from Stata 10, are reported in Table 2. Model 1 represents a baseline model including all 
control variables except for the industry fixed effects, while model 2 includes the industry 
fixed effects. In model 3 measures of the sources of uncertainty which are resolved 
exogenously (only) are added. Model 4 includes our measures of the three endogenous forms 
of uncertainty (only). Finally, model 5 includes measure of all sources of uncertainty 
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simultaneously. The model likelihood chi-squares show that every model is significant 
(p<.001) relative to an intercept-only model.21 
We also conduct likelihood-ratio tests to determine the joint significance of, 
respectively, the exogenous and endogenous forms of uncertainty. The likelihood-ratio can be 
useful to evaluate our null hypotheses as it allows us to evaluate the strength of evidence for 
one hypothesis versus another (Johnson, 2005; Royall, 1997). The likelihood-ratio test shows 
that adding the three sources of uncertainty which are resolved exogenously to model 2 as we 
did in model 3, significantly increases the fit of the model (χ²=112.42 for three variables; 
p<.001). In contrary, the addition of the three sources of uncertainty which are resolved 
endogenously to model 2, as we did in model 4, does not improve model fit (χ²=5.76 for three 
variables). Finally, in model 5 we add the three sources of endogenous uncertainty to the 
model which includes all the sources of exogenous uncertainty (model 3). This also reveals 
that the endogenous sources of uncertainty do not contribute significantly to model fit 
(χ²=2.62 for three variables). Overall, the joint significance of the exogenous forms of 
uncertainty and the lack of joint explanatory power of the three endogenous forms of 
uncertainty are in line with our hypotheses. 
The results of models 1 and 2 show that, among the control variables, only JV 
duration has a significant (positive) effect. This is consistent with the existence of an NPV 
component in real option investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Likewise, the foreign 
partner’s experience has a significant (negative) effect. Inclusion of industry effects does not 
substantially change the interpretation of the results. 
Exogenously Resolved Uncertainty 
In model 3, we find a negative and significant relationship (p<.001) between foreign 
share and our measure of economic uncertainty. This is consistent with hypothesis 1. 
                                                 
21 A step-wise approach adding each hypothesized variable separately does not substantively change the results. 
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Similarly, we find a negative and significant relationship (p<.01) between foreign share and 
our measure of local institutional uncertainty, supporting hypothesis 2. Finally, we find that 
foreign investors will take a smaller share when our measure of exchange rate uncertainty 
increases. Thus, hypothesis 3 is strongly supported (p<.001). When we add to model 3 the 
effects for endogenously resolved uncertainty, as in model 5, we find almost identical results, 
with hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 supported; indeed, the significance of local institutional 
uncertainty (hypothesis 2) improves to p<.001. Thus, our findings strongly support our first 
three hypotheses. The results for the exogenously resolved sources of uncertainty are, as 
expected, in line with real option logic. 
Endogenously Resolved Uncertainty 
Model 4 adds the effects of endogenously resolved uncertainty. In line with 
hypothesis 4 (and contrary to what might be expected if real option logic were mis-applied), 
we find no relationship between foreign share and our measure of cultural uncertainty. 
Similarly, in line with hypothesis 5, we find no relationship between foreign share and the 
presence of development activities indicating uncertainty about partner capabilities. In model 
4, we do not find a negative relationship between foreign share and our measure of scope-
related uncertainty in the JV; indeed the coefficient is significant and positive in model 4, but 
becomes insignificant in the more completely specified model 5. Either way, this is in line 
with hypothesis 6. The coefficients of the other two sources of endogenously resolved 
uncertainty remain insignificant in model 5. Thus, the overall results are in line with 
hypotheses 4, 5 and 6. As expected, real option predictions do not hold when uncertainty can 
be resolved endogenously, and thereby the source of uncertainty departs from the 






Examination of the practical magnitudes of the hypothesized effects confirms the 
statistically significant results. Based on the partial derivatives of the coefficients in model 5, 
the marginal effect of a one-standard deviation increase in economic uncertainty lowers the 
foreign partner’s equity stake by 2.2%. Likewise, the dependent variable is approximately 
1.8% lower when the investment is in a Special Economic Zone or Coastal City with lower 
local institutional uncertainty. A one-standard deviation increase in exchange rate 
uncertainty, meanwhile, lowers the dependent variable by over 4.1%. Besides being 
statistically non-significant, the practical magnitudes associated with endogenous sources of 
uncertainty are only a fraction of those of the exogenous variables. The marginal effect of a 
one-standard deviation change in cultural uncertainty lowers the foreign partner’s equity 
stake by just 1%. The dependent variable is about 0.4% higher in JVs that encompass 
development activities. Likewise, a one-standard deviation change in the scope-related 
uncertainty increases the dependent variable by 0.3%. Comparing continuous variables, the 
magnitudes of the exogenously resolved variables are over twice as large as (and up to 13 
times larger than) those of endogenously resolved variables. Likewise, comparing binary 
variables, the endogenously resolved variable has a magnitude 4.5 times greater than the 
exogenously resolved variable. Overall, the average of the absolute values of the practical 
magnitudes of the exogenous sources of uncertainty is more than 4.5 times greater than that 
of the endogenous sources of uncertainty. This analysis is again consistent with our 
predictions, and we hope that this also illustrates the value of paying more attention to the 
substantive magnitude of observed effects in international business research as well as in 
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Analyzing the Range of the Effect Magnitudes 
Analyzing the practical magnitudes of the effects revealed strong differences between 
exogenously and endogenously resolved sources of uncertainty. This provides essential 
information about the mean of all possible values that the true effect can take, but not about 
the range of values that the true effect can take (and therefore confidence in the mean). 
Therefore, we investigated the entire range of effect sizes, which also allows us to calculate 
the probability that the true effect of each hypothesized coefficient is larger than a trivial 
value. As it is difficult to specify what is a trivial effect size, we consider several plausible 
and empirically informed cutoff values for trivial effects. 
First, we considered a 1% change in the dependent variable as cutoff for a trivial 
effect. Of all the endogenous sources of uncertainty, a one-standard deviation change in 
cultural uncertainty has, with an impact of 1%, the largest effect on the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, a 1% change in ownership is the smallest change we can observe in our data; 
given rounding, any observed 1% change may in fact be much smaller yet. Hence, this is a 
meaningful cutoff. The probabilities that a 1% decrease in the foreign partner’s ownership of 
the JV results from a one-standard deviation increase in economic uncertainty (p=.999), a 
unit-increase in institutional uncertainty (p=.924), and a one-standard deviation increase in 
exchange rate uncertainty (p>.999), respectively, are all very high. In contrary, the 
probabilities that a 1% decrease in the dependent variable results from respectively a one-
standard deviation increase in cultural uncertainty (p=.500, by definition), a one-unit increase 
in development uncertainty (p=.265), and a one-standard deviation increase in scope-related 
uncertainty (p<.001) are considerably lower. 
Second, we considered a 1.8% change in the foreign partner’s ownership stake as a 
cutoff for a trivial effect. A 1.8% change is meaningful in that the effect of a one-unit change 
in institutional uncertainty equals 1.8%, which is the lowest effect of all three sources of 
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exogenous uncertainty. We find that the probabilities that 1% decrease in the dependent 
variable results from, respectively, a one-standard deviation increase in economic uncertainty 
(p=.900), a one-unit increase in institutional uncertainty (p=.500, by definition), and a one-
standard deviation shift in exchange rate uncertainty (p>.999) are again considerable. 
Conversely, the corresponding probabilities for the endogenously resolved forms of 
uncertainty are less than half of those values: cultural uncertainty (p=0.248), development 
uncertainty (p=.161), and scope-related uncertainty (p<.001). 
Finally, we replicate the analysis using 2.5% as a cutoff value. This is motivated by 
the fact that a 2.5% change in ownership corresponds, on average, to a $100,000 increase in 
the equity investment made by the foreign partner in our data. The tests reveal a similar 
pattern. Namely, the probabilities that an increase in each of the exogenous sources of 
uncertainty result in a decrease in the dependent variable that is larger than 2.5% are still 
considerable, while those of the endogenous sources are small (p<.100). 
Overall, across a range of different cutoff values for a trivial effect, we find high 
probabilities that the true effect of the exogenous sources on the dependent variable is non-
trivial. In contrast, the probabilities that the true effects of the endogenously resolved sources 
of uncertainty are non-trivial are considerably smaller. These consistent differences between 
the exogenous and endogenous resolved sources of uncertainty provide strong support for our 
hypotheses. 
Hoenig and Heisey (2001) also argued that Bayesian methods provide an alternative 
approach to evaluate null hypotheses. To further test robustness of our results, we generated 
the posterior distributions of our coefficients using a Bayesian Tobit model.22 Analyzing the 
                                                 
22 We generated the posterior distributions using uninformative priors and the Gibbs Sampler. This involves 
sampling sequentially from all relevant conditional distributions over a large number of iterations. We made 
100,000 draws from a single continuous Gibbs chain of which the first 20,000 draws are used as a “burn in” 
period and subsequently discarded. Unfortunately existing Bayesian software is limited in that it does not allow 
for random effects and cannot incorporate left-censoring and right-censoring simultaneously. The replication is 
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posterior distributions of the coefficients of the exogenously resolved sources of uncertainty 
revealed that all three are negative and distinctly different from zero. By contrast, the 
posterior distributions of the coefficients of the endogenously resolved sources of uncertainty 
are centered around zero. Further details of our Bayesian analysis are available from the 
authors upon request.  
In summary, by every method proposed by Hoenig and Heisey (2001), Colegrave and 
Ruxton (2005), and Johnson (2005), amongst others, we find consistent support for the 
predictions whereby exogenous uncertainty leads to a real option-consistent choice of equity 
shares, and conversely consistent support for the predictions whereby endogenous uncertainty 
does not lead to such outcomes.23 
DISCUSSION 
The results advance our understanding of the boundary conditions for real option 
theory. In real option theory, one of the main predictions is that higher levels of uncertainty 
will increase option value, which will in turn increase the likelihood of the occurrence of a 
real option investment. In JVs this will result in a smaller ownership share for the call option 
holder. However, we also argued that this logic would not hold when uncertainty is resolved 
endogenously rather than exogenously. When uncertainty is resolved exogenously, we indeed 
find a negative relationship between economic uncertainty (hypothesis 1), local institutional 
uncertainty (hypothesis 2), and exchange rate uncertainty (hypothesis 3), respectively, and the 
foreign share in a JV. These results confirm the power of real option logic when it comes to 
exogenous uncertainty. We also examined the relationship between cultural uncertainty 
(hypothesis 4), uncertainty about development capabilities (hypothesis 5) and scope-related 
uncertainty (hypothesis 6), respectively, and the foreign share in a JV. Using appropriate 
 
therefore imperfect. Nevertheless, our results are very similar to those obtained using the conventional (non-
Bayesian) Tobit model. 
23 In addition, we replicated the commonly used if statistically problematic use of post hoc power analysis to test 
the null hypotheses 4-6. The results, available from the authors, again show that the effects of the endogenously 
resolved variables do not differ from zero. 
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techniques meant to test null hypotheses, we find no support for the statistical relationship 
that would follow from a real option model. Thus, as we argued, conventional real option 
logic is applicable when uncertainty is resolved exogenously, but not when it is resolved 
endogenously. 
This study has implications for both scholars and practitioners. Firstly, our framework 
makes it possible to identify under what conditions an investment can truly be expected to 
represent a real option. A wide range of investments has been classified as real option 
investments, and previous empirical results have shown inconsistent support for real option 
theory. We argue that this may be because real option logic might inadequately characterize 
investments that are subject to endogenously resolved uncertainty. Our research also confirms 
that real option theory has strong predictive power in the presence of exogenous uncertainty. 
While we did not examine the performance implications of JV stakes, the results are 
consistent with arguments whereby real options can be an effective means of dealing with 
uncertainty when undertaking strategic investments – provided the uncertainty is exogenous. 
Secondly, as appealing as using real options metaphorically may be, this should only 
be done while keeping carefully in mind what sources of uncertainty the option is meant to 
hedge, and whether the uncertainty is resolved endogenously. Thirdly, researchers and 
practitioners should be aware of the boundaries of the theory when they use it to examine 
potential investments. Using real option logic to value projects when it is not suitable is likely 
to lead to suboptimal decision-making. Adner and Levinthal (2004a, 2004b) argued that 
practitioners might be able to make use of real option logic when uncertainty is resolved 
endogenously, but only if they compensate for endogeneity by putting control systems into 
place and by changing the design of the organization. However, this is likely to require a 
costly trade-off, as such mechanisms may impede progress, and the organizational costs may 
outstrip the quasi-option value thus obtained. 
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Similarly, researchers might be able to make use of real option logic when uncertainty 
is resolved endogenously – but only if their formal models, and equally importantly their 
empirical analyses, incorporate the unique characteristics and consequences of endogenously 
resolved uncertainty. Sophisticated decision-theoretic models with endogenous uncertainty 
have been developed in the operations research and economics literatures (Koussis, 
Martzoukos and Trigeorgis, 2007; Pawlina and Kort, 2006), and have started to find their 
way in international business and strategy research such as Chi and Seth’s (2009) work on 
MNE entry mode choices. However, these modeling developments have so far been 
accompanied by a relative dearth of empirical evidence about the actual feasibility and 
impact of such strategies. From this standpoint, our study does not imply that it is necessary 
to “shut down” research on real options when uncertainty is endogenous. However, it implies 
that such research should duly and explicitly incorporate the endogeneity of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, it must also develop and build upon compelling, generalizable empirical 
evidence about whether the strategies for real options with endogenous uncertainty are 
feasible and cost effective in practice, notwithstanding the computational and organizational 
costs that they add. 
The implications for joint venture research are substantive too. While numerous 
scholars have looked at the conditions under which JVs are more or less appropriate (e.g., 
Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Hennart, 1988), the determinants of the ownership distribution 
of JVs have received far less attention in the JV literature (Cuypers and Martin, 2007), and 
studies have produced comparatively disappointing empirical results (e.g., Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988). Our results confirm that a real option perspective can be useful in modeling 




Furthermore, our model describes determinants of the optimal level of ownership for 
a foreign investor. This is especially relevant in dealing with highly (exogenously) uncertain 
markets, which is a basic reason to consider JVs in the first place. Our findings thus point to 
the importance of carefully specifying the relationship between various sources of uncertainty 
and a firm’s expansion strategy, as a firm’s strategy should be in line with the nature of the 
uncertainties it faces. This highlights the need for and the rewards from a more precise 
conceptualization of uncertainty in the international business and strategy literatures. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
This study is not without its limitations, and several suggestions for further research 
can be made. Firstly, we study the applicability of real option theory in one particular 
country. While China has become a favorite destination of foreign investment, future studies 
could verify our results in other national settings, provided local conditions are consistent 
with the use of JVs as real options. Secondly, we only look at one particular type of real 
option investment, namely the JV. However, our theoretical arguments hold regardless of the 
type of real option investments. Thus, it would be interesting to look at other types of real 
option investments such as in patenting and new business contexts. Thirdly, we look at six 
different sources of uncertainty. Future research could examine yet other sources of 
uncertainty to further evaluate where real option logic holds in practice. 
Relatedly, a debate has arisen about the extent to which research activities should be 
thought of as real options. As mentioned above, our sample did not include pioneering 
technological research activities – as opposed to plain development activities, which are more 
akin to technical tasks (Kotabe, Martin and Domoto, 2003). Nevertheless, our framework 
offers a way to think about research activities too. By our logic, research aimed at pioneering 
new technology may represent a real option investment – but only if the resolution of the 
associated uncertainty is outside the control of the firm and therefore exogenous. Oriani and 
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Sobrero (2008) likewise point to the relevance of the distinction between industry-wide 
patterns of design upheaval whose resolution may depend on the uncoordinated efforts of 
multiple actors from various industries, and discrete projects within a dominant design. The 
former may represent (nearly) exogenous uncertainty that can occur at some stages of an 
industry’s evolution, whereas the latter is normally endogenous. This distinction thus maps 
onto our discussion of exogenous vs. endogenous uncertainty, and future research 
encompassing this distinction may generate insights into specific conditions under which 
R&D can be effectively modeled as a matter of real options. 
We examined the roles of different types of uncertainty on the ownership distribution 
of JVs from a real option perspective. However, our findings also have implications for 
alternative theoretical perspectives. For example, in transaction cost economics (TCE), 
behavioral uncertainty figures as an endogenous factor that can be addressed via governance 
decisions (Williamson, 1985). More specifically, a premise of TCE is that firms will opt for a 
governance structure which provides a higher level of control, in order to reduce the 
increased hazards of opportunistic behavior by the other party, when behavioral uncertainty is 
high. However, few TCE studies have looked at the equity distribution of JVs and these 
studies yielded mixed results. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) were able to explain the choice 
between full ownership and shared ownership, but they were generally unsuccessful in 
explaining the ownership distribution when a JV was chosen. Similarly, Delios and Beamish 
(1999) and Chen, Hu and Hu (2002) found ambiguous or no effects of factors causing 
behavioral uncertainty on the ownership distribution of JVs. 
Given these mixed results in the TCE literature on JVs, our non-significant findings 
are not surprising. However, we must note that the variables we use to capture the level of 
endogenous uncertainty differ from the typical variables used in TCE studies, where 
measures typically focus on asset specificity and marketing intensity. Unfortunately we lack 
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such data for the JVs in our sample, although our JV-level control variables and industry 
fixed effects go some way towards accounting for such unobservables. Furthermore, although 
our empirical setting is all the more suitable to test real option predictions, it is far less 
suitable to explain the ownership distribution from a TCE perspective or from an agency 
perspective. Namely, due to China’s unique JV legislation during the period of our sample, 
the correspondence between decision rights and control, respectively, and the level of 
ownership in JVs was not as close as in other contexts. In our setting, it may be more 
appropriate for TCE research to examine the allocation of key (managerial) positions instead 
(Chi and Roehl, 1997). Nevertheless, research exploring the implications of our findings for 
various alternative theoretical perspectives would be well warranted. 
Finally, we use a dichotomous classification to distinguish between endogenously and 
exogenously resolved uncertainty. However, some sources of uncertainty may be more 
strictly endogenous (exogenous) than others. Therefore, a more continuous classification of 
how uncertainty is resolved could lead to additional insights, provided proper scales can be 
developed. Once this basis, it would also be worthwhile to extend the range of sources of 
uncertainty considered, including especially demand uncertainty (Delacroix and 
Swaminathan, 1991; Wholey and Brittain, 1989). Furthermore, an interesting avenue for 
future research would be to refine our conceptualization of uncertainty by identifying 
different types of uncertainty within the exogenous-endogenous classification, and to explore 
their implications. In particular, some forms of endogenous uncertainty may precipitate all-
or-nothing investments (for instance, to shape industry structure) while others need not.24 
CONCLUSION 
Our study shows that the use of real options can be made more powerful, both 
academically and in practice, by paying extra attention to the sources and resolution of the 
                                                 
24 We are grateful to an anonymous Reviewer and the Associate Editor for pointing out these research 
opportunities. 
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uncertainty that the options are meant to exploit. In the context of IJVs, we show that normal 
real option predictions are ineffective when uncertainty is resolved endogenously, but all the 
more powerful when the firm faces exogenous uncertainty. Given the prevalence of 
uncertainty in international operations, and of IJVs as a mode of entry, further research in this 
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We predict and find that firms whose ownership levels in international 
subsidiaries are misaligned with the levels of uncertainty in the environment 
surrounding the subsidiary adapt their ownership levels to re-align with the 
environment. We argue that the impact of experience on the evolution of 
subsidiaries is contingent on the source and type of experience. Moreover, 
we theorize about how shifts in the levels of external uncertainty can have 
an opposing effect on subsidiary ownership stability depending on the 
direction of the shift. Using a sample of 726 Japanese-foreign subsidiaries 
established in 38 different host countries, we find support for our 
predictions. Overall, our arguments and findings improve our 
understanding of how subsidiaries evolve. 
 
                                                     




                                                     
INTRODUCTION 
During the last few decades international subsidiaries, including joint ventures (JVs) 
and wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS), have been the subject of much investigation. While 
initial work on international subsidiaries mainly focused on ownership issues (Hennart, 
1991), the focus of more recent studies has shifted towards issues pertaining to the instability 
of these subsidiaries. Several of these studies have shown that despite their enormous growth 
in numbers, many subsidiaries are unstable (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). These high 
instability rates have been attributed to various factors including subsidiaries’ ownership 
structures (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004), shifts in bargaining power (Inkpen and Beamish, 
1997), and asymmetric levels of learning (Hamel, 1999). 
One limitation of the research to date is that it primarily investigated subsidiary 
termination or the transition from one extreme ownership form to another, such as the shift 
from JVs to WOS or outright JV divestment. However, subsidiary dynamics can take other 
forms such as incremental changes in ownership levels, and contractual negotiations. 
Considering these intermediate phenomena relating to subsidiary dynamics offers new 
insights into the evolution of subsidiaries (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). Accordingly, we will look 
at how parents incrementally adjust their ownership levels in their overseas subsidiaries, 
rather than at extreme buyout or closure issues. More specifically, we will investigate to what 
extent parents’ initial and subsequent ownership levels in a subsidiary are or become aligned 
with the levels of uncertainty2 in the external environment. This has been shown to be a 
critical aspect of subsidiary dynamics (Lu and Hébert, 2005; Reuer and Ariño, 2002).  
Throughout this study, we will look at how different types of experience and learning 
determine to what extent a parent’s ownership stake is aligned with the external environment 
and thereby at how they impact the evolution of a subsidiary. By doing so, we aim to make 
2 The concept of uncertainty we use throughout this paper corresponds to what Roberts and Weitzman (1981) 
and Cuypers and Martin’s (2010) refer to as exogenously resolving uncertainty in the external environment. For 
simplicity we will refer to this as “uncertainty”. 
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several contributions to both the literature on organizational learning, and the international 
business and strategy literatures on international subsidiaries. 
Firstly, several studies have looked at the implications of misaligned ownership 
levels. These studies have looked at performance implications (Sampson, 2004) and at how 
firms adapt to re-align their ownership structures (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003). However, 
far less is known about what determines the extent to which ownership levels are misaligned. 
In this study we show how different types of experience and changes in the levels of 
uncertainty surrounding the subsidiary affect the level of ownership misalignment. This in 
turn has important implications for the dynamics of a subsidiary. 
Secondly, we integrate and extend research on, respectively, subsidiary design and 
subsidiary evolution. Most studies have looked at either initial design issues or post-
formation issues, but not at both. However, both stages are intertwined and a better 
integration of these literatures offers new insights into the evolution of subsidiaries (Cuypers 
and Martin, 2007). More specifically we will look at the determinants of ownership 
misalignment at formation and also later during the life of the subsidiary. This allows us to 
show that certain factors play a different role in each stage. 
Thirdly, most studies have focused on internal factors such as the nature of a 
subsidiary’s resources to evaluate whether a parent’s ownership levels are aligned or not. To 
the best of our knowledge, no other study has directly looked at how uncertainty determines 
ownership misalignment and how it shapes a subsidiary’s evolution. Taking this external 
focus allows us to explore issues which have been largely overlooked but are becoming 
increasingly important as firms more frequently form subsidiaries in highly uncertain foreign 
environments. 
Fourthly, we provide clear evidence that parents adjust their ownership levels when 




heterogeneity exists in the rate and direction in which firms adapt their ownership levels. 
These insights help us understand under what conditions firms adapt faster and more 
appropriately to changing conditions in their environment. 
Fifthly, we contribute to the literature on organizational learning by contrasting the 
effects of experiential learning and vicarious learning and showing that they have different 
effects. More specifically, we show that vicarious learning reduces the degree of ownership 
misaligned when the subsidiary is formed, i.e. firms learn to structure their subsidiaries from 
other firms. Conversely, we find that experiential learning leads to strategic momentum 
which has a negative impact on the degree of misalignment at formation. However, 
experiential learning has a positive effect once the subsidiary has been formed as it facilitates 
re-alignments in the ownership levels of the subsidiary. These findings also highlight that we 
should not take the positive effects of learning and experience for granted. 
 
BACKGROUND 
External Uncertainty and Subsidiary Ownership Levels  
Firms establishing a new foreign subsidiary have to decide on how much ownership 
they will seek in their new venture. When making this important strategic decision firms face 
a trade-off between limiting their downside risk and capturing more of the subsidiary’s 
upside potential (Pindyck, 1988). On the one hand, a lower level of ownership reduces a 
firm’s exposure to the downside risk of entering into a subsidiary to its small(er) initial 
investment (e.g., Reuer and Leiblein, 2000). On the other hand, a higher level of ownership 
allows the firm to capture more cash flows from the subsidiary. No single level of ownership 
is universally superior or inferior and a firm’s optimal level of ownership depends on various 
factors, including the levels of uncertainty surrounding the subsidiary. Namely, higher levels 
of uncertainty favor lower ownership levels as it becomes more important to limit your 
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downside risk. Contrary, low levels of uncertainty push for higher levels of ownership (e.g., 
Chi and McGuire, 1996; Cuypers and Martin, 2010). This relationship highlights that firms 
have to align their ownership level with the external environment. 
As we mentioned above, firms make ownership decisions when they form a 
subsidiary, but these are not permanent decisions. At various times after the subsidiary has 
been founded, firms also need to decide whether or not to adjust their ownership levels. Both 
the initial ownership level and the post-formation ownership level can have a considerable 
impact on the subsidiary dynamics. Namely, the initial design of a subsidiary has an enduring 
impact on its stability (e.g., Beamish and Banks, 1987). Similarly, a change in the preferred 
level of ownership after the subsidiary is formed is likely to trigger instability and lead to 
changed subsidiary terms (e.g., Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Therefore, it is crucial to assess 
and understand a firm’s initial and post-formation ownership choices simultaneously in order 
to get a more complete understanding of subsidiary dynamics. 
Ownership Levels and Misalignment at Formation 
A vast literature has looked at firm’s subsidiary design choices, including the 
ownership levels parent firms take. Most of these studies focused on improving our 
understanding of what the optimal levels of ownership are under certain conditions, and at 
least implicitly assumed that suboptimal ownership choices would be selected out by 
competitive forces (e.g. Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). Still, in practice it is not uncommon 
that firms get their ownership levels wrong when they form a subsidiary.  
Early research investigating this issue showed that firms indeed frequently make 
ownership choices which are misaligned (e.g. Sampson, 2004; Nickerson and Silverman, 
2003). Moreover, several studies have started to look at the implications of misaligned 
ownership levels. For example, Sampson (2004) looked at the performance implications of 




innovative. Lu and Hébert (2005) showed that IJVs with misaligned governance structures 
will be more likely to be terminated. Reuer and Ariño (2002) and Nickerson and Silverman 
(2003) looked at the dynamics of ownership structures and showed that firms make 
adaptations in order to reduce the levels of misalignment. Their findings also indicate that in 
many cases firms with inefficient ownership structures adapt rather than being selected out by 
competitive forces. 
Although these studies have increased our understanding of the consequences of 
misaligned ownership structures, they leave us largely uninformed about the sources of 
misalignment. Furthermore, most of these studies focused on the consequences of ownership 
structures that are misaligned with internal factors, such as the nature of the firm’s assets, 
rather than with external factors (e.g. Sampson, 2004; Reuer and Ariño, 2002). Nevertheless, 
it has been well established that external factors such as uncertainty impact both the levels of 
ownership firms take in their subsidiaries and post-formation dynamics (Yan and Gray, 1994; 
Makino, Chan, Isobe and Beamish, 2007). 
Therefore, it is crucial to get a clearer picture of the determinants of subsidiaries’ 
ownership structure misalignments with the external environment if we want to have a better 
understanding of their post-formation dynamics. Accordingly, we aim to identify factors 
which influence the extent to which firms’ ownership structures are misaligned. More 
specifically, we are interested in the impact of experience and learning on a firm’s initial 
ownership choice and thereby also on the need for post-formation adaptations. Reuer, Zollo 
and Singh (2002) found that a firm’s experience trajectories affect the likelihood of post 
formation adjustments in the terms of alliances. We build on their work and offer new 
insights by contrasting the effects of experiential and vicarious learning on ownership 
misalignment and thereby also on post-formation subsidiary dynamics (hypotheses 1a, 1b and 
2). 
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Misalignment and Post-formation Dynamics 
A wide body of research has looked a subsidiary instability and dynamics. Within this 
literature there are differences in the way instability is defined or operationalized. However, 
the majority of (early) studies focused on subsidiary termination or the transition from one 
extreme ownership form to another (e.g. from JV to WOS). More recently scholars started to 
look at subsidiary dynamics in a broader way. For example, Reuer and Ariño (2002) looked 
at adjustments in the contractual terms of subsidiaries. Folta and Miller (2002) looked at 
firms increasing their ownership stake in equity partnerships. By also considering incremental 
adaptations, these studies help us to get a more complete view of the evolutionary paths of 
subsidiaries. In line with these studies, we will look at incremental changes in the ownership 
levels a firm has in a subsidiary. 
As we discussed above, firms’ ownership levels in their subsidiaries can be 
misaligned with the levels of uncertainty in the external environment. This can be the result 
of ownership choices made when the subsidiary is formed (Lu and Hébert, 2005) or from 
post-formation changes in the environment (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). Regardless of the cause, 
firms should then adjust their ownership levels to re-align with the external environment. In 
related research, Nickerson and Silverman (2003) found that firms in the for-hire trucking 
industry make necessary adjustments – in their case replacing employee drivers with owner-
operators - to re-align their misaligned governance structure. They also found differences in 
the rate at which firms adapt resulting from heterogeneity in nature of the resources and 
contracts firms have. Reuer and Ariño (2002) found that firms adjust the contractual terms of 
their alliances when they are misaligned with the internal conditions of the alliance. 





The findings in these studies raise two issues. Firstly, Nickerson and Silverman 
(2003) and Reuer and Ariño (2002) only look at contractual changes and at internal factors 
that determine the rate of adaptation. In contrast, we are looking at changes in firms’ equity 
stakes. We can expect equity changes to require more resources and to be more costly than 
simply adjusting contractual terms. Therefore, the conditions for adjustments in ownership 
levels are all the more important to examine (hypothesis 3). Furthermore, we will show that 
experience can explain differences in the adaptation rates across firms. Reuer, Zollo and 
Singh (2002) argued that certain types of experience might help firms to adjust to unforeseen 
conditions. Accordingly, we will examine whether and under what conditions firms with 
higher levels of certain types of experience have higher adaptation rates than other firms 
(hypothesis 4). 
Secondly, the mixed empirical evidence about the conditions under which firms adapt 
to changes in the external environment warrants our attention. As we mentioned before, we 
lack understanding of what drives misalignment ex ante. However, the empirical evidence in 
Reuer and Ariño (2002) implies that the general premise that changes in the environment 
trigger adjustments is too simplistic. To address this, we will examine under which conditions 
changes in the level of uncertainty in the external environment will lead to post-formation 
adjustments (hypothesis 5a and 5b). More specifically, we will look at the direction in which 
the ownership structure of a subsidiary is misaligned and argue that in certain situations 
changes in the external environment will be more likely to lead to re-alignment. 
In sum, two broad issues are understudied in the existing literature. Firstly, little is 
known about the antecedents of initial and post-formation ownership misalignment in foreign 
subsidiaries. To examine this we will focus on different types of learning and on the 
asymmetric effect of changes in the levels of uncertainty in the external environment. 
Secondly, little is known about how misalignment triggers adaptation and which factors 
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influence the rate of adaptation. Specifically, we will examine how experience helps firms to 
adapt their misaligned ownership structures. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Strategic Momentum and Misalignment at Formation 
 
Firms rely heavily on routines in their decisions and actions, including those decisions 
pertaining to their corporate development activities; over time, these routines become 
reinforced and refined through experience (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Given that a firm’s 
actions are guided by these routines, it is not surprising that firms continue to pursue the 
actions for which they have well developed and strongly embedded routines. Indeed, firms 
often exhibit a pattern of repeated actions of the same kind. In other words, actions are often 
driven by strategic momentum which entails that the probability that a firm pursues a certain 
action increases with the number of times they have pursued the same action in the past 
(Amburgey and Miner, 1992; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Martin and Park, 2004). For 
example, Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan (2006) found that past acquisition experience 
positively affects the likelihood of pursuing additional acquisitions. Similarly, Amburgey and 
Miner (1992) showed that in the context of acquisition activity firms have a tendency to 
repeat actions they have previously taken. Martin and Park (2004) found that firms who have 
formed a high number of alliances of a particular type have a higher propensity to form 
subsequent alliances of the same type. In line with these studies, and since ownership 
decisions represent another type of the corporate development choices that have been shown 
to exhibit momentum, we expect to see firms who have engaged in subsidiaries with high 
levels of equity ownership to continue to do so in their subsequent subsidiaries. Similarly, 
firms that have more experience with low levels of equity in subsidiaries should be more 




Meanwhile, drawing on transfer theory, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) showed that 
there are limits to the transferability of prior experiences. More specifically, they argued that 
transferring routines can have a negative effect when the setting from which they are 
transferred differs from the setting to which they are transferred. Again, the context for their 
research was corporate development activities (acquisitions). Likewise, experience and 
strategic momentum should push firms to persist with taking similar levels of equity as they 
took in previous subsidiaries even if the setting is different or has changed. Furthermore, 
positive learning effects cannot be taken for granted in dynamic environments because 
lessons learned from previous experience are more likely to not apply anymore (Levitt and 
March, 1988). Hence, strategic momentum can be all the more problematic for international 
subsidiaries which tend to be surrounded by higher but also more diverse levels of 
uncertainty (Miller, 1992). 
As a result, equity levels which were aligned with the surrounding environment in 
terms of uncertainty in other locations may be misaligned with what is required given the 
current levels of uncertainty in a given location. The ensuing misalignment can take two 
forms: On the one hand, strategic momentum can lead to firms taking equity levels which are 
too high for the local conditions, i.e. excessive levels of equity. We expect this form of 
misalignment to be more likely for those firms which have more experience with wholly-
owned subsidiaries, as momentum would lead them to make subsequent investments with 
high levels of ownership too even if the subsequent investments are joint ventures. On the 
other hand, strategic momentum can push firms to take equity stakes which are too low, i.e. 
insufficient levels of equity. The probability of observing insufficient levels of equity should 
be higher for firms with higher levels of experience with jointly owned subsidiaries as they 
are more likely to persist with lower levels of equity and not to entertain taking higher 
ownership of subsequent ventures. Accordingly, we predict: 
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Hypothesis 1a: The higher the foreign parent’s experience with wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries, the more likely the foreign parent will opt for an excessive equity stake 
in subsequent subsidiaries. 
Hypothesis 1b: The higher the foreign parent’s experience with jointly owned foreign 
subsidiaries, the more likely the foreign parent will opt for an insufficient equity stake 
in subsequent subsidiaries. 
 
The Substituting Effect of Vicarious Learning on Post-formation Adaptation 
In the previous section, we argued that routinization through experience can explain 
misalignment between a firm’s ownership level in a subsidiary and the levels of uncertainty 
surrounding the subsidiary. However, not all types of experience need to have such a negative 
impact. Specifically, Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) argued that certain types of experience 
can help firms to design their alliances more effectively when they are formed and thus 
substitute for post-formation adaptation. We expect that observing other firms’ activities, i.e. 
learning from the experience of others, can help firms to design their alliances more 
effectively. 
Firms do not only learn from their own experiences, they also learn from other firms. 
This vicarious learning allows firms to explore alternatives without incurring the cost 
associated with experiential learning (Miner and Haunschild, 1995, Barkema and Schijven, 
2008). Several studies have provided evidence of vicarious learning and its benefits. For 
example, Ingram and Baum (1997) showed that Manhattan hotels which benefit from the 
operating experience of other Manhattan hotel chains survive longer. Shaver, Mitchell and 
Yeung (1997) provided evidence of the positive effects of vicarious learning by showing that 




subsidiaries. Looking at strategic alliances using a perceptual performance measure, Sarkar, 
Echambadi and Ford (2003) found that vicarious learning has a positive impact on alliances 
particularly in dynamic environments. 
This body of literature also revealed that firms mainly benefit from vicarious learning 
when establishing new subsidiaries, and less so afterwards (Baum and Ingram, 1998; Guillén, 
2002; Ingram and Baum, 1997). Furthermore, contrary to experiential learning, vicarious 
learning is more varied and does not depend on the path-dependent history of a single firm 
(Ingram and Baum, 1997). As a result, we expect vicarious learning to help firms to take a 
more optimal level of ownership when they establish their own subsidiaries. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the foreign parent’s levels of vicarious learning, the lower 
the level of ownership misalignment at formation. 
 
Misalignment and Post-formation Adaptation 
Ownership misalignment can result either from suboptimal ownership choices made 
when the subsidiary is founded, or from post-formation changes in the environment even 
though the initial decision was appropriate (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). Regardless of the 
source, misalignment is costly and this will pressure firms to adapt their ownership levels 
(Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Sampson, 2004). Furthermore, these costs depend on the 
direction in which a firm’s ownership levels are misaligned. 
This applies to joint venture ownership decisions too. On the one hand, misalignment 
can result from firms taking insufficient levels of ownership considering the levels of 
uncertainty in the environment. In this case, firms reduce their downside risk more than 
necessary while at the same time foregoing valuable cash flows because of their lower equity 
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stake (Pindyck, 1988). On the other hand, misalignment can arise from firms taking excessive 
levels of ownership. In this case firms will be able to capture a larger share of the cash flows 
from their subsidiary, however, they will be exposed to excessive levels of downside risk. 
Hence, regardless of the direction in which a firm’s ownership level is misaligned, there will 
be costs associated with it, albeit costs of a different nature. In order to achieve higher levels 
of profitability or simply to survive competitive pressures, firms will look for ways to 
increase their performance (March and Simon, 1993). Indeed Nickerson and Silverman 
(2003) found evidence that trucking firms adjust their use of company drivers and owner-
operators after deregulation in the for-hire trucking industry. Reuer and Ariño (2002) found 
that firms adapt the contractual terms of their alliances when these are not aligned anymore 
with the internal conditions of the alliance. Similarly, we expect firms to address 
misalignment with the external conditions and adjust their ownership levels to levels that are 
more in accordance with their environment. Hence, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A foreign parent will adjust its ownership level in a subsidiary when it 
is misaligned with levels of uncertainty in the environment surrounding the 
subsidiary. 
 
The Facilitating Role of Experience on Post-formation Adaptation 
Although we expect firms to adapt their misaligned ownership levels, we do not 
expect them all to adapt at the same rate. A variety of factors might influence a firm’s 
adaptation rate. For example, Nickerson and Silverman (2003) showed that firms’ adaptation 
rates differ depending on whether they have formal or informal contracts. Another factor we 
expect to have an important impact on a firm’s adaptation rate is the firm’s prior experience. 
Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) showed that a firm’s prior experience can have a 




argue that prior experience with alliances helps firms to develop routines related with the 
capacity to appropriately modify alliances over time. In other words, firms with more 
experience have a better understanding of the need to adjust and have a higher ability to 
successfully make adjustments if they are required. Accordingly, we expect more 
experienced firms to have a higher rate of adaptation when their ownership levels are 
misaligned with the levels of uncertainty surrounding the subsidiary. However, the 
facilitation effect of uncertainty will not be as pronounced for all types of experience (Reuer, 
Zollo and Singh, 2002). 
Facilitating experience may arise from previous experience with forming and 
operating joint ventures as well as from previous experience with adjusting their terms. By 
gaining experience with the formation and operation of subsidiaries firm learn to recognize 
when their ownership levels are misaligned, when to adjust them and in what direction they 
need to be adjusted. Through previous adjustments in ownership, firms learn how to arrange 
and put into effect such adjustments. Of the two, we expect the facilitation effect to be 
stronger for experience with actually making adjustments to the ownership levels of a 
subsidiary. This is because it provides direct and focused experience of the task on hand, 
which maximizes learning. Several studies have argued that effect of prior experience is 
stronger when experience is transferred between tasks with high levels of similarity (e.g., 
Cormier and Hagman, 1987; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Zollo and Reuer, 2008). Such 
should be the case with such a specific task as ownership adjustment. 
By contrast, prior experience with subsidiaries will establish and refine routines of 
successfully operating and managing a subsidiary. These routines potentially help to facilitate 
one particular aspect of managing a subsidiary, i.e. adjusting the ownership structure. 
However, managing a subsidiary entails a lot more than adjusting ownership structure. 
Moreover, firms do not face the need for, and challenges associated with ownership structure 
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adjustments in all subsidiaries. Hence, the routines firms developed through subsidiary 
management experience in general may only provide limited guidance in the process of 
adjusting ownership structure.  
Therefore, having specific experience at the task of adjusting the ownership structure 
should be more valuable in helping to facilitate subsequent adjustments than general 
experience of managing subsidiaries. Accordingly, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The rate of adaption of misaligned ownership levels will be higher for 
foreign parents with higher levels of prior subsidiary and adaptation experience. 
However, the effect of prior adaptation experience will be stronger than that of prior 
subsidiary experience. 
 
Uncertainty and Ownership Misalignment 
As mentioned before, misalignment can result from changes in the environment after 
the subsidiary has been established (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). In line with this, several studies 
have looked at how changes in the environment, and in particular changes in the levels of 
uncertainty, affect subsidiary dynamics (e.g., Yan and Gray, 1994; Makino, Chan, Isobe and 
Beamish, 2007). Makino, Chan, Isobe and Beamish (2007) observed that changes in the 
external conditions increase instability in international JVs. Yan and Gray (1994) found that 
changes in the policies of local governments lead to changes in relative bargaining power 
between the partners and thereby trigger JV instability. In a conceptual paper, Zajac and 
Olsen (1993) argued that changes in an alliance’s environment result in a reconfiguration of 
the alliance as a result of changes in the value of the alliance. 
In this stream of research, some more recent studies introduced an intermediate 




misalignment and thereby to instability (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Reuer and Ariño, 
2002). However, Nickerson and Silverman (2003) did not empirically establish the link 
between regulatory changes in the environment and misalignment. Moreover, Reuer and 
Ariño (2002) found that alliance partners are no more or less likely to adjust the alliance’s 
contract when the alliance is subject to environmental change. 
Despite the mixed empirical results, the general premise in this body of literature is 
that firms’ ownership structures are aligned and that changes in the environment subsequently 
lead to misalignment. As a result, changes in the environment will cause instability and/or 
trigger adaptation. However, we argue that environmental changes can also lead to less 
misalignment and a lower need for adaptation, in the case where the ownership was 
misaligned to start with and the environment changed in such a way as to make this 
misalignment less severe. More specifically, we argue that a change in uncertainty will have 
an asymmetric effect on the level of misalignment depending on whether the parent had 
excessive or insufficient levels of uncertainty prior to the change. 
Cuypers and Martin (2010) found a negative relationship between the level of 
exogenous uncertainty and the ownership levels firms take in a foreign subsidiary. 
Subsequently, an increase in uncertainty should make lower ownership levels more desirable. 
Assuming that a firm’s ownership level was well-aligned before the change in the 
environment, this will result in the firm’s ownership levels being misaligned after the change. 
In turn this will push the firm to re-align its ownership levels. However, in practice firms’ 
ownership structures are not always aligned before changes in the environment occur (Reuer 
and Ariño, 2002). Therefore, the direction in which a firm’s ownership levels are misaligned 
will determine whether a firm needs to adapt or not. If a firm has an excessive level of 
ownership in its subsidiary, an increase in uncertainty will further misalign its ownership 
structure. Hence, an increase in uncertainty will increase the need for and likelihood of 
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adaptations to the level of ownership. Conversely, if a firm has insufficient levels of 
ownership, then a subsequent increase in uncertainty will re-align its ownership structure 
without any adaptations in the ownership structure. Hence, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: An increase in the level of exogenous uncertainty surrounding the 
subsidiary will further misalign the ownership levels of foreign parents which have 
excessive ownership levels before the increase in uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 5b: An increase in the level of exogenous uncertainty surrounding the 
subsidiary will re-align the ownership levels of foreign parents which have 





We test our hypotheses using longitudinal data on foreign subsidiaries by Japanese 
automotive vehicle assemblers and parts manufacturers covering a period from 1979 until 
2001. The primary source of our subsidiary-level data is the Japan Auto Parts Industry 
Directory which was published every three or four years by Dodwell Marketing Consultants. 
This directory provides detailed information about the ownership, location, history and 
activities of each subsidiary. We tracked each subsidiary across different editions using 
subsidiary and parent names and locations. Parent-level information was collected from the 
same source. We then used common country-level data sources, including Euromoney, and 
the International Country Risk Guide, to compile our county-level uncertainty variables. 
The data source listed 1,005 foreign subsidiaries of 327 Japanese parents in 47 
different host countries that were documented in at least two issues of our data source. From 




country-level, and/or (3) parent-level data. Using these selection criteria, our final sample 
includes 726 foreign subsidiaries of 196 Japanese parents in 38 host countries. 
Overwhelmingly, the partners were local companies for which systematic data was 
unfortunately not available. 
The context of our data is particularly interesting to study the effects of uncertainty 
and experience on subsidiary adaptations for a number of reasons. Firstly, Japanese data in 
general (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 2001; Hennart, 1991; Makino and Beamish, 1998) and 
more specifically data on the Japanese automotive industry (e.g. Martin, Swaminathan, and 
Mitchell, 1998) have been widely used in strategy and international business research. These 
studies have shown that the Japanese context provides a platform to test theories with similar 
levels of external validity compared to those in other contexts such as North America 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Secondly, Japan was the world’s second largest source of FDI 
(behind the United States) during the period of our sample (UNCTAD, 2002). This provides a 
large number of observations covering a wide range of host countries. As a result, we have 
substantial levels of variation in the Japanese parents’ levels of experience and in uncertainty 
in the host countries. Finally, it has been well documented that Japanese firms have a high 
propensity to use JVs and not just wholly-owned subsidiaries as a vehicle to enter new 
markets (Delios and Beamish, 1999). As a result, we observe the entire range of possible 
ownership levels in our sample, which makes the data all the more complete. 
Model Specification and Estimation 
To test our hypotheses, we follow a two-step procedure similar to the ones used in 
Anderson (1988), Nickerson and Silverman (2003) and Reuer and Ariño (2002). In a first 
step, we determine to what extent a parent’s equity stake in a subsidiary actually corresponds 
with the equity stake we theoretically would expect given the level of uncertainty 
surrounding the subsidiary. Cuypers and Martin (2010) modeled the impact of exogenous 
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uncertainty on equity share decisions in overseas subsidiaries for a different sample of 
investments (into China). Using a two-tailed Tobit model, they found that parents setting up 
new overseas subsidiaries in environments with higher levels of exogenous uncertainty will 
take smaller ownership stakes in their subsidiary. In line with their model, we use a two-
tailed Tobit model with various sources of uncertainty as independent variables to calculate 
the levels of equity we would expect given the levels of uncertainty. The model and each of 
the uncertainty variables are highly significant (p<.001) and largely consistent with Cuypers 
and Martin’s (2010) findings (Appendix 1). Subsequently, we calculate the difference 
between the expected ownership stakes based on the model, and the actual ownership stakes 
we observe. That is, we set ownership misalignment equal to the residual for each 
observation. 
In a second step, we test our hypotheses using ownership misalignment as our 
dependent variable. Specifically, we use cross-sectional OLS models for the hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 1 and 2) that focus on misalignment at formation. 
 
      
    where 
   is a normally distributed error term,  
        are the independent variables. 
 
Hypotheses 3 through 5 evaluate how firms adapt their misaligned ownership 
structures after the subsidiary is established. Accordingly, we use fixed-effects partial 
(dynamic) adjustment models similar to those employed by Haveman (1992, 1993) and 






         
    where 
  is the fixed effect for a parent’s equity stake in a given 
subsidiary, 
   is a normally distributed error term,  
         are the independent variables.   
Dependent Variables 
We calculate the level of ownership misalignment as described above and in 
Appendix 1. We use the variable as such, which varies theoretically from –99% (where the 
parent took almost no equity when it should have taken maximum equity) to +99% (where 
the parent took nearly complete equity when it should have taken minimum equity), to test 
hypotheses 1a/1b and as basis for splitting our sample for hypotheses 5a/5b. Hence, negative 
values correspond to a situation where a Japanese parent has an insufficient equity level, 
while positive values imply that the parent has an excessive level of equity in its subsidiary. 
In our other hypotheses we are interested in the degree of misalignment rather than its 
directionality. In those cases, in order to facilitate the interpretation of our results, we use the 
absolute value of the level of misalignment as our dependent variable. We label this Absolute 
Ownership Misalignment. As a result, Absolute Ownership Misalignment ranges from 0, 
which occurs when the parent’s equity stake corresponds perfectly to the equity stake we 
predicted, to (almost) 100 which occurs when the parent’s equity stake is exactly opposite to 
what we predicted (i.e. whether the firm took almost no equity when it should have taken 
maximum equity or vice versa). 
Independent Variables 
 
Economic uncertainty: The degree of economic uncertainty is measured using the 
Euromoney country risk index. This oft-used index measures the economic uncertainty of a 
country at a particular time on a scale from 0 to 100 based on credit (e.g., payment records), 
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analytical (e.g., economic performance forecasts), and market indicators (e.g., selldown 
performance). The index comprises a mix of market perception and objective measures. 
Political uncertainty: We capture the level of political uncertainty using Henisz’ 
political hazards index (Henisz, 2000). This index is oft used and captures the extent to which 
a change in the preferences of any single branch of government can result in a change in 
government policy. The measure ranges from zero (the lowest level of political uncertainty), 
to one (the highest level of political uncertainty). 
Institutional Uncertainty3: As a measure of institutional uncertainty, we used the 
component of the Economic Freedom of the World index which captures the level of 
uncertainty resulting from a country’s institutional framework. This index is published 
annually by the Fraser institute and has been recoded so a higher score represents higher 
levels of institutional uncertainty. 
Overall International Experience: A Japanese Parent’s overall international 
experience was measured as the count of the total number of foreign subsidiaries that it has 
been involved in preceding the focal observation. 
Overall International Adaptation Experience: This variable is measured as the total 
number of equity adjustments a Japanese partner has made in all its foreign subsidiaries 
preceding the focal observation. 
Overall International JV Experience: This variable is measured as the total number 
of foreign JVs a Japanese partner has been involved in preceding the focal observation. 
Overall International WOS Experience: We use the count of total number of foreign 
WOS a Japanese partner has been involved before the focal observation. 
3 As alternative measures of institutional uncertainty, we used the separate components of the International 
Country Risk Guide index which captures the level of uncertainty resulting from a country’s institutional 
framework. Our results remain robust. However, these alternative measures are available for less subsidiaries 




Country-specific Experience: We measure the parent’s experience in a given host 
country as the count of the total number of subsidiaries that it has been involved in preceding 
the focal observation in the corresponding country. 
Country-specific Adaptation Experience: This measure is operationalized as the total 
number of equity adjustments a parent has made in the same country preceding the focal 
observation. 
Country-specific JV Experience: This variable is measured as the total number of 
JVs a Japanese partner has been involved in preceding the focal observation in the same host 
country. 
Country-specific WOS Experience: We use the count of total number of WOS a 
Japanese partner has been involved before the focal observation in the same host country. 
Vicarious Learning: We proxy the amount a parent learns from other sample firms in 
a focal host country as the count of the number of Japanese parents that have been active in 
the same host country preceding the focal observation. We expect that with an increased 
number of other Japanese parents in a host country, the pool of experience from which a focal 
Japanese parent can benefit increases (Shaver, Mitchell and Yeung, 1997). 
Vicarious Adaptation Learning: This variable was measured as the total number of 
equity adjustments Japanese parents made in the corresponding host country preceding the 
focal observation. 
Vicarious JV Learning: This variable is measured as the total number of foreign JVs 
all Japanese parents has been established in the same host country preceding the focal 
observation. 
Vicarious WOS Learning: We measured vicarious WOS learning as the total number 
of foreign WOS all Japanese parents has been established in the same host country preceding 
the focal observation. 
116
The Impact of Uncertainty, Ownership Misalignment and Experience on Subsidiary Dynamics 
 
Control Variables 
We control for a number of additional factors that may influence equity misalignment and/or 
adaptation. Firstly, we measure the Japanese parent’s performance as its net profits in 
millions of Yen. Secondly, we control for the age of the subsidiary, measured by the number 
of years since subsidiary foundation. Thirdly, we also control for the strategic importance of 
the subsidiary using the ratio of the subsidiary’s number of employees to those of its parent. 




Table 1 the reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables. 
In panel A of Table 1, we provide information on the variables appearing in the subsample 
we use to analyze the degree of misalignment at formation. The descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the variables we use in the full sample are reported in panel B. Overall, the 
magnitudes of the correlations between our independent variables are moderate, which 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem. This is confirmed by the variance inflation 
factors for all our variables appearing in the models, which are all below the accepted rule of 
thumb value of 10 (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1985). 
Examination of the distribution of ownership levels shows that the values are broadly 
dispersed over the possible range of 1%-100%. Similarly, we find that the level of Ownership 
Misalignment is normally distributed. 
Strategic Momentum and Misalignment at Formation 
The models examining the effects of strategic momentum on the degree and 
directionality of misalignment when the subsidiary is established are reported in Table 2. 
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This allows us to investigate the direction of the misalignment. The results in models 
1 and 2 show that parents with more overall international WOS experience (p<.001) or more 
host country-specific WOS experience (p<.001) are more likely to take higher levels of 
equity. Thus, as we predicted in hypothesis 1a, higher levels of prior WOS experience 
increase the likelihood that parents take excessive amounts of equity. Conversely, we find 
that parents with higher levels of overall international WOS experience (p<.001) or more host 
country-specific WOS experience (p<.001) are more likely to take lower levels of equity in 
their subsequent subsidiaries. As predicted in hypothesis 1b, this increases the likelihood that 
parents with more prior JV experience take insufficient levels of equity in their subsidiaries. 
Hence, we find evidence of strategic momentum in parents’ ownership decisions which 
contributes to higher levels of misalignment. 
To explore these findings further we look at the probability that a parent either takes 
too much or too little equity in a subsidiary. To do so we estimate our coefficients using the 
logistic regression methodology with two different dummy variables as dependent variable. 
The dependent variable in models 4 and 5 equals 1 when a parent takes too much equity in a 
subsidiary while the dependent variable in models 6 and 7 equals 1 when a parent does not 
take enough equity in a subsidiary. In models 4 and 5, we find that higher levels of 
respectively a parent’s overall international WOS experience (p<.001) and host country-
specific experience (p<.001) increase the probability that the parent takes an ownership share 
in a subsidiary that is higher than desirable. Conversely, we find that higher levels of 
respectively a parent’s overall international JV experience (p<.001) and host country-specific 
JV experience (p<.001) reduce the probability that a parent take too much equity in a 
subsidiary. In models 6 and 7, we look at the probability that a parent does not take enough 
equity in a subsidiary. This reveals that the coefficients for a parent’s overall international the 
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while coefficients for a parent’s overall international JV experience (p<.001) and host 
country-specific JV experience (p<.001) are positive and significant. These results provide 
further support for hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
The Substituting Effect of Vicarious Learning on Post-formation Adjustments 
In models 8 through 11 (Table 3), we investigate whether vicarious learning has a 
substituting effect on post-formation equity changes as predicted in hypotheses 2. We 
investigate and contrast the effects of three types of experience/learning: vicarious learning, 
overall international experience, and host country-specific experience. In models 8, 9, and 10 
we respectively look at each of these three types of experience individually, while model 11 
is our full model which includes all three types of experience. 
 
In model 8 and 11, we find that vicarious learning significantly (p<.1) reduces the level of 
misalignment at formation. Hence, vicarious learning seems to assists parents in the initial 




result of this reduction in misalignment, vicarious learning reduces the need for post-
formation adaptations. This lends support for hypothesis 2. Parent’s overall international 
experience and its host country-specific experience, by contrast, do not have a bearing on the 
level of misalignment at formation when we do not distinguish between JV and WOS 
experience as we did to test hypothesis 1. This suggests that indeed only vicarious learning 
has a substituting effect on post-formation equity changes.  
Post-formation Ownership Misalignment and Adaptation 
The regression results to test hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 4. All models are 
highly significant (p<.001) and have considerable explanatory power. Regarding hypothesis 
3, Absolute Ownership Misalignment is positive and significant (p<.001) in model 12. 
Furthermore, at .772 the coefficient is significantly different from both 0 and 1. If adaptation 
were unconstrained, parents would perfectly realign their ownership levels regardless of the 
degree of misalignment in the previous period. Hence, the coefficient for Absolute 
Ownership Misalignment would be 0. In contrast, if the parent did not adapt its ownership 
level at all, the level of misalignment in the previous period would be a perfect predictor of 
misalignment in the subsequent period. This would correspond to the coefficient being equal 
to 1. Hence, as predicted in hypothesis 3, our results indicate that subsidiary parents at least 
partially adapt their equity levels in their subsidiaries to reduce the degree to which they are 
misaligned. In models 13 (Table 4), 18 and 22 (Table 5), 26 (Table 6) we introduce several 
other factors step-wise that we expected to influence the amount of adaptation and/or 
misalignment. Including these variables does not change the magnitude or significant level of 
the coefficient for the Absolute Ownership Misalignment variable. Hence, hypothesis 3 











We also re-ran our models after splitting the sample depending on whether the 
Japanese parent has excessive or insufficient levels of equity in its subsidiary. In models 14   
and 15 we look at the adaptation rate of those parents which took more equity than desirable 
in their subsidiary. We find coefficients of Absolute Ownership Misalignment which are 
respectively, .417 and .397 (p<.001) for this subset of parents. When we look at the 
coefficients in models 16 and 17 for the subset of parents which took less equity than 
desirable we find lower adaptation rates as indicated by a higher coefficient of the previous 
period’s misalignment (i.e. greater stickiness), with coefficients of respectively .754 and .741 
(p<.001). Although the adaptation rates of parents with too much equity ownership in their 
subsidiaries are higher than of those parents with too little equity ownership, each is 
significantly different from both 0 and 1. 
Finally, our results indicate that the misalignment we observe is not the result of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Namely, if the ownership level of a parent we find to be 
misalignment was actually properly aligned given some unobserved characteristic, we would 
observe a coefficient which is not different from 1 (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003). 
The Facilitating Effect of Experience 
The models in Table 5, present the estimation results for six different types of 
interactions terms. We interact 6 different types of experience with the Absolute Ownership 
Misalignment variable. Given the structure of our models, negative coefficients for the 
interaction terms indicate faster rates of adaptation (more decrease in misalignment) while 
positive coefficients for the interaction terms indicate slower rates of adaptation. If 
experience indeed has a facilitating effect as predicted in hypothesis 4 we would expect 
parents with higher levels of experience to have higher adaptation rates. 
In models 19, 20 and 21 we investigate the effects of vicarious experience, overall 
international experience, and host-country specific experience. Only the parent’s overall  
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international experience seems to have a facilitation effect (p<.05), i.e. it increases the 
rate of adaptation. In models 23, 24, and 25 we look at the parents’ experience at making 
adaptations. We find that a parent’s vicarious adaptation experience, overall international 
adaptation experience and host country-specific adaptation experience all have a significant 
(p<.01 or lower) facilitating effect. All three sources of experience increase the rate of 
adaptation. The effect of a one-standard deviation change for each of the three types of 
adaptation experience on the adaptation rate is substantial (>4%) and at least twice as large than 
the effect of a one-standard deviation change in each of the three types of general subsidiary 
experience. 
As predicted in hypothesis 4, these results confirm that experience indeed has a 
facilitating effect and accelerates the rate of adaptation. However, this effect is more 
pronounced for experience that relates directly to the specific task, i.e. making adaptations. 
Uncertainty and Ownership Misalignment 
In Table 6, we report the models which investigate the impact of changes in the level 
of uncertainty on the degree of misalignment. In model 26, we find no relationship between 
the degree of misalignment and our three measures of uncertainty for the overall sample 
including cases where we found excessive as well as insufficient ownership levels. This is not 
surprising given that we predict an asymmetric impact of changes in uncertainty on the 
degree of misalignment, depending on whether the parent has too much or not enough equity 
in the subsidiary. 
In model 27, we look at the impact of an increase in the level of uncertainty on the 
level of misalignment for the subset of parents that had excessive ownership levels. We find 
that increases in the levels of economic (p<.001) and political (p<.001) uncertainty 
significantly increase the level of misalignment. Hence, increases in the level of uncertainty 




However, we fail to find such an effect for political uncertainty. Thus, these results provide 
partial support for hypothesis 5a. 
  In model 28, we look at the subset of parents whose ownership levels are less than 
desirable. In accordance with hypothesis 5b, we find that increases in political uncertainty 
(p<.05) and economic uncertainty (p<.001) reduce the degree of misalignment. Thus, an 
increase in uncertainty re-aligns the ownership structure when the parent has a too small a 
share. However, Institutional Uncertainty does not have a similar significant impact on the 
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DISCUSSION 
We aimed to improve the understanding of the evolution of international subsidiaries. 
We achieve this by providing evidence that firms often have ownership level in their 
subsidiaries which are misaligned with the levels of uncertainty they face in the external 
environment. This has important implications for the evolution of these subsidiaries, as we 
show that firms adapt their ownership levels to reduce the degree of misalignment. 
Furthermore, we observe and explain why some firms adapt their ownership levels faster than 
others. Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. 
Firstly, we contribute to the literature on organizational learning by providing 
evidence of different types of learning – namely, differences between general JV learning and 
JV adaptation learning, and between vicarious and experiential learning. Furthermore, we 
reveal a complex relationship between a firm’s prior experience and the dynamics of 
subsequent subsidiaries. Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) argued that experience can both 
facilitate and substitute for post-formation adjustments in alliances. We find evidence 
consistent with the facilitating effect of experience. Our results show that firms with higher 
levels of subsidiary experience in the same host country as the focal subsidiary adapt their 
ownership levels faster when it is misaligned. Furthermore, firms that have more adaptation 
experience exhibit faster adaptation rates than firms with general subsidiary experience or 
firms without any experience at all (hypothesis 4). 
In order to investigate the substitution effect of experience, we look at experience as a 
determinant of ownership misalignment when the subsidiary is formed. As expected, we find 
that vicarious learning helps firms to better design their subsidiaries, thereby reducing the 
need for post-formation adjustments (hypothesis 2). This also highlights that firms benefit 
from the experience of previous entrants in a country. However, experiential learning does 




strategic momentum which in turn results in less optimal ownership levels when a subsidiary 
is formed. Firms with more WOS experience tend to take higher levels of ownership than 
optimal, while higher levels of JV experience tends to result in ownership levels which are 
lower than optimal (hypotheses 1a and 1b). 
Hence, our results highlight three different but complementary effects of experience 
contingent on the type of experience and the stage in the life-cycle of the subsidiary: (1) a 
substituting effect at formation which results in more stable subsidiaries, (2) a post-formation 
facilitating effect and (3) a momentum effect at formation, which results in more unstable 
subsidiaries. This highlights the importance of differentiating between the source and type of 
knowledge firms accumulate in their international subsidiaries. Moreover, it further 
challenges the assumption that experience is always positive (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). 
Secondly, we contribute to the international business and strategy literatures on 
subsidiary dynamics. Most studies in these literatures have focused on subsidiary survival 
and the shifts from one extreme ownership level to another. In contrast, we look at 
incremental ownership changes during the life of a subsidiary. This reveals that firms adjust 
their ownership levels to re-align with the external environment (hypothesis 3). While 
instability is often considered to be negative and an indication of failure (e.g., Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1997), the re-aligning adaptations we observe can be considered positive and are 
likely to lead to increased performance. 
In this study we also integrate research on subsidiary design and subsidiary evolution. 
This allows us to discuss how factors influencing a subsidiary’s initial design in terms of 
ownership levels subsequently influence a subsidiary’s evolution. Our findings highlight the 
rewards of simultaneously considering multiple stages of subsidiaries’ life-cycles to get a 
more complete understanding of how subsidiaries evolve and adjust. 
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Finally, we show that firms need to align their ownership levels with the external 
environment. Most previous studies looking at ownership misalignment have mainly focused 
on internal factors (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003). However, we show that the external 
environment, and uncertainty in the environment in particular, is a key determinant of 
subsidiary dynamics. However, we find that changes in the external environment do not 
automatically lead to higher levels of ownership misalignment and instability (hypotheses 5a 
and 5b). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
This study is not without its limitations, and several suggestions for further research 
can be made. Firstly, we study Japanese overseas subsidiaries. Although there are no reasons 
to believe that our findings are specific to Japanese firms, future studies could verify our 
results for firms from another home country. Similarly, we focus on the automotive industry. 
Theoretically there is no reason to expect that our findings do not apply to other industries, 
nevertheless, it would be interesting to look at other industries.  
Secondly, we looked at the roles of different types of learning and experience. We 
contrasted the effects of experiential learning and vicarious learning. Future research might 
examine yet other sources or forms of knowledge accumulation. Thirdly, we examined how 
firms align or fail to align their ownership structure with the external environment. However, 
factors internal to the subsidiary also seem to be important drivers of ownership 
misalignment and subsidiary dynamics (e.g. Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Lu and Hébert, 2005). 
Due to data limitations we cannot simultaneously consider internal and external factors. 
Future research could also examine the interactions among internal and external factors. 
Notwithstanding these limitations and remaining research avenues, our study increases the 
understanding of how subsidiaries are designed and adjusted over time. Given the theory and 




 APPENDIX 1: Calculating Ownership Misalignment 
 
In a study of 6,472 Sino-foreign JVs formed between 1979 and 1996, Cuypers and 
Martin (2010) investigated the determinants of the ownership distribution of JVs. Their 
model describes determinants of the optimal level of ownership for a foreign investor. More 
specifically, they found a negative relationship between exogenously resolving sources of 
uncertainty and the foreign parent’s level of ownership in a JV. The three exogenous sources 
of uncertainty they focused on were the level of institutional uncertainty, economic 
uncertainty and local institutional uncertainty. To estimate their coefficients they used a two-
tailed Tobit model because their dependent variable, the foreign parent’s equity share, is 
bounded.  
For the purpose of our study we are interested in the degree of Ownership 
Misalignment. In order to calculate the degree of Ownership Misalignment we start from 
Cuypers and Martin’s (2010) model to calculate the differences between the observed 
ownership levels and the expected ownership levels. In practice this corresponds to residual 
for each observation resulting from the model described below. Due to data constraints and 
minor differences in the empirical setting our model differs marginally from Cuypers and 
Martin’s (2010) model. We can write our model as: 
 
 
   
   




where Political Uncertainty, Economic Uncertainty, and Institutional Uncertainty are our 
three sources of exogenous uncertainty. We also control for the size of the parent and 
subsidiary, parent profitability, cultural distance, whether the subsidiary has any sales 
activities, and we add year dummies. All three sources of uncertainty are highly significant 
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(p<.001) and negative as expected, and the overall model is statistically significant (p<.001) 
and has considerable predictive power. The results are presented below: 
  Ownership Stake 
Constant 82.612 *** 
 (7.079)  
Subsidiary Size -5.315 *** 
 (0.471)  
Parent Size 6.828 *** 
 (0.775)  
Parent Profitability 0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  
Sales Activity 10.754 *** 
 (1.540)  
Cultural Distance -3.022 *** 
 (0.724)  
Political Uncertainty -10.474 ** 
 (3.417)  
Economic Uncertainty -0.229 ** 
 (0.075)  
Institutional Uncertainty -8.897 *** 
  (1.312)   
      
Log-likelihood -13186.22  
Chi-squared 782.27 *** 
 
The model includes year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two tailed:    † p < 0.10;    * 










LEARNING FROM JOINT VENTURES: 





Extending research on the link between prior JV experience and the amount and 
distribution of value generated by a JV, we examine the effects of the level of 
asymmetry between JV partners’ prior JV experience. Using a sample of 576 
JVs, we show that both the partners’ total JV experience and the degree of 
asymmetry in their levels of prior experience determine how much value is 
created upon JV announcement. Furthermore, the value distribution between the 
JV parties depends on the level of asymmetry in their respective JV experience. 
We discuss implications for practice and research on JVs and organizational 
learning. 
                                                 





During the last decades the numbers of joint ventures (JVs) has grown dramatically. 
As a result, the study of JVs has aroused considerable enthusiasm in recent years among both 
scholars and practitioners of strategic investments. Various theoretical streams have resulted 
in a better understanding of JV types, purposes, scope and life stages. 
An extensive body of research has also looked at the value implications of investing 
in JVs (e.g., McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Balakrishnan and 
Koza, 1993; Madhavan and Prescott, 1995; Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin, 1997; 
Anand and Khanna, 2000; Merchant and Schendel, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). These 
studies revealed that on average JV partners gain from entering into a JV. Yet, JVs vary 
greatly in how much value they create for their partners. These differences have been 
attributed to numerous factors such as the JV’s structure, environmental characteristics and 
partner characteristics. 
One major limitation of these studies is that they primarily investigated the wealth 
gains of individual partners, or in a few rare cases the total value created in a JV (e.g., Koh 
and Venkatraman, 1991). Contrary to the merger and acquisition (M&A) literature, they 
failed to examine how much value is created in total – the joint value that is created by all 
partners in the JV - and how this value is distributed among the JV partners (for an exception, 
see Gulati & Wang (2003)). The M&A literature has shown that generally there are wealth 
transfers from acquirers to target firms (e.g., Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983; Morck, 
Schleifer and Vishny, 1990; Seth, Song and Pettit, 2002). Theoretically, we would expect 
similar asymmetric wealth gains in JVs too as JV partners are likely to have different abilities 
and opportunities to extract value from a JV (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Gulati and Wang, 2003). 
Indeed, Kumar (2007, 2010) found patterns of asymmetric wealth gains in JVs. This suggests 
that it might be impossible to have an accurate understanding of how much value individual 
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partners capture by looking at a single JV partner in isolation, i.e. without considering the 
other JV partners and their characteristics. Furthermore, several studies in the M&A literature 
have shown that the distribution of wealth is driven by different factors than those which 
influence the total amount of value that is created in a deal (e.g., Seth, 1990a; Seth, Song and 
Pettit, 2000, 2002; Cuypers, Cuypers and Martin, 2009). Hence, without considering both 
value creation and appropriation simultaneously, it remains unclear whether higher gains for 
an individual partner can be attributed to a JV which created more value or to the partner’s 
ability to appropriate more value at the expense of its partners. Overall, it seems crucial to 
distinguish between value creation and the value capturing which has so far been largely 
ignored in the JV literature (Seth, 1990a, 1990b). We contribute to existing JV literature by 
making such a distinction. More specifically, we look at the total amount of value created in 
JVs using event study methodology and subsequently investigate how the value created is 
distributed among the partners. 
A wide range of factors including JV structure, environmental characteristics and 
partner characteristics has been linked to JV value creation. In this paper, we examine the 
role of the prior JV experience of each JV partner on the total value that is created in a JV and 
how this value is distributed. Anand and Khanna (2000) found initial evidence of positive 
experience effects on JV performance and value creation. However, the effect of experience 
does not need to be positive in all circumstances. Several studies have shown that the effect 
of experience can be contingent. For example, Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) found that 
experience has to match the environment in order to beneficial and Anand and Khanna (2000) 
found that the effect of experience is contingent on the activities of the JV. Hence, experience 
has to fit with the environment and the activities of the JV. However, the learning literature 
has not addressed the possibility that there also has to be a fit between the different partners’ 




suggested that inter-partner fit is crucial and an important determinant of JV performance. 
Several dimensions of fit including cultural, strategic, and organization fit, have been 
explored and found to be relevant (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Geringer, 1991; Luo, 1997; 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). These findings suggest that fit in general is important, 
yet the fit of experience between JV partners remains largely unexplored. This paper fills this 
void by looking at the fit between each of the JV partner’s experience and its effect on value 
creation and distribution. Furthermore, we identify a number of conditions under which such 
a fit in experience is more important. 
By considering the experience of all of the JV partners, and examining the total value 
created and the way it is distributed, this paper aims to makes a significant contribution to the 
literature on JVs. In addition, we contribute to the research on organizational learning by 
looking at the degree of fit between the prior JV experience of each of the JV partners and 
how this influences value creation in a different way than the subsequent distribution of the 
value created. Furthermore, we argue that the need for experience fit is contingent on several 
factors internal and external the JV. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Learning From Prior Joint Venture Experience 
Several studies have looked at the potentially beneficial effect of prior JV experience 
on JV performance. These studies built on several ideas from the learning, evolutionary 
economics, and behavioral theory literatures (Reuer, Park and Zollo, 2002). The learning 
curve literature has examined how repetition and corrections in a manufacturing setting 
increase the performance of production activities (Argote, 1999). The evolutionary 
economics and behavioral theory literature looked at experience effects on a wider range of 
activities including JVs and M&As. Studies in these literatures argued that firms develop a 
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competence to manage certain activities by creating routines and capabilities (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). These routines and capabilities can then be retrieved 
and used in subsequent activities of a similar nature, which in turn offers the potential to 
improve performance. In the context of JVs, this implies that firms with previous JV 
experience will be able to make inferences from previous ventures and develop JV routines 
and capabilities which will allow them to improve performance in subsequent JVs (Anand 
and Khanna, 2000; Reuer, Park and Zollo, 2002). 
Although several studies indeed found positive experience effects on JV performance 
(e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000), others have failed to find such an effect (e.g., Barkema, 
Shenkar, Vermeulen and Bell, 1997) or found a negative effect (e.g., Reuer, Park and Zollo, 
2002). We believe that some of these inconsistencies result from a number of empirical issues 
and the way JV performance is conceptualized. Firstly, these studies generally focused on a 
single partner’s prior JV experience. Ignoring the other partners’ experience may bias 
findings on JV experience, as it may underestimate or overestimate the JV’s aggregate 
experience base. Failing to take into account both parties’ prior experience has been shown to 
have a significant effect on results when studying performance in an M&A setting (Cuypers, 
Cuypers and Martin, 2009). Secondly, the JV studies generally focus on the performance 
implications for a single partner. However, it might be impossible to have an accurate 
understanding of how prior experience leads to value creation looking at a single JV partner 
in isolation. Without making a distinction between value creation and value appropriation, it 
remains unclear whether higher gains for an individual partner can be attributed to a JV 
which created more value, or to the partner’s ability to appropriate a larger share of the total 
value created at the expense of its partners. Again, several studies in the M&A literature have 
shown that the distribution of wealth is driven by different factors than those which influence 




2000, 2002; Cuypers, Cuypers and Martin, 2009). In particular, prior M&A experience 
appears to influence value creation and value appropriation differently (Cuypers, Cuypers and 
Martin, 2009). To address these issues, we look at each of the JV partners’ prior JV 
experience and how this influences the total value that is created through a JV and then the 
value that a single partner appropriates. 
Experience can help firms deal with many of the challenges associated with entering 
into a JV. In order to realize the potential benefits of JVs, firms have to initiate cooperation, 
coordinate activities, overcome operational difficulties, resolve conflict, realize potential 
synergies and deal with unanticipated contingencies among other things in an adequate way 
(Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Lane and Beamish, 1990; Park and Ungson, 1997; Pangakar, 
2003). These significant challenges require effective management by each of the parties 
involved in the JV (Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanat, 2002). The JV literature has established that 
partners learn to manage their JVs more effectively by transferring their experiences from 
one JV to subsequent JVs (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Anand and Khanna (2000) found 
that firms develop an alliance capability as their experience with doing alliances accumulates. 
Such a capability can be seen as a firm’s ability to manage the different phases or aspects of 
alliances, communicate and interact with its partners, and to anticipate and respond to 
unforeseen contingencies (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007). Hence, an 
alliance capability enables them to handle more adequately the unique challenges inherent to 
interfirm cooperation. Pangarkar (2003) found evidence that firms learn to manage alliances 
and generate synergies through the pooling of resources. Prior experience also enables the 
development of relational assets which have shown to be positively related to superior firm 
performance (Dyer, 1997). Finally, Wang and Zajac (2007) argued that the combined alliance 
capability, i.e. the combined previous JV experience of the JV partners, should be considered 
to understand how much economic benefits can be realized in a JV. 
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In sum, each partner’s prior JV experience allows firms to cooperate and 
communicate more efficiently. As a result, the JV should generate more value when each of 
the individual partners enters into the JV with the benefits of greater prior JV experience. 
Accordingly, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The combined previous joint venture experience of the partners is 
positively related to the total value generated upon entering into a joint venture. 
 
Experience Asymmetry 
So far, we have looked at the absolute levels of experience. However, the partners’ 
relative experience might also have an impact on how much value is created in JVs. This 
issue remains largely unexplored in the literature. Nevertheless, numerous scholars have 
argued that the emergence and maintenance of effective cooperation between JV partners is 
related to the diversity and symmetry between the partners, i.e. the inter-organizational 
differences on certain attributes or dimensions. Namely, diversity and asymmetry between JV 
partners can seriously impede their ability to work effectively together (Parkhe, 1991; 
Harrigan 1988a)2. The main reason for this is that JV partners are more likely to create value 
when they possess complementary missions, resources capabilities, managerial capabilities 
and other attributes that create a strategic fit such that they will require few mutual 
adjustments to sustain collaborative effectiveness and reduce the costs of coordination 
(Whetten, 1981; Harrigan, 1985; Parkhe, 1991). 
Empirically, evidence has been found of a negative relationship between JV partner 
asymmetry and JV performance on a wide range of dimensions. For example, Parkhe (1991, 
1993) found evidence that differences in partner nationality and culture negatively affect the 
                                                 
2 It has to be noted than in some cases symmetry may also be detrimental for collaboration. For example, 
business or product relatedness may increase the probability of unwanted transfers of intellectual property or of 




success of alliances. Barkema, Shenkar, Bell and Vermeulen (1997) found similar effects of 
cultural distance on JV survival. Others have focused on variations in corporate, rather than 
national, culture between JV partners and have also found a negative relationship between 
asymmetry and performance (e.g., Killing, 1982). Harrigan (1988a) observed that 
asymmetries in terms of strategic direction are negatively related to JV performance. Shenkar 
and Zeira (1992) found that role conflict and ambiguity increase as the partners in a JV differ 
more. Finally, Gulati and Wang (2003) found that similarity in the core businesses of the JV 
partners contributes positively to JV performance. 
If we extend this logic to prior JV experience, we expect symmetric levels of 
experience to be beneficial and lead to more value creation. The importance of symmetry in 
the levels of experience of JV partners has been suggested by Harrigan (1985, 1988a) who 
found that experience symmetry is positively related to JV duration. 
As discussed above, prior experience leads to the creation of an alliance capability 
which allow for better management of the JV (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000). However, one 
partner having experience is not sufficient for successful cooperation. Each of the partners 
also has to be able to understand the other (Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001). Prior JV experience 
and alliance capabilities are not distributed evenly across firms (Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath, 
2002). Accordingly, partners which differ more in their levels of prior experience will also 
differ more in their ability to manage the various phases or aspects of alliances, and to 
anticipate and respond to unforeseen contingencies (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and 
Singh, 2007). Such differences influence communication and co-ordination and increase the 
probability that misunderstandings and misinformation arises. The danger of 
misunderstanding and misinformation is that they detract significantly from the joint 
effectiveness of collaboration, unless considerable amounts of costly resources are dedicated 
to developing mutual understanding (Buckley and Casson, 1992). Likewise, Parkhe (1991) 
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argued that partners with less similar capabilities require relatively more mutual adjustment 
to be able to cooperate effectively. More specifically, JV partners with different experience 
levels will be less able to understand each other’s goals and priorities, communicate 
effectively, coordinate activities, and avoid or resolve conflict. 
The literature that has looked at collaboration at a more micro level provides similar 
arguments. Namely, several studies have shown that diversity in groups, in terms of team 
members’ levels of prior experiences, skills, abilities, etc, increases the likelihood of conflict 
and miscommunication, and requires additional coordination efforts for collaboration (e.g., 
Jackson, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999). Hence, these studies also suggest that large 
differences in prior experience will hamper collaboration.  
As a result, we expect that the JV would benefit less when the partners have a more 
asymmetric level of prior JV experience. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Asymmetry in the levels of the joint venture partners’ prior joint 
venture experience will be negatively related to the total value generated upon 
entering into a joint venture. 
 
Moderating the Effect of Experience Asymmetry 
Several factors might influence the negative relationship between experience 
asymmetry and the amount of value that is created in a joint venture. As discussed above, 
asymmetric levels of prior JV experience will make cooperation more difficult because the 
JVs partners’ routines and capabilities enabling them to manage the alliance will be less 
similar. We expect that in those JVs in which more intense cooperation is required, the 
problems resulting from asymmetric prior JV experience will be more profound. Hence, 
experience asymmetry should have a stronger negative impact on the total amount of value 




that may moderate the asymmetry-performance relationship, namely (1) the distribution of 
the JV’s ownership, (2) the scope of the activities of the JVs, (3) the cultural distance 
between the JV partners, and (4) the level of economic uncertainty surrounding the JV. We 
will now discuss each of these factors in detail and derive four hypotheses: 
Ownership Distribution: The issue of the way equity is distributed among the JV 
partners has been particularly important in the JV literature (Beamish and Banks, 1987). In 
general, ownership is seen as a primary mechanism of control (e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986). Furthermore, several studies have linked the internal structure of JVs to how the JV 
partners interact with each other. JVs can be split in two broad categories based on the 
distribution of their equity. On the one hand, there are JVs with balanced ownership in which 
each of the partners has a similar level of equity. This results in shared control of the JV. On 
the other hand, the ownership distribution in a JV can be unbalanced with one dominant 
partner having control over the JV (Gatingon and Anderson, 1988; Makino and Beamish, 
1998). 
Having absolute control in a JV simplifies decision-making and lowers the potential 
for conflict (Killing, 1983). Furthermore, decision-making in a JV becomes more complex 
and cumbersome when the partners are equally involved in the daily running of the JV as is 
the case in balanced JVs (Killing, 1980; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). Shared decision-making 
will also require additional coordination (Stopford and Wells, 1972; Killing, 1983). 
The increased levels of interaction between JV partners in balanced JVs should not 
necessarily lead to additional problems. When both partners have similar routines and 
capabilities, they should be able to cooperate without noteworthy problems. However, when 
their routines and capabilities differ significantly, as is more likely to be the case when their 
prior JV experience differs, balanced ownership might cause additional problems. Hence, 
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balanced ownership will increase the challenges resulting from asymmetric prior JV 
experience. As a result, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A more unbalanced ownership structure will reduce the negative 
relationship between experience asymmetry and the total value generated upon 
entering into a joint venture. 
 
Joint Venture Scope: JVs differ in their scope, i.e. the extent to which their partners 
combine functions and activities within the JV (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). For example, JVs 
can perform manufacturing, marketing, R&D, service activities or any combinations of these. 
An increase in the scope of a JV increases the interdependence, complexity and uncertainty 
of collaborating (Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 2002). Thus, we expect 
the need for additional coordination and interaction to be higher in JVs with a broader scope. 
This will make some of the problems that arise from asymmetric levels of prior JV 
experience more severe. Hence, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 4: A wider scope of joint venture activities will strengthen the negative 
relationship between experience asymmetry and the total value generated upon 
entering into a joint venture. 
 
Cultural Distance: When an organization expands abroad it will be confronted with 
an environment that is culturally different from that in its home country. The success of the 
foreign venture will depend on the cooperation and communication with local parties who 
tend to have different values, beliefs, and customs (Hofstede, 2001). Lack of knowledge of 




Pennings, 1996). With increased cultural distance the partners face increased communication 
problems, are more likely to have different goals, and are more likely to have a more negative 
attitude towards each other (Weber, Shenkar and Raveh, 1996). While such cultural 
differences indeed represent severe challenges for the firm initiating expansion abroad and 
for the local firm, they can be resolved by increased interaction and communication between 
the JV partners. Thus, the ability to communicate and interact with each other becomes even 
more important in cross-cultural JVs than in domestic partnerships. As we argued in 
hypothesis 2, effective cooperation between JV partners is already hampered when they have 
asymmetric levels of prior JV experience. However, the additional need for cooperation as a 
result of a greater cultural distance will amplify the issues resulting from experience 
asymmetry. Therefore, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Cultural distance will strengthen the negative relationship between 
experience asymmetry and the total value generated upon entering into a joint 
venture. 
 
Economic Uncertainty: An important host country factor that has an impact on the 
value of an investment is economic uncertainty. This refers to the uncertainty about the 
macroeconomic situation in a host country and encompasses all the unknowns about the level 
of economic activity and prices (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1987). More economic uncertainty 
results in higher variability in the investor’s cash flows and in the value of the investment and 
the conditions surrounding the investment. As a result, it will lead to a higher likelihood of 
renegotiation of the JV terms and will require additional coordination between the partners to 
adjust to the changing circumstances (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). The additional need for joint 
adjustments as a result of higher economic uncertainty will amplify difficulties of cooperating 
resulting from experience asymmetry. Hence, we expect: 
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Hypothesis 6: A higher level of economic uncertainty surrounding the joint venture 
will strengthen the negative relationship between experience asymmetry and the total 
value generated upon entering into a joint venture. 
 
The Distribution of the Value Created 
So far we have argued that combined JV experience and experience symmetry will 
have a positive effect on the total value created from the deal, and that the latter effect will be 
contingent on alliance and environmental circumstances. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that all the partners involved in the JV benefit from experience, or that they all benefit 
to the same extent. The total value that is created via a JV has to be distributed between the 
JV partners. 
Although research has shown that JVs create value for the partners on average (e.g., 
McConnell and Nantell, 1985), several studies also indicated that there is significant 
heterogeneity in the outcomes of JVs for each of the JV partners. For example, McConnell 
and Nantell (1985) found that around 33% of all JV partners earned negative returns, while 
Gulati and Wang (2003) observed a portion of 46% with negative returns. Furthermore, 
Kumar (2007, 2010) found evidence of asymmetric wealth gains and wealth transfers 
between JV partners. 
The immediate outcome of the deal is largely determined by ex ante negotiations 
between the parties involved (Rao and Schmidt, 1998). Negotiations are a crucial part of 
creating JV deals, as firms that want to cooperate have to decide on a number of issues - such 
as the duties and obligations of the partners, mechanisms to make future changes in the terms 
of the JV, mechanisms to dispute resolution, and the division of profits (Campbell and Reuer, 




when the terms of the JV are renegotiated over the life of the JV (Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 
2002). Rao and Schmidt (1998) emphasized the importance of taking into account the 
attributes of both parties as well as the transaction between them, when studying the JV 
negotiation and its outcome. Hence, in order to get more insight into the way the value 
created in a JV is distributed between the partners it is important to understand how the 
experience of both parties affects the negotiation process and its outcome. 
As discussed above, prior collaborative experience allows for the development of 
partnering skills which subsequently allow firms to collaborate in a more effective manner 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000). More specifically, higher levels of collaborative prior experience 
result in improvements in a firm’s JV negotiation skills, the design of a JV, and the post-
formation management (Kale and Singh, 2007). Where there is significant heterogeneity in 
firms’ levels of prior JV experience and thereby in their partnering skills, these interfirm 
differences explain why some firms get more value out of their JVs (Anand and Khanna, 
2000). Similarly, Ireland, Hitt and Vaidynath (2002) argued that the asymmetric distribution 
of alliance capabilities, which result from a firm’s prior alliance experience, within an 
industry allows certain firms to exploit these capabilities as a source of competitive 
advantage over other firms in their industry. Although Anand and Khanna (2000) and Ireland, 
Hitt and Vaidyanath (2002) did not explicitly refer to asymmetry  in the levels of experience 
and alliance capabilities within an alliance, the logic that firms can exploit this asymmetry 
should also apply within alliances and JVs, particularly so because prior collaborative 
experience also results in improvements in JV negotiation skills (Kale and Singh, 2007). This 
suggests that firms with relatively more prior JV experience in a JV will be at a negotiating 
advantage over their less experienced partner, and thereby will be able to capture more value. 
The importance of the partners’ relative JV experience in determining who will 
capture the value created in the deal is further supported by findings from the negotiation, 
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game theory and experimental economics literatures (e.g., Thompson, 1990; Fudenberg and 
Levine, 1998). Research has shown that the distribution of outcomes of negotiations is 
influenced by the asymmetries in experience of the negotiating parties. Through experience 
negotiators learn strategies and skills, thus developing a capability they can use in future 
negotiations. These skills or strategies will be especially valuable to the negotiator in 
situations where their counterparty has not developed similar skills or capabilities. More 
precisely, Thompson (1990) showed that more experienced parties find themselves at an 
advantage over less experienced negotiators as the former are better able to accurately 
represent their opponent’s priorities and behavior. As a result, asymmetric experience allows 
the more experienced party in the negotiations to capture more value. 
Similarly, research in game theory and experimental economics has looked at the role 
of experience in a number of other situations involving strategic interaction. In line with 
Thompson’s findings, studies in these areas found that adaptive learning takes place and can 
be carried over to future games. This again allows more experienced players to capture more 
value as they are better able to anticipate the behavior of their opponent and subsequently 
adjust their own strategy based on this information and the feedback of previous games (e.g., 
Cooper, Garvin and Kagel, 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). In short, experience 
asymmetries influence the outcomes of a wide variety of situations involving strategic 
interaction - including but not limited to negotiations- and the behavior of the players 
involved. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The more experience a focal firm has relative to its partner, the more 








Testing the above hypotheses requires a sample of JVs in which the performance of 
both partners can be measured and compared. We obtained such a sample from Thomson 
Financial’s Security Data Corporation (SDC) database. This database has been used 
frequently in previous studies as it offers detailed information on firms’ investment activities, 
especially JVs (e.g., Reuer, Park and Zollo, 2002). For the purpose of this study we obtained 
data from SDC on JVs between two firms that are listed on one of the eight largest stock 
exchanges in terms of market capitalization.3 We opted to look at JVs between firms listed on 
these stock exchanges to ensure a sample of well-documented JVs with substantive but 
varying levels of prior JV experience. Furthermore, focusing on these stock exchanges with 
large trading volumes ensures that differences in the amount of value created by either 
partner are not attributable solely to differences across stock exchanges. After verifying the 
data – in particular the JV announcement date – using alternative sources such as Lexis-
Nexis, we found that SDC provided complete and accurate information on the 
announcements of 576 matching pairs of parents of JVs established between 1985 and 2006. 
Subsequently, we collected stock market data from Thomson Financial’s Datastream 
database in order to be able to calculate stock market returns and the amount of value 
generated for each parent upon JV announcement. 
Dependent Variable 
To calculate our dependent variables we follow the procedure initially developed by 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and since used several times in the strategy and 
                                                 
3 The eight largest stock exchanges in terms of market capitalization during the period of our sample are the 
New York Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, the London Stock Exchange, the Hong 
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international business literature (e.g., Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000; Seth, Song and Pettit, 
2002). 
Firstly, we use event study methodology to calculate the abnormal returns of both JV 
partners after the announcement of the JV. This methodology has been widely used in the 
finance and strategic management literature as it is particularly suited to capture the value 
implications of firms’ investment decisions (e.g., Park, 2004; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, 
Dyer and Singh, 2002). More specifically, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
using the market model with a 250-day estimation window and a 5-day event window 
centered around the event date. Both windows are consistent with prior studies which looked 
at the value implications of JVs (Cunha, 2005). We also check the robustness of our results to 
different specifications, including shorter event windows (up to the narrowest two-day 
windows). 
The use of abnormal returns to measure value creation and value distribution are 
suitable for our purpose for several reasons. Firstly, the abnormal returns from event studies 
allow us to capture all performance implications of a JV as they can be anticipated in a near-
instantaneous measurement window (e.g., Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 1969; Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinlay, 1997). Such an instantaneous measurement window is crucial for our 
purpose as we look at the value created and captured by both partners which requires 
comparable measures for each partner. Accounting measures such as ROA are not readily 
available to measure the performance implications of an individual JV and are subject to 
differences in accounting standards across countries. Secondly, studies have found that 
abnormal returns are strongly correlated with other performance measures where the latter are 
available. For example, Koh and Venkatram (1991) and Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) found a 





The CARs, as expressed in percentage terms, cannot simply be combined to calculate 
the total value that is created upon the announcement of the JV (hypotheses 1-6), nor can they 
be used to compare the value captured by each of the partners (hypothesis 7). The reason is 
that there might be size differences between partners: All else equal, a JV will have a smaller 
% impact on the value of a large firm than on that of a smaller firm. This can be resolved by 
using absolute amounts of the value created in U.S. dollars, rather than relative returns 
expressed as percentages (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000; 
Seth, Song and Pettit, 2002). 
Therefore, in a second step, we calculate the total value associated with the 
announcement of the JV in absolute terms. This equals the sum of the dollar values accruing 
in U.S. dollars to both parties. The value created by each of the partners can be calculated by 
multiplying the individual partner’s pre-announcement market value by its CARs during the 
event window. Hence, the total value created associated with the announcement of the JV can 





























A and B are the two partners in the JV, 
3−S  is the number of shares on day -3, 
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When structuring our data to test hypotheses 1 through 7 we had to decide who we 
allocated as partner (A) and partner (B) respectively. We opted to structure our sample in 
such a way that partner A is the partner with the highest level of prior JV experience of the 
two partners. Compared to a more random allocation, this facilitates the interpretation of our 
results. 
Testing hypothesis 7 is complicated substantially by the fact that at least one of the 
partners in a given JV deal may have negative returns upon announcement – as indeed is 
common (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Kumar, 2007; Kumar, 2010). In these cases, 
dependent variables such as the ratio or difference between both partners’ returns, have no 
straightforward interpretation. Therefore, we opted to use a dependent variable which is not 
subject to these problems. More specifically, we calculated a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if , and zero otherwise. BA Created ValueCreated Value >
Independent Variables 
Prior JV Experience (H1): We measure the firms’ prior JV experience as the total 
number of JVs that both firms have been involved in during the 15-year period preceding the 
focal JV (Wang and Zajac, 2007). The results are robust to the use of alternative periods. 
Furthermore, our results are very similar when we use an experience measure that has been 
log-transformed. 
Experience Asymmetry (H2): We measure experience asymmetry as the difference 
between each partner’s number of prior JVs. More specifically, we subtract the number of 
prior JVs of partner (B) from the number of prior JVs of partner (A). 
Unbalanced Ownership (H3): We measure the imbalance in the ownership 
distribution of the JV using the following equation: 




A higher score on this value implies a more unbalanced ownership distribution while a score 
of zero means that the two JV partners have equal equity shares. 
JV Scope (H4): Similar to several other studies (e.g., Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 2002), 
we measure the degree of scope in the activities of a JV using a count measure which 
captures the number of activities performed in the JV. This count measure increases with 
each of the following activities that are conducted in the JV: manufacturing, marketing, 
services, and R&D. 
Cultural Distance (H5): We measure cultural distance by using Kogut and Singh’s 
(1988) cultural distance index. This oft-used index is based on the difference between each of 
the partners’ home countries along Hofstede’s (2001) four initial cultural dimensions. A 
higher score on Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index implies greater cultural distance. 
Economic Uncertainty (H6): The degree of economic uncertainty is measured using 
the Euromoney country risk index. This oft-used index (e.g., Oxley, 1999) measures the 
economic uncertainty of a country at a particular time on a scale from 0 to 100 based on three 
types of indicators, namely credit indicators (e.g., payment records), analytical indicators 
(e.g., economic performance forecasts), and market indicators (e.g., selldown performance). 
The index comprises a mix of market perception and objective measures. 
Control Variables: When testing for the total value created, we control for a number 
of additional factors. Firstly, we control for the relatedness between both JV partners with a 
dummy variable which equals one when both parties are active in the same 4-digit SIC code 
(Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). We also control for the combined 
size of both firms measured as the sum of their respective market value before the JV 
announcement. Finally, we include fixed effects for each year in which the JVs were 
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announced4. For the models that look at value distribution we use the same controls or we 
take the equivalent partner level measures. Namely, we control for partner size differences, 
i.e. the difference between the pre-announcement market value of both partners instead of 
combined size. Furthermore, we control for the equity stake a partner has in the JV. 
Estimation 
We use ordinary least squares regression to test hypotheses 1 though 6. In hypothesis 
7 we are interested in the value distribution between the JV partners.  To test hypothesis 7, 
we use a Logit regression which accommodates for a binary dependent variable. The general 
formulation of such a model is (Greene, 2003): 
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where is the probability a focal firm captures more value than its partner, and
 is the vector of all explanatory variables. 
( 1=iYP )





Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations can be found in Table 1. Table 1 shows 
that the mean total value created (combining both parties absolute returns in $ terms) is 
approximately $50 million. The value created by the individual partners is on average about 
$25 million. Hence, on average JVs are creating value but approximately 47% of all JV 
partners earn negative returns. These results are in line with recent research (e.g., Kumar, 
2007; Kumar, 2010). They are also robust to alternative event windows. 
 
4 In order to check the robustness of our results, we also ran our models using fixed effects for the industry in 
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Table 1 also shows that both JV partners combined have on average been involved in 
nearly 14 JVs before the focal JV. This comes down to about 6.8 prior JVs for each 
individual partner. The correlations do not suggest that collinearity might be a problem, and a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis confirms this. 
Value Creation 
The results of the models to test hypotheses 1 through 6 are reported in Table 2. After 
including only our control variables in Model 1, we add both partners’ prior JV experience in 
and the level of experience asymmetry between partners in Model 2. Subsequently, we 
introduce each of the individual interaction terms in Models 3 through 6. Finally, we include 
all the interaction terms simultaneously in Model 7. The F-statistics show that every model is 
significant relative to an intercept-only model. 
Among the control variables, combined parents size, unbalanced ownership and 
economic uncertainty are significant (p<.001). Hence, the larger the combined size of the JV 
partners, the more value is created. Furthermore, we find that the more unbalanced the 
ownership distribution between both partners the more total value is created through the JV. 
The positive effect of unbalanced ownership is consistent with the literature that has argued 
that unbalanced ownership makes it easier to make decisions and reduces the potential for 
conflict, thus resulting in more stable and long-lived JVs (e.g., Killing, 1983). Higher levels 
of economic uncertainty seem to result in less value creation. This is consistent with 
Merchant and Schendel (2000). 
The results of Model 2 are consistent with hypothesis 1. Namely, we find a positive 
and significant relationship (p<.001) between the cumulative prior JV experience of both JV 
partners and the total amount of value that is generated through a JV. Similarly, we find in 
Model 2 that the experience asymmetry is negatively and significantly (p<.001) related to the 
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include the interaction between experience asymmetry and unbalanced ownership. As 
predicted in hypothesis 3, the interaction between these two variables is positive and 
statistically significant (p<.01). The results in Model 5, 6 and 7, are consistent with 
hypotheses 4, 5 and 6. Namely, we find negative and significant relationships (p<.05) 
between the interaction of experience asymmetry and JV scope and the amount of value that 
is created. Similarly, we find that the interaction between experience asymmetry and cultural 
distance (p<.10), and the interaction between experience asymmetry and economic 
uncertainty (p<.001) are both negative and significant. Finally, Model 8 includes measure of 
all interaction terms simultaneously. This does not substantively change the results, though 
the significance of the interaction between experience asymmetry and JV scope (p<.01), and 
the interaction between experience and cultural distance (p<.05) are higher. 
An examination of the practical magnitudes of the hypothesized effects confirms the 
statistically significant results. A JV where the partners have one additional JV’s worth of 
experience will generate almost an additional $5 million in value. Similarly, one extra JV of 
experience asymmetry between both JV partners will destroy about $6 million. 
To facilitate the interpretation of our findings and their economic magnitude, we have 
plotted the effects of our four interaction terms on total value created in Figures 1a-1d. 
following the procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991). More specifically, we 
plotted the relationship between experience asymmetry and the amount of value that is 
created through a JV over the entire observed range of experience asymmetry, with separate 
lines representing different levels of unbalanced ownership (Figure 1a), JV scope (Figure 1b), 
cultural distance (Figure 1c), and economic uncertainty (Figure 1d), respectively. The plotted 
lines represent the expected amount of value created on the basis of the unstandardized 
regression coefficients from each of the respective models with an individual interaction 
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uncertainty lines represent values of one standard deviation below the mean of these variables 
while the high unbalanced ownership, JV scope, cultural distance, and economic uncertainty 




supports our hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 and indicate that our results have a substantial 
economic impact of the total value that is created in JVs. 
The Distribution of the Value Created between the JV Partners 
In hypothesis 7 we argue that the distribution of the total value created by the JV 
between both partners will depend on the level of asymmetry in their respective prior JV 
experience. To test our hypothesis we use a dependent variable which equals 1 when partner 
A captures more value than partner B, and zero otherwise. 
The Logit results to test hypothesis 7 are reported in Table 3. Model 8 represents a 
baseline model including all control variables, while Model 9 includes our experience 
variables. The coefficients of the control variables remain stable when experience asymmetry 
is added to the model though none significant are except partner relatedness (p<.05) in either 
model. 
In model 9 we find a positive and significant (p<.01) relationship between the level of 
experience asymmetry and our dependent variable. Hence, the more experience a focal firm 
has compared to its partner, the more likely the focal firm will be the partner who captures 
most of the value that is created in the JV. This is consistent with our hypothesis 7. 
Practically, a firm whose experience exceeds that of its partner by an additional standard 
deviation’s worth of JV experience will see its probability to be the partner that captures most 
value increase by over 30%. Hence, our results are both statistically and practically 
significant. 
Overall, we can conclude that the level of experience asymmetry does not only play a 
role in determining how much value is created through a JV, but also determines how the 
value that is created is distributed among the JV partners. 
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In this paper, we sought to increase our understanding of how firms create and capture 
value in JVs by looking simultaneously at both partners’ prior JV experience. This paper 
provides evidence on the impact of prior JV experience on both value creation and value 
capturing. More specifically, we find that higher levels of the partners’ combined prior JV 
experience increase the total value that is created through JVs (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, 
we find that what matters is not only absolute levels of experience matter; it also matters 




create substantially less values when they are formed between partners whose prior 
experience levels differ considerably from each other. However, our results also suggest that 
the negative impact of experience asymmetry on total value created is contingent on a 
number of factors both internal and external to the JV. Namely, we find that experience 
asymmetry is less problematic when the ownership distribution of equity in the JV is more 
unbalanced (hypothesis 3). We also find that JV scope (hypothesis 4), cultural distance 
(hypothesis 5), and economic uncertainty (hypothesis 6) strengthen the negative effect of 
experience asymmetry on total JV value creation. Finally, we demonstrate that the 
distribution of the total value created by the deal between partners depends on the symmetry 
in their prior JV experience (hypothesis 7). More specifically, we find that the more 
experience a focal partner has relative to the other partner, the more likely the focal firm is to 
be the partner who captures most value from the JV. 
Overall, our model and results demonstrate the importance of both partners’ 
experience and the asymmetry between their levels of prior JV experience. We show that 
experience asymmetry has substantive main effects on the total value created as well as on 
the distribution of value between both partners upon JV announcement. These effects have 
been largely ignored in previous research. As a result, this study makes a number of 
contributions to both the JV and organizational learning literatures. 
First, we advance research on JVs by distinguishing between value creation and value 
capturing and assessing both simultaneously. Most studies have investigated either the wealth 
gains of individual partners, or in a few rare cases the total value that is created (e.g., Koh and 
Venkatraman; 1991). However, without considering value creation and appropriation 
simultaneously, it remains unclear whether higher gains for individual partners can be 
attributed to a JV which created more value, or to the partner’s ability to appropriate more 
value at the expense of its partners. This study pushes the JV literature forward by 
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demonstrating that value creation and value capturing effects are both substantive, and 
furthermore that these two effects are driven by different factors and mechanisms. In 
particular, we find that experience asymmetry has opposite effects on value creation and on 
value appropriation. This shows that this refinement is important as we cannot have an 
accurate understanding of how firms benefit from cooperation by looking at either value 
creation or value appropriation in isolation. Our findings reinforce a few prior studies which 
suggest that firms benefit asymmetrically from interfirm collaboration when JV partners have 
different abilities and opportunities to extract value from collaborating (e.g., Gulati and 
Wang, 2003). Furthermore, the JV literature has established that partner fit along several 
dimensions affects JV success (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Geringer, 1991; Luo, 1997; 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). We contribute to the JV literature by adding an 
important dimension of fit – that in the prior experience levels of the JV partners. 
Second, our study has substantive implications for research on organizational learning 
as we look not only at the experience effects of individual partners, but also at how 
asymmetries in prior experience levels matter. Experience asymmetries between ostensibly 
cooperative firms have been largely overlooked in the learning literature. We offer new 
insights by showing under what conditions such asymmetries matter, and how they can be a 
substantial source of value creation and value capturing. 
Furthermore, we provide evidence that experiential learning leads to value creation in 
JVs. Despite the growing body of research in this area, no consensus on the role of 
experience and learning in collaborative settings has been reached as previous studies yielded 
mixed empirical results. Previous research has found positive experience effects on JV 
performance (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000), has failed to find such effects (e.g., Barkema, 
Shenkar, Vermeulen and Bell, 1997) or has found negative effects (e.g., Reuer, Park and 




their focus on wealth gains of individual partners and/or the experience of individual partners 
– are at the basis of some of the confusing results in the literature. After dealing with these 
issues by looking at both partners’ prior JV experience and total value creation, we find 
convincing evidence in support of a positive relationship between prior JV experience and 
value creation in subsequent JVs. 
Finally, our findings have substantive practical implications for managers of firms 
looking to enter into JVs. The negative effect of experience asymmetry entails that firms 
should take this into account when searching for and evaluating a potential partner. However, 
having a more similar level of previous JV experience will not necessarily lead to the best 
outcome in terms of capturing more value. Hence, firms face a trade-off in dealing with two 
opposing effects of experience maximization and asymmetry. This may determine whether 
maximizing the total value created in a deal also maximizes the amount of value that the focal 
firm can capture. Managers should deal with the dual role of information asymmetry while 
incorporating in their decisions that there is a positive effect of the JV partners’ absolute 
levels of prior JV experience on value creation. 
Further Research and Conclusion 
This study is not without limitations and several suggestions for further research can be 
made. Firstly, we study JVs between firms listed on the eight largest stock exchanges. Firms 
listed on these stock exchanges are characterized by high levels JV activity and have been the 
focus of numerous JV studies, which facilitates comparisons with previous research; 
however, future studies could fruitfully verify our results in other settings. Secondly, we look 
at experience in the broadest sense. Further studies could examine the impact of different 
types of experience. For instance, there may be differences between international and 
domestic JV experience (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen and Bell, 1997). Likewise, there may 
be differences between sectors, e.g., high-tech versus low-tech sectors. Furthermore, a 
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number of recent studies have shown that experience with one corporate development activity 
can spill over to other activities (e.g., Zollo and Reuer, 2008: Cuypers and Martin, 2008). 
Whether the effect of these spillovers is negative or positive is largely dependent on the 
cognitive distance or similarities between the activities (Zollo and Reuer, 2008). Therefore, it 
would be interesting to investigate how experience with other corporate development 
activities, such as M&As and non-equity alliances, influences how much value is created in 
JVs and how this value is distributed between the partners. 
Future research could also explore whether firms with more JV experience will be 
more likely to actively seek potential partners, and whether they prefer more or less 
experienced partners. A further implication of our results is that the matching of experience 
levels between JV partners requires attention in future research, as it stands to affect who 
deals with whom and with what consequences. 
Notwithstanding these limitations and remaining research avenues, our study 
increases the understanding of how firms can improve the likelihood of JV success by paying 
extra attention to both JV partners’ prior experience and to the effects that this will have both 
on the total value that is created and on how this value is distributed. Given the theory and 









MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTIBUTIONS 
  
 
During the last decades, we have witnessed an explosion in the number of JVs which 
has triggered considerable enthusiasm among scholars and practitioners. Numerous studies 
have contributed to our understanding of specific JV stages – from initial conditions, to JV 
terms and initial ownership, to subsequent adjustment and post-JV outcomes (sale, 
dissolution etc.). Nevertheless, we still observe that many JVs do not live up to their 
expectations.  
In the JV literature, two factors in particular, i.e. experience and uncertainty, have 
received considerable theoretical and empirical attention. Namely, various theoretical 
perspectives on JVs such as learning, transaction cost and real option theory provide different 
and sometimes even contradictory predictions about the roles of uncertainty and experience. 
Simultaneously, empirical studies have yielded mixed results regarding uncertainty and 
experience. These apparent theoretical contradictions, mixed empirical findings, and the fact 
that many JVs do not live up to their expectations, warranted further research. In the four 
essays of this dissertation I have contributed to the JV literature by improving our 
understanding of the roles of different types of uncertainty and experience on the successive 
stages in the lifecycle of a JV. 
In my second chapter, I provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real 
option literature on JVs. Firstly, I discuss several major alternative theoretical perspectives on 
JVs such as learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory. I argue that these 




use a more precise conceptualization of uncertainty by distinguishing between exogenous and 
endogenous sources of uncertainty. 
Secondly, I compare arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages and 
highlight research opportunities. I have highlighted the need for integrating the different 
stages of the JV’s life cycle. In doing so, I indicate a number of theoretical gaps and 
contradictions in the real option literature on JVs. Furthermore, I discuss and provide 
solutions to a number of empirical problems – the possibility of endogenous-selection biases 
and omitted variable biases - that may arise from the lack of integration in the existent 
literature. Finally, I outline several opportunities for future research by incorporating 
explanatory variables in a particular stage that previously have only been used in the context 
of another stage. 
Thirdly, I look at behavioral effects and how potential decision-making biases might 
lead to suboptimal investment behavior when making real option (JV) investments. More 
specifically, I distinguish between objective and perceived uncertainty and build on 
behavioral-decision theory to illustrate how a number of heuristics influence how managers 
perceive uncertainty and make real option investment. In doing so, I introduce additional 
realism in the use of real options, especially JVs. This refinement is all the more relevant as it 
can inform researchers about how practitioners use or misuse real options in practice. 
Overall, chapter 2 demonstrates that real option theory is an important perspective to 
study JVs for researchers in strategy and practitioners, and opens avenues for further research 
both in combining real option research with other theories, and in integrating what we know 
about different JV decisions and stages. 
In the third chapter, I examine empirically the boundaries of real option logic by 
distinguishing between forms of uncertainty which resolve endogenously versus 
exogenously. My results reveal that when uncertainty resolves exogenously, there is indeed a 
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negative relationship between economic uncertainty, local institutional uncertainty, and 
exchange rate uncertainty, respectively, and the foreign share in a JV. Hence, my results are 
consistent with real option predictions when it comes to exogenous uncertainty. I also 
examine endogenous sources of uncertainty by looking at the relationship between cultural 
uncertainty, uncertainty about development capabilities and scope-related uncertainty, 
respectively, and the foreign share in a JV. Using an appropriate technique to test null 
hypotheses, I find no support for the statistical relationship that would follow from a real 
option model. 
My findings have important implications for real option theory. I provide a 
framework that makes it possible to identify under what conditions an investment can truly be 
expected to represent a real option. In doing so, I advance our understanding of the boundary 
conditions for real option theory. Namely, my results provide evidence that real option logic 
is applicable when uncertainty resolves exogenously, but not when it resolves endogenously. 
Although a wide range of investments has been classified as real option investments and as 
appealing as using real options metaphorically may be, this should only be done while 
keeping carefully in mind what sources of uncertainty the option is meant to hedge, and 
whether the uncertainty resolves endogenously. 
The implications of my findings for joint venture research are substantive too. The 
determinants of the ownership distribution of JVs have received relatively little less attention 
in the JV literature and have produced comparatively disappointing empirical results. My 
results confirm that a real option perspective can be useful in modeling equity share decisions 
in JVs, although I show that this is only true when uncertainty resolves exogenously. Hence, 
this demonstrates that there is a conditional effect of uncertainty on JV ownership, thus 




need for and the rewards from a more precise conceptualization of uncertainty in the JV 
literature. 
In the fourth chapter, I look at the evolution of international subsidiaries. More 
specifically, I provide evidence that firms often have ownership level in their subsidiaries 
which are misaligned with the levels of uncertainty they face in the external environment. 
This has important implications for the evolution of these subsidiaries, as I show that firms 
adapt their ownership levels to reduce the degree of misalignment. Moreover, I observe and 
explain why some firms adapt their ownership levels faster than others. My arguments and 
findings make several contributions. 
Firstly, I provide evidence of different types of learning – namely, differences 
between general JV learning and JV adaptation learning, and between vicarious and 
experiential learning. Secondly, I reveal a complex relationship between a firm’s prior 
experience and the dynamics of subsequent subsidiaries. Namely, my results highlight three 
different but complementary effects of experience contingent on the type of experience and 
the stage in the life-cycle of the subsidiary: (1) vicarious learning has a substituting effect at 
formation which reduces the need for post-formation adjustments and thereby results in more 
stable subsidiaries, (2) experiential learning has a post-formation facilitating effect and (3) a 
experiential learning has a momentum effect at formation, which both result in ultimately 
more unstable subsidiaries. This highlights the importance of differentiating between the 
source and type of knowledge firms accumulate in their international subsidiaries. 
My findings also contribute to the international business and strategy literatures on 
subsidiary dynamics. Firstly, I show that uncertainty in the external environment is a key 
determinant of subsidiary dynamics. Firms indeed align their initial ownership levels with the 
external environment. Secondly, contrary to most previous studies I look at incremental 
ownership changes during the life of a subsidiary. This offers new insights and reveals that 
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firms adjust their ownership levels to re-align with the external environment. However, I find 
that impact of changes in the external environment on ownership misalignment and 
subsidiary instability is contingent on the direction of the change. While instability is often 
considered to be an indication of failure, the re-aligning adaptations in the ownership levels 
of subsidiaries can be considered positive. 
In the fifth chapter, I extend research on the link between prior JV experience and the 
amount and distribution of the value generated by the JV. My results show that the prior JV 
experiences of each of the JV partners, and the level of asymmetry in their respective JV 
experience, have an impact on value creation and value appropriation. Namely, higher levels 
of the partners’ combined prior JV experience increase the total value that is created through 
JVs while asymmetry in the partners’ levels of prior JV experience decreases the total value 
that is created. Furthermore, my results suggest that the negative impact of experience 
asymmetry on total value created is contingent on a number of factors both internal and 
external to the JV. Finally, I demonstrate that the distribution of the total value created by the 
deal between partners depends on the symmetry in their prior JV experience. More 
specifically, I find that the more experience a focal partner has relative to its partner, the more 
likely the focal firm is to be the partner who captures most value from the JV. 
These findings have important implications for both the JV and learning literatures. 
Firstly, I further advance research on JVs by distinguishing between value creation and value 
capturing and assessing both simultaneously. Because past research typically examined one 
effect to the exclusion of the other, it remained unclear whether higher gains for individual 
partners can be attributed to a JV which created more value or to the partner’s ability to 
appropriate more value at the expense of its partners. I demonstrate that value creation and 
value capture demand different explanations, as for instance experience asymmetry has 




Secondly, my findings also have substantive implications for research on 
organizational learning. I do not only look at experience effects of individual partners in 
isolation, but also at how asymmetries in prior experience levels matter. Experience 
asymmetries between ostensibly cooperative firms have been largely overlooked in the 
learning literature. I offer new insights by showing under what conditions such asymmetries 
matter, and how they can be a substantial source of value creation and value capturing. 
Furthermore, I provide evidence that experiential learning leads to value creation in JVs. 
Overall, besides making a number of individual contributions, the four studies which 
comprise this dissertation also make a broader contribution to the JV literature by adding to 
our understanding of how different types of uncertainty and experience influence the different 
stages of the life-cycle of a JV. In chapter 2, I address this by distinguishing between, 
respectively, endogenous and exogenous uncertainty, and objective and perceived 
uncertainty, and by showing how each of these types of uncertainty influence several of the 
major stages of the life-cycle of a JV. In chapter 3, I build on the distinction between 
exogenous and endogenous uncertainty and show that only exogenous sources of uncertainty 
determine the distribution of equity stakes in JVs at formation. Again this highlights that a 
more accurate conceptualization of uncertainty leads to new insights. In chapter 4, I look at 
how firms adapt their ownership levels in foreign subsidiaries when they are misaligned with 
the levels of uncertainty in the environment surrounding the subsidiary. I use the model from 
chapter 3 to determine the optimal level of ownership for a foreign investor given the levels 
of exogenous uncertainty surrounding the subsidiary. Furthermore, I show how shifts in the 
same sources of uncertainty which were of interest in chapter 3 influence subsidiary stability. 
Finally, in chapter 5, I look at the effects of prior JV experience and experience asymmetry 
on value creation and appropriation. I also show that several of the sources of uncertainty 
(scope, economic, and cultural uncertainty), which are also of interest in chapter 3, moderate 
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the effect of experience asymmetry on value creation regardless of whether they are 
exogenous or endogenous. All in all, these four essays contribute significantly to our 
understanding of the role of different types of uncertainty and experience on JV formation, 
stability and performance. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The essays in this dissertation offer several opportunities for future research. In the 
second chapter I highlight important research opportunities and provide a number of testable 
propositions. However, several of these propositions remain untested in this dissertation. 
Therefore, a promising avenue for future research is the empirical examination of these 
effects I have not tested yet. A particularly interesting starting point for future research may 
be the distinction between objective and perceived uncertainty. Overall, the literature on JVs 
has usually conceptualized and measured uncertainty as being objective. However, in reality 
managers make their JV decisions based on their subjective perceptions of uncertainty. 
Therefore, it is important to consider how uncertainty is perceived by managers to explain 
more accurately how they make and manage their JV investments. This could also help to 
explain observed deviations from the normative predictions of several theories (e.g. real 
option, transaction cost, and learning theory). 
Secondly, I look at several major stages of the life-cycle of a JV. More specifically, I 
investigate how uncertainty and experience influence JV formation, stability, and 
performance. However, some JV aspects remain largely unexplored in this dissertation. For 
example, it would be interesting to investigate how different types of uncertainty and 
experience drive JV partner selection. Also, we know relatively little about the consequences 




exit takes. Further research in these areas is all the more justified as these topics have 
received relatively little attention in the JV literature. 
Finally, I only look at one particular type of investments, namely the JV. However, 
several of the issues I raise and of the theoretical arguments I make should be generalizable at 
least to some extent to other types of investments. For example, the distinction I make in 
chapter 5 between value creation and value appropriation should also be relevant in an M&A 
context. This distinction should also be crucial to understanding the outcomes of M&As. Yet, 
it remains largely unexplored in the M&A literature. Future research could therefore 
investigate whether distinguishing between value creation and value appropriation 
mechanisms sheds light the conditions under which acquirers and/or targets benefit from 
M&As. Similarly, the distinction between exogenous and endogenous uncertainty that I make 
in chapters 2 and 3 should be relevant for investments other than JVs, as the theoretical 
arguments hold regardless of the type of real option investment. Thus, it would be interesting 
to look at the effects of these two types of uncertainty in the context of other real option 
investments, such as applying for patents or founding new businesses. In so doing, however, 
the results of chapter 3 show that it is important to understand what sources of uncertainty are 
genuinely exogenous in each context. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken: een inleiding, vier gerelateerde studies en een 
conclusie. Er bestaan veel toetredingsvormen zoals export, joint ventures (JVs) en 100% 
dochterondernemingen. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik hoe verschillende soorten 
onzekerheid en ervaring de verschillende fases in de levenscyclus van een JV beïnvloeden. 
Om de invloed van deze factoren te bestuderen maak ik gebruik van verschillende 
theoretische stromingen zoals learning, transaction cost, en reële optie theorie. 
 
In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk 2) geef ik een gedetailleerd overzicht van de bestaande 
literatuur betreffende JVs en reële opties. Hiermee lever ik drie bijdragen aan de huidige 
literatuur. Allereerst kijk ik naar verschillende alternatieve theorieën zoals learning, 
bargaining, transaction cost, en agency theory en bespreek ik hoe deze theorieën reële optie 
theorie aanvullen. Vervolgens integreer ik een aantal argumenten die tot op heden enkel 
gebruikt zijn om naar één enkele fase van de levenscyclus van een JV te kijken met de 
bedoeling om de integratie  binnen de reële optie literatuur te bevorderen. Tenstotte bestudeer 
ik hoe de subjectieve waarneming van onzekerheid een invloed heeft op hoe managers 
investeringen in reële opties doen. Gebaseerd op deze bevindingen suggereer ik verschillende 
mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
 
In de tweede studie (hoofdstuk 3) onderzoek ik empirisch de grenzen van reële optie theorie. 
Ik argumenteer dat exogene soorten onzekerheid een invloed hebben op het aandeel dat 
buitenlandse investeerders nemen in buitenlandse JVs. Ik verwacht echter geen invloed van 
endogene soorten onzekerheid. Ik test mijn hypotheses op data over 6472 JVs in China die 
opgericht zijn tussen 1979 en 1996. Mijn resultaten tonen aan dat reële optie theorie van 
toepassing is wanneer onzekerheid exogeen is maar niet wanneer onzekerheid endogeen is. 
Deze bevindingen dragen bij tot een meer accuraat gebruik van reële optie theorie in de 
praktijk. 
 
In mijn derde studie (hoofdstuk 4) kijk ik naar de determinanten van JV instabiliteit. Ik 
verwacht dat bedrijven hun aandeel in hun buitenlandse dochterondernemingen aanpassen 
wanneer hun aandeel niet meer in overeenstemming is met de externe omgeving van de 
dochteronderneming. Verder argumenteer ik dat verschillende soorten ervaringen een 
verschillend effect hebben op de stabiliteit van JVs. Gebruikmakende van data over Japanse 
buitenlandse dochterondernemingen, vind ik bewijs voor mijn hypotheses.   
 
In de vierde en laatste studie (hoofdstuk 5) bestudeer ik hoe bedrijven waarde kunnen creëren 
of eigenmaken in hun JVs. Ik maak een theoretisch onderscheid tussen het creëren van 
waarde en het eigenmaken van waarde. Aan de hand van dit onderscheid argumenteer ik dat 
asymmetrische hoeveelheden ervaring tussen beide moederbedrijven in een JV een negatieve 
impact hebben op de creatie van waarde, maar positief zijn voor het meer ervaren 
moederbedrijf als het op het eigenmaken van waarde aankomt. Mijn resultaten gebaseerd op 
de analyse van 76 JVs bevestigen mijn hypotheses. 
 
Als een geheel dragen mijn vier studies bij tot de literatuur door het verdiepen van onze 
kennis over hoe verschillende soorten onzekerheid en ervaringen een invloed hebben op 
verschillende aspecten van JVs, zoals hun structuur, stabiliteit en rendement. 
